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The World Summit on the Information Society - WSIS -
was the largest single activity in international discus-
sion of information and communication technologies
(ICTs) during the past ten years – at least in scale. It
absorbed a great deal of time and other resources of
international organisations, governments, civil society
organisations and businesses over a four-year period
(2001-2005). It produced four documents setting out
aspirations for the information society. It provided a
framework for international debate on infrastructure fi-
nance and Internet governance. But it received only lim-
ited public attention and failed to bridge the paradigm
gap between the worlds of information technology and
international development.
This report summarises a study of developing country and
civil society participation and influence in WSIS that was
commissioned by the Association for Progressive Commu-
nications (APC). As well as analysing participation, the
study looked at the impact of WSIS on international ICT
Introduction
decision-making in general and makes recommendations
to all main actors about how future decision-making might
become more inclusive of developing countries, non-gov-
ernmental actors and their concerns. In particular, it revis-
its the conclusions of the “Louder Voices” report on de-
veloping country involvement in decision-making, pub-
lished at the G8 summit in 2002, which identified a series
of weaknesses in both international organisations and
national policymaking processes which contributed to
poor participation – and it asks how these have and have
not changed as a result of WSIS.
This study drew on five main sources of evidence:
• Participant observation of the WSIS process through-
out its four-year period, by the principal author, David
Souter, and research associate, Abiodun Jagun
• Desk research, particularly the documentation pro-
duced within the WSIS process by all stakeholders,
including developing countries and civil society
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• Questionnaires and interviews with many individual
participants in WSIS preparatory committees
(PrepComs) and in the two summit sessions (Geneva,
2003; Tunis, 2005)
• Detailed interviews with forty key actors in the WSIS
process
• Case studies of experience in five developing coun-
tries - Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya.
This executive summary briefly summarises the main is-
sues, conclusions and recommendations of the report. It
does not include all of the issues covered in the main re-
port that follows.
The WSIS story
The origins of WSIS lay in a decision taken, without de-
bate, at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)’s
1998 Plenipotentiary Conference, calling on the ITU to or-
ganise a world summit on the information society. It is
doubtful if ITU delegates expected this to be a global sum-
mit of the kind which the United Nations holds regularly
on different issues, but that is what WSIS became when it
won the backing of other UN agencies.
There is a standard process for the organisation of world
summits. The summit meeting itself is the last stage of a
prolonged process of negotiation, and is primarily an op-
portunity for heads of state and government to make public
statements and commit their countries to a formal decla-
ration. The real work takes place in complex discussions
over the previous year or two, in a series of regional meet-
ings and preparatory committees (or PrepComs). These are
where the text that is eventually signed is hammered out,
and in which disputes are either resolved or shelved.
WSIS mostly followed this standard structure, but its or-
ganisation differed from the standard model in two main
ways.
Firstly, it was organised in two phases - one two-year phase
leading to the first summit meeting in Geneva in Decem-
ber 2003, another to the second summit meeting in Tunis
in November 2005. This was justified as an opportunity to
devote separate discussions to (firstly) principles and (sec-
ondly) implementation - though the underlying reason was
failure to choose between two willing hosts. There were
therefore five regional meetings during the first phase and
four during the second; as well as three full PrepComs and
a number of additional meetings in each phase.
Secondly, WSIS was organised by a technical agency of
the United Nations, the ITU, rather than by the UN’s cen-
tral organisation. This was not uncontroversial. The “in-
formation society” includes wide-ranging cultural and de-
velopmental issues which many considered the responsi-
bility of agencies like UNESCO and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) rather than the techno-
cratic ITU. An underlying tension between broader devel-
opment goals and goals of the ICT sector lasted through-
out WSIS. Some within the ITU also saw the summit as an
opportunity for it to redesign itself and broaden its man-
date from telecommunications to wider information tech-
nology and information society issues. This was opposed
by some ITU members, other international agencies and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
The first phase of WSIS, up to the Geneva summit in 2003,
developed two general texts - a Declaration of Principles
and a Plan of Action. These texts were agreed in negotia-
tions between governments, though other stakeholders
sought to influence them with varying degrees of success.
The Declaration sets out the summit’s (considerable) as-
pirations for the role of ICTs in transforming social and
economic life. The Plan of Action brings together many
different issues and identifies possible areas for interna-
tional action, together with suggested actions on which
agreement could be reached. These included targets re-
lated to the Millennium Development Goals.
A number of issues proved contentious during the first
phase, including the right of non-governmental stakehold-
ers to take part in WSIS negotiations, and issues concern-
ing information and communication rights (particularly
their relationship to fundamental agreements such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Two issues, how-
ever, proved intractable and were referred to separate fora
established by the UN Secretary-General, which met be-
tween the first and second WSIS phases.
• The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM) was
initially concerned with a proposal to establish a Dig-
ital Solidarity Fund (DSF), supported by many African
governments, but opposed by donors. Its remit ex-
tended, however, to ICT infrastructure finance in gen-
eral, and its conclusions were mostly concerned with
this. The TFFM worked along conventional UN task force
lines, in which limited representatives of interested par-
ties reviewed issues on the basis of consultants’ reports.
• The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)
was concerned with anxieties expressed, primarily by
developing countries, about the way the Internet op-
erated – in particular, the perception that critical as-
pects of the Internet (particularly the Internet Corpo-
ration for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN),
which governs domain identities, and the root server
system) were ultimately controlled by the United
States, rather than a conventional international or in-
ter-governmental forum. It adopted innovative work-
ing methods, in which a wide range of participants from
the whole range of stakeholder groups worked to-
gether to resolve differences and establish a common
frame of reference for further negotiations.
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The second phase of WSIS agreed not to reopen discussion
of the first phase texts and so was almost entirely concerned
with these two deferred issues and with the question of fol-
low-up activity. In practice, issues of infrastructure finance
were resolved relatively quickly, and the final year of the
WSIS process was overwhelmingly concerned with Internet
governance. Both issues are described further below.
The final outputs of the WSIS process were two further
documents, the Tunis Commitment, reiterating the first
summit’s conclusions, and the Tunis Agenda, drawing out
the second summit’s conclusions on infrastructure finance
and Internet governance and setting out follow-up proce-
dures for implementation.
The following sections of this summary in turn review the
findings of the APC WSIS study concerning the organisa-
tion of WSIS, the issues discussed, and the participation
of developing country and civil society actors in them.
The organisation of WSIS
Global summits are expensive ways of doing international
business. They require large investments in time and
money, especially for the governments of smaller coun-
tries and for non-governmental actors, and they raise high
expectations. Because they rely on global consensus, how-
ever, they often get bogged down in controversial detail
and are less likely to innovate than more informal fora.
They are usually thought to be best at forcing governments
to confront intractable problems of fundamental impor-
tance at the most senior level, but less good at develop-
ing strategies to meet new opportunities.
Kofi Annan’s view, expressed at the opening of the Geneva
summit, that “This summit is unique: where most global
conferences focus on global threats, this one will consider
how best to use a new global asset,” was, therefore, not
seen by everyone as positive. Although little voiced in pub-
lic at the time the UN General Assembly agreed to hold
WSIS, there was a good deal of scepticism amongst inter-
national officials and (particularly) industrial country gov-
ernments about the merits of a world summit on the infor-
mation society. Many others were concerned about the
cost - both in general and to their own organisations.
Many different interests therefore came together in the
WSIS process, and it was always going to be difficult for
the secretariat, managed by the ITU, and the summit proc-
ess as a whole to meet the different aspirations and ex-
pectations of different stakeholder groups. What implica-
tions did these factors have on the way in which different
stakeholders behaved and the summit itself evolved? The
study draws conclusions around this in four main areas.
Firstly, the interaction between WSIS and other decision-
making fora was poor. Although it did involve the ITU and
did address issues of Internet governance, it had very little
interaction with the actual decision-making work which the
ITU and Internet governance bodies engaged in during the
four years it took place, and it had even less interaction with
other significant international fora of importance to com-
munications (such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO)).
Prior international discourse on information, communica-
tions and development, such as the work of the G8 Digital
Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) and a variety of UN agen-
cies, did not greatly inform WSIS debates either. WSIS was
not, overall, seen as a significant decision-making body by
industrial countries, which were, by and large, represented
at a much lower level than developing countries in WSIS
processes and at the two summit meetings.
Secondly, the central role of the ITU had an important im-
pact on the nature of participation and discussion in WSIS.
The ITU is essentially a technical agency and had little ex-
pertise in the wider rights, development and political ques-
tions that profoundly affected discussions at WSIS. Al-
though it sought to address these weaknesses, and al-
though other UN agencies were also involved in overall
WSIS management, the fact that the ITU led the process
meant that governments tended to give lead responsibil-
ity for their own participation to ministries of communica-
tions rather than to central or developmental ministries.
WSIS therefore did very little to reduce the “paradigm gap”
between ICT specialists and mainstream development
communities which has become a significant concern for
the development community.
Thirdly, the two-phase approach failed to deliver. Rather than
enabling the discussion to move from principles in phase
one to implementation in phase two, agreement on the main
development and societal issues in phase one stifled fur-
ther discussion about them in phase two. Many important
developments in ICTs and their application in development
occurred in the four-year WSIS period, but these are barely
reflected in its final outcome documents. Many in develop-
ment agencies felt that these were already outdated as they
were agreed. Four years is, in any case, a long time to spend
discussing a sector as fast-moving as ICTs. Those who ar-
gue that the second phase was, in effect, a world summit
on Internet governance are not far from the mark; and the
limited nature of that outcome leaves a big question mark
over the merits of a two-phase summit. While some partici-
pants feel quite strongly that the two-phase approach fa-
cilitated networking and understanding among participants,
this was at high cost, and it is unlikely that the WSIS expe-
rience will encourage the UN to repeat it in future.
Finally, a number of important organisational issues arose
concerning the participation of non-governmental stake-
holders (the private sector and civil society), in the sum-
mit itself and in the two “interim fora”, the TFFM and the
WGIG. Multistakeholder principles were adopted in the
WSIS texts but contested in WSIS negotiations. The TFFM
and the WGIG adopted very different ways of working with
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different stakeholders. The WGIG’s very open approach to
non-governmental actors has been seen as a potential
model for future dialogue in other international issues – a
point discussed further below.
WSIS issues
WSIS meant different things to different people. Prima
facie, a World Summit on the Information Society might
have been expected to address issues of importance in
many aspects of all societies. The concept, after all, im-
plies a comprehensive transformation of society and
economy, comparable to that following the Industrial Revo-
lution. In practice, WSIS did not address the “Information
Society” on this grand scale but focused on a much nar-
rower range of issues - the relationship between ICTs and
fundamental rights, that between ICTs and development,
infrastructure finance and Internet governance. It paid
much more attention to developing countries than to in-
dustrial countries. At most, therefore, it might be called a
summit on aspects of the information society rather than
on the information society per se.
The relationship between information and fundamental
human rights was contested from the start of the WSIS
process when some governments sought to exclude ex-
plicit references to binding rights agreements from draft
WSIS texts. Although references to fundamental rights
were eventually included, the underlying tensions be-
tween freedom of expression and government authority
remained throughout the summit, and were put in
sharper focus by arguments over freedom of expression
in the second host country, Tunisia. The WSIS texts do
not discuss rights issues in any substance, and do not
address the potential which ICTs have for adjusting the
balance of rights and responsibilities between citizens
and governments.
The WSIS texts on the role of ICTs in development are also
disappointing. WSIS overall had a strongly pro-ICD (infor-
mation and communications in development) ethos, but
its texts do not reflect the fact that this ethos is not univer-
sally shared within the development community. While the
WSIS texts therefore emphasised the potential, as they
saw it, for ICTs to engender a step change in countries’
ability to overcome development challenges, the Millen-
nium Review Summit, held just a couple of months before
the Tunis summit, had almost nothing to say about ICTs in
its review of progress towards achieving the Millennium
Development Goals.
Many who work at the interface of ICTs and development
policy see this as an opportunity missed, and regret the
fact that WSIS failed to create a genuine dialogue between
ICT and development communities, or between ICD enthu-
siasts and sceptics. There are many reasons why this might
have happened. For reasons discussed above, WSIS was
attended by ICT professionals rather than development
specialists. Its overall ethos encouraged enthusiasts to
participate, and sceptics to stay away. The process used
to gather input for inclusion in the outcome documents
made it easier to construct lists of aspirations and desid-
erata than to analyse the evidence and draw priorities.
Summit statements often emphasise rhetoric over realism,
and avoid addressing issues of contention. The result, in
WSIS’ case, was text that reflected the views of ICD be-
lievers without addressing the concerns of sceptics.
This is not to say that WSIS did not build awareness and
understanding of the potential importance of ICTs in devel-
opment. Many in developing country governments, in par-
ticular, stress how much more familiar they became with
the issues as a result of exposure through WSIS and how
much more importance is now attached to them by their
governments. At the same time, however, WSIS did nothing
to convince multilateral agencies and bilateral donors of the
case for ICD. It has not led to widespread new commitments
in the ICD field, and some agencies have made reductions
on past engagement. It seems possible that WSIS may come
to be seen as the highpoint of ICD enthusiasm rather than a
stimulus to new development initiatives.
One exception to this conclusion is the area of infrastruc-
ture finance. The proposal for a Digital Solidarity Fund
during the first phase of the summit posed a significant
problem for donors since it sought a reallocation of devel-
opment finance outside the terms of the global develop-
ment consensus represented by the Monterrey Conven-
tion and the Millennium Development Goals. ICT infrastruc-
ture, in this consensus, was considered adequately ad-
dressed by the private sector, and to many in donor agen-
cies support for the DSF looked like an attempt to secure
funding for the ICT sector at the expense of other develop-
ment priorities (such as power, water, health and educa-
tion). The dispute here was almost enough to prevent
agreement on a draft text being reached before the first
phase summit opened its plenary session.
In this case, the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms de-
veloped an approach which recognised that access in some
geographical areas and some types of ICT infrastructure
could not be financed by the private sector alone and that
international and/or public finance would also be required.
This was accompanied by a move to support African ICT
infrastructure by the World Bank and the European Union,
and together these proved sufficient to enable global
agreement on the issue to be reached at an early stage in
the second phase of WSIS. The Digital Solidarity Fund pro-
posal was transformed into a small voluntary organisation.
A consensus, therefore, was quickly reached – with the
result that the significance of the shift in thinking about
infrastructure finance has been missed by many.
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No-one expected WSIS to be preoccupied by Internet gov-
ernance when the summit was first mooted. Some argue
that it was an issue waiting in the wings for the right occa-
sion to come along; others that its prominence was largely
the result of political factors concerning different coun-
tries’ relations with the United States. A central aspect of
the question is the fact that, almost uniquely in human
history, the Internet has become very important, very
quickly, with very little government or inter-governmental
involvement. For most governments, this was an anomaly
in need of resolution (though for some governments and
much of civil society and the private sector it was a posi-
tive factor that should be preserved). Here, then, were two
principal contests of authority: between governments and
non-governmental agencies, and between those govern-
ments perceived to have authority over the Internet world-
wide (principally the United States) and those feeling they
had none at home.
This issue remained highly politicised and contentious to
the very end of WSIS. Although substantial and consen-
sual, the WGIG’s report did not secure the same consen-
sus within WSIS as that of the TFFM. The final outcome –
compromises on “enhanced cooperation” within existing
Internet governance and the creation of an Internet Gov-
ernance Forum with substantial scope but insignificant
powers – left the issues largely in the air. One way of look-
ing at this suggests that it represents another step within
the Internet’s long-term evolution – a step that continues
the erosion of its original North American identity, rather
than the revolutionary step that some desired; perhaps
also a step that tends to bring the Internet further within
the ambit of government or inter-governmental oversight.
But the arguments over Internet governance were in no
sense resolved by WSIS and will continue in the future.
Developing country participation
Summits differ from conventional, permanent international
decision-making fora, such as the ITU and the WTO, in
many ways – not least because they are more politicised
and because their outcomes usually have less immediate
practical effect. Less expertise is needed to participate
effectively in summits, while the need for consensus
(rather than majority vote) also gives more weight to
smaller and less powerful countries.
Nevertheless, developing country participation in WSIS
varied markedly in scale. The Internet governance debate
in particular provided a platform for a small number of
larger developing countries to assert their influence and
authority, in a way comparable with similar new alignments
in (for example) WTO negotiations. Smaller countries and
LDCs (Least Developed Countries), by contrast, tended to
be more concerned with specific development questions,
such as infrastructure finance, and played a less politicised
role in Summit negotiations. It is important, in this con-
text, not to confuse the increased influence of a few major
developing countries with any change in influence for the
developing world as a whole, particularly LDCs.
Across WSIS overall, national delegations were largely
made up of diplomats and telecommunications sector pro-
fessionals. Geneva diplomatic missions and home-based
diplomats tended to play the main role in formal negotia-
tions, as in other international agreements regardless of
sector. National policy discourse was usually led by com-
munications ministries and, diplomats aside, a lot of del-
egations were made up mostly of people from the tradi-
tional telecommunications establishment (the communi-
cations ministry and regulator and the incumbent fixed
network operator). Mobile networks, the Internet commu-
nity and private sector operators were poorly represented,
if at all, in most delegations, and there were also few par-
ticipants from mainstream development ministries.
Women were also under-represented.
A few, but only a few, developing countries included civil
society representatives in their delegations, while some
strongly opposed the presence of civil society representa-
tives, even as observers, in formal negotiations – which,
in all summits, are inter-governmental in character. Na-
tional case studies carried out for this report showed con-
siderable variation, too, in the extent of consultation and
participation in WSIS discourse at a national level. In many
countries, policymaking remained largely within the nar-
row confines of government ICT officials; though in some,
such as Kenya, civil society and private sector actors played
a significant part. Media attention to WSIS was minimal in
most cases.
The regional conferences did not play as great a part in
the WSIS process as the preparatory committees. The fact
that they were continental in scale may have inhibited at-
tention to detail, where sub-regional conferences might
have made a bigger contribution. The African regional con-
ferences were both vibrant events, with substantial civil
society input and impact. Others were less dynamic, and
Europe did not even bother with a regional conference in
the second phase.
WSIS was, ultimately, a one-off event, in which develop-
ing country participation was more substantial and as-
sertive than it is in permanent ICT decision-making fora
such as the ITU and the WTO. Partly, this was because
summit dynamics make it easier for developing countries
to manage their participation; partly because industrial
countries did not see WSIS as a priority. Few interview-
ees for the study, however, felt that WSIS had significantly
changed the balance of power in ongoing policy debates
in permanent decision-making fora, likely outcomes aris-
ing from them, or their arrangements for participation,
except where Internet governance is concerned. The ITU
discussed some WSIS-related changes at its November
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2006 Plenipotenary Conference, but it is not yet clear how
these – and the ITU’s own identity – will develop.
In practice, the report concludes that the institutional dy-
namics of participation require much more substantial
changes in both international institutions and national
policymaking processes if they are to enhance develop-
ing country participation – a conclusion very much in line
with that of the “Louder Voices” report. While WSIS raised
awareness of ICT and ICD issues in many countries, at least
amongst government officials and some NGOs, it did not
facilitate capacity-building or change policymaking rela-
tionships at a national level. Unless those weaknesses are
addressed, many developing countries will find it as diffi-
cult to represent their priorities effectively in future in spe-
cialist ICT decision-making fora as they did before WSIS,
which might be considered another opportunity missed.
Civil society participation
One of the most important “Louder Voices” conclusions
concerned the extent of private sector and civil society
participation in ICT policy. Because of the way ICTs and
particularly the Internet have evolved, much relevant ex-
pertise resides in the private sector and civil society rather
than in government.
Although some governments opposed this, the WSIS out-
come texts make much of the importance of multistake-
holder involvement – the principle, as the Geneva Plan of
Action puts it, that “the effective participation of govern-
ments and all stakeholders is vital in developing the Infor-
mation Society[,] requiring cooperation and partnerships
among all of them.”1
Civil society involvement in summits has increased over
the years, sometimes including the holding of “alterna-
tive” summits alongside the main event. No such alterna-
tive happened in the case of WSIS, but the summit did
represent a significant advance in civil society participa-
tion. The ITU’s lack of experience with civil society may
have fostered this, by giving more autonomy and respon-
sibility to a civil society bureau within the secretariat, just
as its extensive experience with the private sector may
have opened spaces for that stakeholder group. Neverthe-
less, the opening stages of the first summit phase were
dominated by arguments about the rights of civil society
and the private sector to participate – arguments which
helped the two non-governmental stakeholder groups to
build more of a common understanding between them than
they had contrived elsewhere. (This was also helped by very
effective coordination of private sector participation.)
In the Geneva phase of WSIS, civil society had a wider
range of issues to discuss. The whole character of the “in-
formation society” seemed up for grabs, and there were
points of principle to argue on a wide range of issues
around which civil society could coalesce. The hostility of
some government delegations to civil society’s presence
also fostered a sense of community and solidarity. Civil
society engagement focused on rights issues, and had
relatively little impact on the text on development. These
factors were less apparent in the Tunis phase, which fo-
cused much more narrowly on Internet governance. How-
ever, this was an issue in which civil society found other
ways of influencing outcomes – in the WGIG, for example,
and through dialogue with those government delegates
who shared many of the Internet community’s objectives.
The quality of civil society organisation was weaker in the
second phase, but the Internet Governance Caucus pro-
vided a powerful instrument to advance positions which it
shared with the Internet community. On the whole, there-
fore, the space for civil society participation in WSIS was
sufficient to ensure that most civil society organisations
felt there was more value in constructive engagement than
in opposition. Caucusing played an important role in de-
veloping civil society overviews and in strategy and tac-
tics, as it has at other recent summits.
Civil society participation in WSIS PrepComs and, to a lesser
extent, the Geneva and Tunis summit sessions, was, like
that of governments, concentrated amongst those with par-
ticular ICT/ICD interests. Few mainstream development or
human rights NGOs attended any part of the process, and
this greatly weakened civil society’s capacity to contribute
to the development agenda. Developing countries were also
disproportionately under-represented in civil society par-
ticipation – partly because of lack of resources, partly be-
cause few civil society organisations in developing coun-
tries had tracked information society issues in the past, and
partly because those which had were less likely to be in-
cluded in their own national discourse on WSIS issues.
The costs and benefits of civil society participation in WSIS
are still debated. The financial cost and opportunity cost
in personnel time were very considerable for those organi-
sations that took WSIS seriously. Policy gains, in terms of
WSIS outcomes, were limited. Where gains were made was
in extending organisations’ understanding of issues and
in their building networks outside their own regions and
specialisms that would not otherwise have been available
to them. The value of this should not be underestimated,
though it is questionable how well these networks can
survive without the focus that WSIS PrepComs provided
for them.
1 Geneva Plan of Action, section C1, article 8.
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After WSIS
The final question to be asked of WSIS concerns its fol-
low-up processes. These can be divided into three groups.
a. Some overview implementation processes were set in
place, reporting to the UN General Assembly, as with
other summits.
b. In the case of Internet governance, ambiguous com-
promises were reached to foster “enhanced coopera-
tion” in order “to enable governments, on an equal
footing, to carry out their roles and responsibilities, in
international public policy issues pertaining to the
Internet,”2  and to establish a multistakeholder
Internet Governance Forum with no substantive pow-
ers but extensive scope.
c. A list of eleven “action lines” was established (with a
further eight subsidiary lines) to undertake otherwise
unspecified “multi-stakeholder implementation at the
international level.”3
Internet governance developments have continued to at-
tract the interest and attention of all stakeholder groups,
principally because the issues remain unresolved. They will
continue to do so, and Internet governance institutions will
continue to change, as they have done throughout the
Internet’s history. How they change is yet unclear, but the
profile of Internet governance has become and will remain
much more substantial as a result of its politicisation in
the WSIS process. The breadth and quality of discourse at
the first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum met
with a very positive response from most participants.
The WSIS texts on wider information society issues are far
from the cutting edge of development thinking, and are
proving of little interest to those who are seriously engaged
in ICD. The first round of action line meetings held in May
2006 was very poorly attended and produced little in the
way of new initiatives. It seems unlikely that these will of-
fer any significant legacy for WSIS, which is likely to re-
main largely a stand-alone event in the history of ICT/ICD.
One significant question which is often asked is whether
the WGIG experience of multistakeholder participation of-
fers a model for use in other international fora. The report
concludes that this is possible, but in limited contexts. The
WGIG was concerned with an area of international govern-
ance in which governments and inter-governmental institu-
tions were not predominant. Multistakeholder participation
and processes were easier to instigate, therefore, because
they did not challenge existing (inter-)governmental author-
ity. The WGIG’s process – as a genuinely “working” group
of diverse individuals – was also particularly suited to
an issue which was both complex and highly politicised
and where many disputants were largely ignorant of the
technical complexities involved. There are some other in-
ternational issues which are similarly complex and politi-
cised, and where issues are poorly understood, but rela-
tively few. These would be much more susceptible to this
approach than issues which do not share all these charac-
teristics.
Conclusion
What lasting impact has WSIS had on the “information
society” and on developing country and civil society par-
ticipation?
Almost a year on from the Tunis summit, it is difficult to
see that WSIS has had a lasting impact on the issues it
discussed, with the exception of Internet governance. The
quality of its development texts was poor. Much more sig-
nificant documents and initiatives in this context have been
written and undertaken outside the WSIS framework dur-
ing the past five years than within it. WSIS does seem to
have drawn more attention to the lack of evidence and criti-
cal evaluation available concerning ICT’s impact on devel-
opment, and to the paradigm gap between ICT and devel-
opment professionals. Some international agencies are
now seeking to address these. Many developing country
governments were made more aware of ICT issues by WSIS,
and ICT and ICD are being included in more Poverty Re-
duction Strategies. There has also been a shift, following
the TFFM, in thinking about infrastructure finance. How-
ever, these developments do not represent a revolution in
thinking about the information society of the kind that
WSIS’ advocates had hoped to see.
At an institutional level, WSIS has not had a significant
impact on the deliberations or processes of most existing
permanent international ICT decision-making fora. WSIS
did allow the ITU to push the boundaries of its mandate
beyond telecommunications towards the information so-
ciety to some extent, but within limits. If anything, the WSIS
process probably increased hostility to the idea of it play-
ing a major role in Internet governance, rather than ad-
vancing the case for this. The scope for the ITU extending
its developmental role is constrained by both its own mem-
bers’ wishes and those of other agencies within the UN
system. The ambiguous compromise on Internet govern-
ance reached in Tunis will be played out over some time to
come. The meaning of “enhanced cooperation” and the
role of the Internet Governance Forum are yet unclear; but
WSIS is likely to mark a stage in the evolution of Internet
management which itself is likely to see increased gov-
ernment involvement alongside that of its historic stake-
holders. The action lines on development issues set up as
part of WSIS follow-up do not seem likely to make a sig-
nificant or lasting contribution.
2 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, article 69.
3 ibid., article 108.
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Developing country participation in WSIS was significantly
higher than in other ICT decision-making fora, but WSIS
did not in fact make significant decisions. The more asser-
tive role played by some larger developing countries may
follow through to other fora, notably in Internet govern-
ance, but WSIS has not equipped smaller and less well-
resourced developing countries to participate more effec-
tively in permanent fora like the ITU and WTO, which will
have more lasting influence than WSIS. Institutional
changes in the way those organisations manage their proc-
esses and national changes to improve the quality, scope
and inclusiveness of national policy debates are still fun-
damental to enabling developing countries to articulate
their issues and concerns more effectively in permanent
decision-making fora. The dominance of WSIS delegations
by ICT professionals, and the very limited participation of
development specialists, meant that WSIS did little to ad-
dress the paradigm gap between these communities in as
well as outside developing countries.
Civil society participation in WSIS was significant, and
some feel that it was both more cooperative and more as-
sertive than in many previous summits. WSIS did illustrate,
however, that civil society, like government, faces a para-
digm gap between organisations interested in ICT/ICD
(which participated in the summit) and mainstream de-
velopment and rights agencies (which did not). Northern
civil society was also more strongly represented than its
Southern counterparts. Civil society’s main gains lay in
increased understanding and networking, but these were
bought at a high cost and their sustainability is uncertain.
In some countries, civil society organisations also im-
proved relationships with national governments, on which
they may be able to build in future.
Finally, the WSIS texts strongly emphasised the value of
multistakeholder participation and, though many govern-
ments remain uncomfortable about it, this will make fu-
ture attempts to exclude civil society and the private sec-
tor more contentious. Experience with the Internet Gov-
ernance Forum will be telling here: a successful Forum will
advance the case for multistakeholder participation, but
failure will be used against the principle.
In the coming period, APC will work with its partners and
other organisations to build on the WSIS experience, as
described in this report, in order to improve developing
country and civil society participation in future interna-
tional ICT decision-making. New fora like the Internet Gov-
ernance Forum and long-standing institutions like the ITU
will both play an important part in this work. There is still
a great need for capacity-building which creates better
understanding and develops new resources; for better
networking and experience-sharing, particularly among
and between developing countries; and for improved dia-
logue between different stakeholder communities. The
WSIS experience has helped APC and other organisations
to think through their own objectives and priorities in this
area and to develop new initiatives. If this leads to more
effective and more inclusive participation in the future,
then that will be a positive and lasting outcome from this
particular World Summit. 
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Introduction
c h a p t e r  1
The World Summit on the Information Society - WSIS in
brief - was the major event in international discourse on
information and communications technologies (ICTs) and
their role in development during the first five years of the
21st century. Held in two preparatory phases, from 2001
to the first summit event in Geneva in December 2003, and
from then until the second summit event in Tunis in No-
vember 2005, it preoccupied much of the time and many
of the resources available for ICT and ICD (information and
communications in development) issues in development
agencies, government departments and civil society. While
the long-term impact of WSIS on actual decision-making
is as yet unclear, its final documents are likely to be cited
for many years as representing a critical point in that evo-
lution - much as the report of the 1984/5 Maitland Com-
mission (formally the Independent Commission for World
Wide Telecommunications Development), “The Missing
Link”, was cited at WSIS itself.
This report considers the participation of developing
countries and non-governmental actors (principally civil
society) in the WSIS experience - the Summit itself and
its lengthy preparatory process - and in its two main sub-
sidiary fora, the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms
(TFFM) and the Working Group on Internet Governance
(WGIG). It was commissioned by the Association for Pro-
gressive Communications (APC), an international network
of civil society organisations, to assess the impact of
WSIS in the light of two earlier reports on developing
country participation in international ICT decision-mak-
ing: the “Louder Voices” report prepared for the G8 Dig-
ital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) in 2002 (summa-
rised in chapter 2), and an initial study of African partici-
pation in the first phase of WSIS, commissioned by APC
in 2004. The author of this report was closely involved in
both of these studies.
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1 There is debate about whether the term “information society” should
be capitalised (“Information Society”) or not. Those who favour
capitalisation tend, on the whole, to grant more transforming power to
the concept than those who do not. In this report, capitals have been
used where the text explicitly refers to this grander vision (as it does in
the name of WSIS itself ); but not in the text as a whole.
This study is not intended as a comprehensive assessment
of WSIS, though substantial attention is paid to WSIS’ over-
all impact and outcomes in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Its main
purposes are:
 1. To observe and comment on the nature, content and
extent of developing country and civil society participa-
tion in and impact on WSIS and its subsidiary fora.
2. To consider whether these are likely to have a lasting
impact on international ICT decision-making processes.
3. To make recommendations to the WSIS follow-up proc-
ess, to international organisations themselves, to govern-
ments, civil society and the private sector about ways in
which international discourse can be made more inclusive
of developing countries and non-governmental actors.
It is also not intended as a comprehensive study of civil
society participation in the WSIS process as a whole. Civil
society engagement with WSIS was widespread and di-
verse, and involved a variety of mechanisms, both tradi-
tional and innovative. While the report does give civil so-
ciety experience considerable assessment, particularly in
Chapter 7, the focus of this assessment is on the relation-
ship between civil society and decision-making processes
rather than the internal mechanisms of civil society en-
gagement.
Research for the study was undertaken during the second
phase of WSIS (from January 2004 to November 2005),
and particularly during the six month period following the
Tunis summit (November 2005 to May 2006). The report
was drafted in May and June 2006, and published in March
2007. A summary, included as the Executive Summary to
this report, was published at the first meeting of the
Internet Governance Forum in November 2006. 
Structure of the report
This report is organised as follows:
• SECTION A of the report sets the overall framework for
the study, as follows:
- CHAPTER 1 includes this introduction and an ac-
count of the methodology used in the study.
- CHAPTER 2 summarises the findings of the “Louder
Voices” report, which raised a series of questions
concerning developing country and multistake-
holder participation whose continued relevance is
tested by the research.
- CHAPTER 3 presents an overall account of the
WSIS process, from the point at which a summit
was first proposed at the Plenipotentiary Confer-
ence of the International Telecommunication Un-
ion in 1998 to the publication of the final outcome
documents of the Tunis summit session in No-
vember 2005.
• SECTION B of the report analyses the WSIS experience
in the light of the research undertaken for the study.
- CHAPTER 4 presents an overview assessment of
WSIS and its associated fora from the perspective
of organisational and institutional structure.
- CHAPTER 5 presents a comparable assessment of
the Summit process’ impact on the four main the-
matic issues which it considered with any sub-
stance - the role of ICTs in development, the rela-
tionship between the information society1  and hu-
man rights, financing mechanisms for ICT deploy-
ment, and Internet governance.
- CHAPTERS 4 and 5 both review participation in gen-
eral, by different stakeholder groups, within the
WSIS structure and WSIS debates.
- CHAPTER 6 looks in more depth at the involvement of
developing countries in these discussions, in the light
of the observations of the “Louder Voices” report,
and suggests conclusions from these for the future.
- CHAPTER 7 considers the involvement of non-gov-
ernmental stakeholders, particularly civil society,
and likewise suggests conclusions about their fu-
ture engagement in international ICT issues.
• SECTION C (CHAPTER 8) of the report draws conclusions
from the study and presents recommendations to in-
ter-governmental, governmental, civil society and
other stakeholders concerning future ICT/ICD issues
and multistakeholder practice overall. It also puts for-
ward specific recommendations concerning the WSIS
follow-up process. These conclusions and recommen-
dations, like the preceding analysis, are the responsi-
bility of the author, and do not necessarily coincide
with those of APC or its member-organisations.
Methodology
This study is the result of a prolonged period of assess-
ment and analysis. Five principal methodologies were used
during this period.
Firstly, the study draws on the personal involvement of the
author and research partner, as participant observers, in
the WSIS process, and that of APC personnel who played
a significant role in WSIS civil society fora. In line with their
responsibilities to this study, the author and research part-
ner did not play any direct role in seeking to influence any
part of the WSIS process, while the experience of APC per-




Secondly, the study’s desk research makes use of the ex-
tensive WSIS literature, particularly that available through
the WSIS website2  and documentation from other inter-
national and civil society organisations.
Thirdly, questionnaire and interview research was under-
taken by the project research partner and APC colleagues
during two fora of the second WSIS phase - the Africa re-
gional meeting in Accra, Ghana and the second global pre-
paratory committee meeting in Geneva, both held during
February 2005. The author and research partner also con-
ducted short interviews and informally discussed the is-
sues concerned in the report with a wide range of partici-
pants during the third preparatory committee meeting of
the second phase (in September 2005) and during the
Tunis summit in November 2005.
Fourthly, the author conducted approximately forty hour-
long interviews with key figures in the WSIS process, from
all stakeholder groups, during the four month period af-
ter the conclusion of the Tunis summit (December 2005 to
March 2006). These interviews included personnel within
the organisation and political leadership of WSIS and its
associated fora, from relevant UN and other international
organisations, a number of bilateral national delegations
and development agencies, civil society organisations, the
private sector and the Internet community.
Finally, the study draws on a series of five case studies of
experience in individual countries which were undertaken
for the project by independent experts. These case stud-
ies - of Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya -
are summarised in written reports, copies of which are
available online3.
The terms “interviews” and “interviewees”, where used
in this report, refer to evidence derived from the whole of
this diverse range of inputs – questionnaires and informal
conversations, formal telephone interviews and contribu-
tions to case study research. All interviews, whether in
person or by telephone, were conducted on the under-
standing that no comments would be attributed to any
individual. This led to a very rich resource of comment and
opinion, on which the report draws extensively. Some in-
terviewees asked that the fact that they were interviewed
for the project should not be made public. For this reason,
a list of interviewees is not included in this report.
The author of the report would like to thank all those who
have contributed to the study. In particular, he would like
to thank Anriette Esterhuysen, Karen Banks and Willie
Currie at APC, who commissioned the work and provided
exemplary support throughout; Abiodun Jagun, whose sup-
porting research work including compilation of Annex 4
added greatly to the enjoyability as well as the quality of
the work; Lishan Adam, Valeria Betancourt, Rekha Jain and
Partha Sarker, who undertook the country case studies;
Alison Souter, who provided additional research support;
and all of those who generously gave their time and their
opinions during an exceptionally rewarding series of tel-
ephone and face-to-face interviews. As noted above, the
conclusions and recommendations of the report - and any
errors - are the responsibility of the author. 
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The “Louder Voices” report: a summary
c h a p t e r  2
This investigation of developing country and civil society
participation in WSIS and associated processes follows the
“Louder Voices” enquiry which was undertaken for the UK
Department for International Development (DFID) and the
G8 DOT Force in 2002.4  This chapter briefly summarises
the conclusions of the “Louder Voices” report. These con-
clusions raised important research questions which lay at
the heart of this project, and form the basis for part of the
analysis in chapters 6 and 7.
The “Louder Voices” enquiry had four main objectives:
• To map international decision-making issues, proc-
esses and fora concerned with ICTs
• To assess the effectiveness of developing country par-
ticipation in these fora
• To identify obstacles facing developing countries at the
national, regional and global levels
• To recommend actions that could be taken by devel-
oping countries themselves, international organisa-
tions and the DOT Force implementation network to
overcome these obstacles.
It focused on three major international ICT decision-mak-
ing fora (the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Internet Cor-
poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)) and
used a combination of interview evidence, case studies of
six developing countries (Brazil, India, Nepal, South Af-
rica, Tanzania and Zambia) and analysis of specific policy
issues to draw conclusions about the state of developing
country participation at that time.
The analysis set out in the “Louder Voices” report provides
an important starting point for the present study. Although,
like all international summits, WSIS represented a discon-
tinuity in the normal pattern of international decision-mak-
ing on the issues with which it was concerned, participants’
engagement with it was predicated on their existing lev-
els of involvement, expertise and priorities. This provides
an opportunity for the present study to assess how the
history of developing country and civil society participa-
tion (assessed in the “Louder Voices” report) affected par-
ticipation in the WSIS process and the course that WSIS
itself took; how WSIS adjusted to and altered constraints
on participation, and what lasting impact WSIS may have
on international ICT decision-making in future.
The Executive Summary of the “Louder Voices” report is
summarised in the following paragraphs, in which italicised
text represents direct quotation from the text of the re-
port. The issues raised here are key matters for consid-
eration in this investigation, and are reviewed in depth later
in this report, particularly in Chapter 6.
1. Four key challenges were identified by the “Louder
Voices” report:
I. First, most developing countries are members of
established international organisations with ICT
responsibilities, such as the ITU and WTO, and are
usually represented at their meetings. However,
there is not as yet an effective connection between
the agendas of these organisations, their deci-
sions, and the international development goals set
out in the UN Millennium Declaration. … In spite
of considerable effort, there is still a “missing link”
between ICT and development at the international
policy level.
II. Second, developing countries have very little pres-
ence or influence in the many voluntary, private,
and not-for-profit decision-making fora that have
been set up in recent years to standardise and
manage the Internet and other new ICTs. They have
none at all in areas where standards are deter-
mined de facto by market power. Although the re-
sults of some of this work are fed into traditional
international fora … it is clear that developing
countries are increasingly excluded from interna-
tional decision-making at the technical level.
III. Third, the experience of many developed and some
developing countries shows that technical and
policy capacity go hand in hand, so that it is diffi-
cult to develop one without the other. Given
present asymmetries in technical capacity, it is
essential for developing countries to set priorities
among international ICT issues and concentrate
their limited resources on building technical and
policy capacity in the areas that are most critical
to their development goals.
IV. Fourth, … effective participation is not limited to what
happens before and during meetings. The goal of
inclusion means that developing countries must as-
sess the effect of decisions made by international
ICT fora on their own development objectives….4 Its report can be found at www.eldis.org/static/DOC10107.htm.
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2. There was consensus among those consulted for the
[“Louder Voices”] study that it is not possible to
strengthen participation by developing countries in
international ICT decision-making fora without first
strengthening their capacity to make and implement
ICT policy at the national and regional levels. Three
critical aspects were identified within this national di-
mension of under-representation and ineffective par-
ticipation:
I. lack of policy awareness, at all levels of govern-
ment and citizenship, of the potential role of ICTs
in development;
II. lack of technical and policy capacity on ICT issues,
particularly in respect of emerging technologies
and new policy areas - such as migration from cir-
cuit-switched to IP networks and indeed Internet
issues in general;
III. weaknesses in national and regional policymaking
processes, including:
i. lack of political leadership;
ii. absence of national ICT strategies;
iii. ineffective coordination between different
government departments and agencies
with ICT responsibilities;
iv. lack of private sector and civil society
participation in national decision-making;
v. inadequate preparation for international
meetings; and
vi. ineffective use of financial and human
resources.
3. There was also consensus among those consulted for
the [“Louder Voices”] study that action to strengthen
the ICT policy capacity of developing countries must
be accompanied by action to level the policy playing
field so as to ensure that the needs of developing coun-
tries are on the agenda of international ICT fora and
that they are included in decision-making processes.
Three critical aspects were, likewise, identified within
this international dimension of under-representation
and ineffective participation:
I. lack of easy, affordable and timely access to infor-
mation about ICT-related issues, decision-making
fora and processes;
II. logistical problems, including the frequency and
location of international meetings and restrictions
on participation (for example, by private sector and
civil society experts);
III. ineffective use of financial resources available to
support participation.
4. A number of recommendations were made in the
“Louder Voices” report aimed at addressing these de-
ficiencies. In relation to the national dimension, de-
veloping country governments were recommended to:
a. improve information flows and policy coordination
between different government departments and
agencies with ICT responsibilities;
b. promote informed public discussion and debate
through both general and specialised media;
c. include all relevant stakeholders in policy-making
on an issue-by-issue basis;
d. encourage participation of experts from the pri-
vate sector and civil society in national delegations
to international decision-making fora;
e. share information, expertise and experience on a
regional and sub-regional basis;
f. implement knowledge management techniques to
ensure that information gained through participa-
tion in international ICT decision-making fora is
captured, disseminated to relevant stakeholders,
and made accessible to other interested parties
through the media; … and
g. review their current practices with respect to meet-
ing preparation, delegate selection, participation,
accountability and follow-up, with a view to en-
suring that these … result in the most effective use
of financial resources through the optimum de-
ployment of technical and policy capacity.
5. International agencies, meanwhile, were recom-
mended to:
a. promote awareness of the role that ICTs can (and
can not) play in development by providing com-
prehensive, publicly-accessible, non-technical in-
formation on … their activities; ...
b. provide independent, authoritative technical/
policy research and analysis of the major issues
to be decided;
c. diversify the location of meetings and ensure that
their procedures allow all sources of developing
country policy and technical capacity to participate
in decision-making, whether they come from gov-
ernment, the private sector or not-for-profit organi-
sations.
These issues - concerning both developing countries and
multistakeholder participation - are central to the investi-
gation in this report. Chapters 6 and 7 review the conclu-
sions of the “Louder Voices” report concerning develop-
ing countries and civil society, respectively, in the light of
the evidence uncovered by the current investigation into
the impact of the WSIS process. 
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WSIS was a world summit within the UN tradition of world
summits - though with some distinctive features of its own.
This section of the report gives a narrative account of the
WSIS process and provides the foundation for the analysis
that follows. It also summarises the content of the main
outputs of the WSIS process, including WSIS’ two interim
fora, the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM) and
the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG).
WSIS: an account
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WSIS TIMELINE 2001 – 2005
REGIONAL CONFERENCES
• African: Bamako (Mali), 25-30 May 2002
• Pan European: Bucharest (Romania), 7-9
November 2002
• Asia Pacific: Tokyo (Japan), 13-15 January
2003
• Latin America and the Caribbean: Bávaro
(Dominican Rep.), 29-31 January 2003
• Western Asia: Beirut (Lebanon), 4-6
February 2003
PREPARATORY CONFERENCES (PREPCOMS)
• PrepCom 1, Geneva 1-5 July 2002
• PrepCom 2, Geneva 17-28 February 2003
• Intersessional, Paris 15-18 July 2003
• PrepCom 3, Geneva 15-26 September 2003
• PrepCom 3A, Geneva 10-14 November
2003
• PrepCom 3B, Geneva 5-6 and 9 December
2003
PREPARATORY CONFERENCES (PREPCOMS)
• PrepCom 1, Hammamet (Tunisia) 24-26
June 2004
• PrepCom 2, Geneva 17-25 February 2005
• PrepCom 3: Geneva 19-30 September 2005
and Tunis (Tunisia) 13-15 November 2005
FIRST PHASE OF WSIS
Geneva, 10-12 December 2003
REGIONAL CONFERENCES
• Western Asia: Damascus (Syria), 22-23
November 2004
• Africa: Accra (Ghana), 2-4 February 2005
• Asia-Pacific: Tehran (Iran), 31 May-2 June
2005
• Latin America and the Caribbean: Rio de
Janeiro (Brazil), 8-10 June 2005
SUBREGIONAL CONFERENCES
• II Bishkek-Moscow Regional Conference
on the Information Society: 16-18
November 2004, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan)
• Pan-Arab Conference on WSIS-Phase II: 8-
10 May 2005, Cairo (Egypt)
SECOND PHASE OF WSIS
Tunis, 16-18 November 2005
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The nature of WSIS
WSIS’ formal origins lie in a resolution, calling for “a world
summit on the information society,” presented by the gov-
ernment of Tunisia and passed without discussion during
the final session of the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU)’s 1998 Plenipotentiary Conference in Minnea-
polis. The objectives of the proposed summit would in-
clude:
• establishing an overall framework identifying, with the
contribution of all partners, a joint and harmonised
understanding of the information society;
• drawing up a strategic plan of action for concerted
development of the information society by defining an
agenda covering the objectives to be achieved and the
resources to be mobilised;
• identifying the roles of the various partners to ensure
smooth coordination of the establishment in practice
of the information society in all Member States.5
This proposal was transmuted into an information society
summit along conventional UN summit lines – probably
much grander and more elaborate than participants in
Minneapolis had envisaged - by the UN Administrative
Committee on Coordination (now known as the UN Chief
Executives Board), where it was enthusiastically received
by a number of other UN agencies with wider development
objectives, notably UNESCO. The General Assembly finally
adopted a resolution endorsing WSIS as a formal summit
in December 2001, by which time the Summit’s momen-
tum was well underway.
These slightly-clouded origins of WSIS raised a number of
institutional issues which were to have implications for the
future WSIS process, and which are discussed in Chapter 4.
Potential rivalries between UN agencies over the manage-
ment of WSIS were addressed by allocating responsibility
for the organisation and administration of WSIS primarily
to the ITU, supported by a High-Level Summit Organising
Committee including the heads (in practice, the repre-
sentatives) of some twenty United Nations agencies plus
the World Bank and World Trade Organisation. An Execu-
tive Secretariat was established at the ITU in Geneva and
staffed substantially through ITU personnel.
Two factors, here, were of particular significance. Firstly,
there was, initially in particular, a tension between the pri-
marily technological approach to the Summit espoused by
the ITU, and the more developmental approach of UN agen-
cies with wider developmental roles. Most interviewees who
were engaged in this process felt that the wider UN family
had successfully shifted the emphasis in WSIS’ formal ob-
jectives from “the development of telecommunications”
(the historic role of the ITU’s Telecommunication Develop-
ment Bureau) to the role of a wider range of information
and communication technologies in social and economic
development - or, to put it another way, from the “infor-
mation society” as an outcome of telecommunications to
the “information society” as a transforming social phenom-
enon.
Nevertheless, the fact that the ITU was the Summit’s lead
agency meant that invitations to participate were handled
by ministries of communications (which deal with national
relations with the ITU) rather than central planning minis-
tries (as might have happened if the Summit had been led
by the UNDP or another part of the central United Nations
organisation) or ministries of information (which might
have followed a UNESCO lead). This had a significant im-
pact on participation in national delegations, which is dis-
cussed in Chapter 6. Though, as in most UN summits, ne-
gotiations were led by diplomats - usually those based in
national missions to the United Nations - those diplomats
were advised primarily by technical and technological spe-
cialists from the telecoms sector, who understood the ways
of the ITU, rather than by mainstream development spe-
cialists. Many participants felt that this contributed to an
emphasis on ICTs, particularly technologies, rather than
on the information society in its wider sense, in many of
WSIS’ deliberations, and to some of the difficulties which
WSIS advocates had in promoting its objectives within the
mainstream development community. There were also ten-
sions between the ITU and some other UN agencies, gov-
ernments and non-governmental stakeholders who sus-
pected it of using the Summit to try and establish a cen-
tral governance role for itself towards the information so-
ciety or the Internet.
There were two other distinctive features of WSIS in com-
parison with other UN summits.
The first was the decision to hold it in two parts - the first
in Geneva in December 2003, the second in Tunis in No-
vember 2005.  Whatever justifications were offered after-
wards, this resulted from unwillingness within the UN sys-
tem to choose between two competing offers to host the
summit. Some advantages could be claimed for this ar-
rangement - for example, a division of work between
phases devoted to (a) principles and (b) implementation -
and enthusiasts for WSIS made the most of these. Others
cited disadvantages - the scope for deferment of decisions
at the end of the first phase, a particular concern in such a
rapidly moving development sector, and the increased cost
for the UN system and all summit participants.
The second distinctive feature, cited by UN Secretary-Gen-
eral Kofi Annan in his opening speech to the Geneva sum-
mit, was the topic under consideration: “This summit is
unique,” he said. “Where most global conferences focus
5 Resolution 73 of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, 1998, available
from: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/73.html.
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on global threats, this one will consider how best to use a
new global asset.”6
Although his speech actually dwelt on the “digital divide”
(a problem) rather than on “digital opportunity”, this re-
mark raises a significant question about the efficacy of UN
summits, in particular whether they are as useful in deal-
ing with opportunities (particularly fast-moving ones or
ones that have developed outside the established param-
eters of international governance) as they are in dealing
with problems. This question is considered in Chapter 4.
Certainly, much of the second phase of the summit was
concerned with specific problems, rather than opportuni-
ties – specifically, with the difficulty of financing ICT de-
ployment and with the absence of traditional governance
mechanisms for the Internet (the latter seen as a problem
by many governments, but as a positive advantage by
some other participants). However, the public ethos of
WSIS was strongly positive about the perceived benefits
of ICTs for development. It marked a highpoint - and, it
may turn out (see Chapter 5), the beginning of a downturn
- in the enthusiasm for ICTs as a, if not the, key instrument
for economic and social development which had emerged
within parts of the ICT professional and development com-
munities during the preceding five years.7
Summit processes
World summits are complex and lengthy processes. While
the media often give the impression that key decisions are
taken at the actual summit meetings themselves, the final
summit meetings are in reality little more than opportuni-
ties for heads of government to make formal commitments,
in speech and signature, to agreements that have been
reached during months of prior negotiations (though they
also provide the opportunity to reach some form of con-
sensus at the highest level on issues that have proved ut-
terly intractable in negotiations). The WSIS process was
perhaps more elaborate than most because of its two-
phase structure.
The first summit phase
The first summit phase began with the establishment of a
WSIS Executive Secretariat, within the ITU, in 2001. This
secretariat, including ITU and other personnel, developed
a preparatory process aimed at negotiating the Summit’s
output documents through a process of engagement, con-
sultation and negotiation.
Both phases of the Summit – those leading up to Geneva
in December 2003 and Tunis in November 2005 - were built
around series of regional and global preparatory meetings.
The first phase included five regional meetings, held as
follows:
• African region, held in Mali, May 2002
• Pan-European region, held in Romania, November
2002
• Asia-Pacific region, held in Japan, January 2003
• Latin American and Caribbean region, held in the Do-
minican Republic, January 2003
• Western Asia [Middle East] region, held in Lebanon,
2003.
An assessment of the African regional conference is in-
cluded in Chapter 6.
More important than these regional conferences, however,
was the series of preparatory committees, or PrepComs,
held in Geneva, which were the primary negotiating fora
for the Summit texts: the space within which commitments
were agreed and where contentious issues were disputed.
Three PrepComs were scheduled: in July 2002, February
2003 and September 2003, though the third PrepCom had
to be reconvened twice, in November 2003 and immedi-
ately before the Geneva summit meeting in December
2003, in order to deal with unresolved issues. An
“intersessional meeting” and an “informal meeting on
content and themes” were also held in Paris in July 2003
and Geneva in September 2003 respectively, in an attempt
to expedite agreement.8
Within the negotiating process, a system of formal and
informal caucuses brought together groups with common
interests - whether governments (for example, in Africa),
civil society advocates (for example, on gender issues) or
loose issue-oriented associations (such as the Internet
Governance caucus). Caucuses discussed and promoted
draft text, seeking to incorporate their ideas and language
into the documents under discussion at the inter-govern-
mental level. They also coordinated lobbying on their is-
sues of concern. Much of the effectiveness of participants
in the summit as a whole depended on the skills and re-
sources available to them for this caucusing activity.
These PrepComs were the primary arenas in which WSIS
issues were contested. The first of them brought to the
fore two critical issues which were to remain contentious
throughout the first summit phase: the participation of non-
governmental actors in the negotiating process, and the
relationship between human rights, freedoms of informa-
tion and expression and the information society. Indeed,
8 Records of the first phase preparatory meetings can be accessed at
www.itu.int/wsis/preparatory/index.html.
6 The Secretary-General’s speech is at www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/
coverage/statements/opening/annan.html.
7 This enthusiasm might be dated from the Kananaskis OECD (Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development) summit in 2000,
which launched the G8 Digital Opportunity Task Force or DOT Force.
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much of the time of the first two PrepComs was taken up
not with issues of substance but with the question of who
should have the right to take part in discussing them.
The key issue here was the nature of international deci-
sion-making. The United Nations and its family of agen-
cies are inter-governmental in character, set up to enable
governments to coordinate activities and resolve disputes
amongst themselves, not to engage in debate with non-
governmental entities. This inter-governmental character
has been jealously guarded by many governments, par-
ticularly those of post-colonial countries which have seen
equal participation in UN bodies as an important symbol
of nationhood. Over the years, however, non-governmen-
tal organisations have gained some space within UN sum-
mit processes - initially through the UN’s formal mecha-
nism for civil society representation, the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC); latterly, in some cases, through
more innovative means. Some UN agencies have paid sub-
stantial attention to civil society organisations in their own
work, while others - including the ITU - have had to create
increasing space for the private sector as it has taken on
roles previously considered provinces of government.
The dispute over non-governmental representation was a
continuous undercurrent throughout the WSIS process.
Some governments, mostly from developing countries,
were implacably opposed to any non-governmental agen-
cies participating in or even being present during negotia-
tions. Others, mostly industrialised countries, were either
relaxed or positive about private sector and civil society
involvement. Tensions frequently boiled over. Civil society
and the private sector shared a common set of interests in
representation, even though their views on content often
differed, and were able to secure limited speaking rights.
However, their more effective participation lay behind the
scenes, in liaising with sympathetic official delegates and
seeking to nuance debate in the directions that they fa-
voured. In the event, there was significantly more multi-
stakeholder participation in WSIS than in previous UN
summits, and multistakeholder principles were supported
in both Geneva and Tunis outcome documents.
Human rights and freedoms of expression were also con-
tentious throughout the summit process. It has become
conventional for UN summit declarations to reaffirm core
principles derived from previous UN statements, including
the freedom of expression principles set out in Article 19
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Some gov-
ernments have been unenthusiastic about this repetition
of human rights language and its implications for summit
declarations. This issue was more than usually significant
in WSIS because of the obvious relationship between the
information society, ICTs and freedoms of expression, and
because of earlier UN debates about the meaning of a
“right to communicate”. A few governments (notably Chi-
na’s) sought to omit or constrain references to human
rights and freedoms of expression in the proposed sum-
mit texts while others (notably the European Union, the
Nordic countries and Canada) sought to maintain them. In
the event, human rights language was included in the Ge-
neva texts, with some limiting references to national cir-
cumstances and cultures, while UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan emphasised in his opening speech that “the right
to freedom of opinion and expression is fundamental to
development, democracy and peace, and must remain a
touchstone for our work ahead.”9
The main development text of the Geneva output docu-
ments was formulated through an iterative process dur-
ing the course of the first summit phase. The ITU invited
governments to submit ideas about the role of ICTs in de-
velopment, and these were incorporated in a draft text,
which was then refined in negotiation. This process has
its problems. Communications ministries were not neces-
sarily the right agencies to put forward development is-
sues, and not all of them discussed their input with devel-
opment ministries. Geneva-based diplomats, too, lacked
expertise in development issues, however skilled they
might be at negotiating texts. While the texts that were
negotiated could be seen as comprehensive in scope and
were relatively uncontested in detail, they have been criti-
cised, not least (in private) by many of those involved in
their negotiation, for the following reasons:
a. That they are aspirational in tone, unprioritised and
over-optimistic about the potential for ICTs to trans-
form society
b. That they are focused on the supply of technology
rather than demand-driven, grassroots development
objectives
c. That they are insufficiently integrated with the UN sys-
tem’s key international development agreements - the
Millennium Development Goals (which are referenced
significantly in the Geneva texts) and the Monterrey
Consensus on the overall development, trade and aid
relationship – and with the outcome documents of
other social summits.
While there was relatively little argument over aspirational
text during the first summit negotiations, there was sub-
stantial argument over its implications, in particular where
the allocation of development funds was concerned. In-
deed, disputes over financing mechanisms almost pre-
vented agreement being reached on draft texts before the
opening session of the Geneva summit in December 2003.
The critical point of dispute here was a proposal for a Dig-
ital Solidarity Fund (DSF), a new UN fund specifically dedi-
cated to financing ICT infrastructure and applications,
which was put forward by the President of Senegal,
Abdoulaye Wade. This attracted extensive African and
9 www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/coverage/statements/opening/annan.html.
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some other developing country support, reinforced per-
haps by the fact that participation in WSIS delegations and
the development of WSIS policies were led by communi-
cations ministries rather than those with broad responsi-
bility for the allocation of national development resources
(such as ministries of finance and economic planning).
Donor countries, however, were almost unanimously op-
posed to the DSF proposal. They were unconvinced that a
new mechanism was either needed or desirable; indeed,
it conflicted with their general view that ICTs should be
mainstreamed within development (i.e. inserted into
health, education, agriculture and other mainstream pro-
grammes) rather than treated as a sector in itself. They
were unconvinced that development funds should be di-
verted into ICTs from other areas of development activity,
particularly as demand for this was not coming from de-
velopment ministries or apparent in either the Millennium
Development Goals or the Poverty Reduction Strategies
being negotiated by many Least Developed Countries. Fi-
nally, they were unconvinced that a new UN agency would
spend resources in this area more effectively than the ex-
isting mechanisms which they supported, including their
own bilateral programmes.
This dispute took the third PrepCom of the first summit
phase to the brink, minutes from the close of negotiations.
Only at the very last minute, at the insistence of the Swiss
PrepCom chair, did the proponents of the DSF back down
and agree to the establishment of a Task Force to investi-
gate the need for such a fund rather than force a dispute in
the summit itself over whether one should be established.
The other major dispute during the first summit phase -
which became the major issue during the second phase -
concerned the governance of the Internet.
The question of Internet governance has many facets, and
was the subject of much misunderstanding during the WSIS
period. One dimension of this was the fact that the Internet’s
emergence as a significant social and economic force had
occurred outside the framework of traditional inter-govern-
mental authority. Much of the Internet was and is un-
governed; much of what it is today was developed by those
who were suspicious of government and capable of using
Internet technologies to bypass any that might be imposed
on it; much of the governance that does exist (managing
resources such as domain names, developing protocols,
etc.) is based on participative rather than inter-governmen-
tal models, very different from those within the UN system.
Many people - including many in the Internet community
itself, the private sector and industrial countries in par-
ticular - believe the Internet’s dynamism to be dependent
on this very lack of governance. Others, particularly de-
veloping country governments, have been wary of some-
thing highly unpredictable and uncontrolled and feel that
it should be brought within the conventional governance
processes established by the UN system - processes which
give governments authority and which, at least in theory,
give weak governments and governments of smaller states
an equal say with those that are more powerful or more
secure. Many participants in the WSIS process also as-
sumed, wrongly, that one Internet governance body, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), had far more wide-ranging powers to govern the
Internet than are actually within its remit.
These issues were complicated by the history of the
Internet, in particular its origins in the United States’ mili-
tary and academic community. As a result of this history,
key Internet institutions (such as ICANN) and facilities
(such as the root server system) were located in the US
and, to many, appeared therefore to be subject to US con-
trol - an impression that was strengthened rather than
weakened by US officials’ unwillingness to recognise the
basis for other governments’ concern. The Bush adminis-
tration’s controversial interventions in international politi-
cal and economic affairs – particularly, many interviewees
observed, the Iraq war which began in March 2003 - helped
to politicise this issue, making it, for some countries and
participants, as much about the United States as about
the Internet itself: it certainly provided a vehicle for anti-
Americanism. As with financing mechanisms, Internet gov-
ernance issues proved too intractable for resolution dur-
ing the first phase of the summit and the final PrepCom
agreed to defer them to a working group that would meet
between the first and second summit phases.
Geneva summit output documents
Having negotiated these last-minute crises, the Geneva
summit was held, amid an air of some relief, in December
2003. For many participants, particularly from civil soci-
ety, the most important or useful dimension was the space
that Geneva provided for networking, including a success-
ful exhibition and meeting area known as the ICT for De-
velopment Platform.10  This “summit fringe” is reviewed in
Chapter 7 of this report.
The first phase of the summit ended with the publication
of two core documents: the Geneva Declaration of Princi-
ples and the Geneva Plan of Action. As implied above, these
documents were the outcome of protracted negotiations
during the first phase PrepComs, and only finally agreed,
at a specially reconvened PrepCom, with minutes to spare
before midnight on the day before the summit opened.
The Declaration of Principles11  is an aspirational text which
incorporates different, sometimes contradictory, visions
10 See www.ict-4d.org/about.htm.
11 The Declaration of Principles is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/
documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|0.
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of the role of ICTs and the nature of an information soci-
ety. Its oft-quoted opening words are these:
We, the representatives of the peoples of the world … de-
clare our common desire and commitment to build a peo-
ple-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Informa-
tion Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and
share information and knowledge, enabling individuals,
communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in
promoting their sustainable development and improving
their quality of life.12
It places this aspirational vision - which does not refer di-
rectly in this opening to technology - within the context of
established UN agreements, from the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights to the Millennium Declaration (which
sets out the world community’s targets for poverty reduc-
tion, the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs). The
limits of ICTs’ potential are acknowledged but within a
highly positive endorsement of their role:
We are aware that ICTs should be regarded as tools and
not as an end in themselves. Under favourable conditions,
these technologies can be a powerful instrument, increas-
ing productivity, generating economic growth, job creation
and employability and improving the quality of life of all.
They can also promote dialogue among people, nations
and civilizations.13
The Declaration as a whole works through the implications
of these aspirations in different areas of activity, each of
which is subsequently developed in the associated Plan
of Action.
Two significant operational or process principles were also
adopted in the Declaration.
Firstly, the Declaration established a commitment to multi-
stakeholder participation, which became known as the
Geneva Principle:
We recognize that building an inclusive Information Soci-
ety requires new forms of solidarity, partnership and co-
operation among governments and other stakeholders, i.e.
the private sector, civil society and international organiza-
tions. Realizing that the ambitious goal of this Declara-
tion - bridging the digital divide and ensuring harmonious,
fair and equitable development for all - will require strong
commitment by all stakeholders, we call for digital soli-
darity, both at national and international levels.14
Secondly, the Declaration included a commitment to coop-
erative international action to achieve the principles con-
tained within it, relate these to the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) agreed by the UN General Assembly in 2000,
and establish coherent follow-up mechanisms for the sum-
mit as a whole. This section of the Declaration included a
compromise statement on the Digital Solidarity Fund issue
which had almost broken the summit during its final
PrepCom meeting, and which referred back to the Geneva
Principle described above.
… while appreciating ongoing ICT cooperation through
various mechanisms, we invite all stakeholders to commit
to the “Digital Solidarity Agenda” set forth in the Plan of
Action. We are convinced that the worldwide agreed ob-
jective is to contribute to bridge the digital divide, pro-
mote access to ICTs, create digital opportunities, and ben-
efit from the potential offered by ICTs for development.15
The Declaration of Principles also invited the UN Secre-
tary-General to set up a working group on Internet gov-
ernance, one of the two key fora addressing highly con-
troversial issues between the first and second phases of
the summit.
The stated purpose of the Geneva Plan of Action16  was to:
[translate] the common vision and guiding principles of
the Declaration … into concrete action lines to advance the
achievement of the internationally-agreed development
goals, including those in the Millennium Declaration, the
Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg Declaration
and Plan of Implementation, by promoting the use of ICT-
based products, networks, services and applications, and
to help countries overcome the digital divide.17
It is notable that this first paragraph of the Plan of Action,
unlike that of the Declaration of Principles, has an explic-
itly technological focus. Indeed, the Plan of Action as a
whole refers predominantly to ICTs rather than the infor-
mation society as its objective.
The Plan of Action sets out a number of “indicative targets
[which] may serve as global references for improving con-
nectivity and access in the use of ICTs, … to be achieved by
2015,” the target date also set for the majority of the MDGs.
These targets18  (listed in the box below) set both techno-
logical and developmental goals, but these are less pre-
cise than those set in the MDGs - there is, for example, no
definition of what level or quality of “connectivity” is im-
plied, or of what, precisely, “access” means.
12 Declaration of Principles, 2003, section A, article 1.
13 ibid., section A, article 9.
14 ibid., section A, article 17.
15 ibid., section B11, article 61.
16 The Plan of Action is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/
doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1160|0.
17 Geneva Plan of Action, 2003, section A, article 1.
18 ibid., section B, article 6.
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GENEVA PLAN OF ACTION TARGETS
FOR ACHIEVEMENT BY 2015
a. to connect villages with ICTs and establish
community access points;
b. to connect universities, colleges, secondary
schools and primary schools with ICTs;
c. to connect scientific and research centres with
ICTs;
d. to connect public libraries, cultural centres,
museums, post offices and archives with ICTs;
e. to connect health centres and hospitals with
ICTs;
f. to connect all local and central government de-
partments and establish websites and email
addresses;
g. to adapt all primary and secondary school cur-
ricula to meet the challenges of the Informa-
tion Society, taking into account national cir-
cumstances;
h. to ensure that all of the world’s population
have access to television and radio services;
i. to encourage the development of content and
to put in place technical conditions in order to
facilitate the presence and use of all world lan-
guages on the Internet;
j. to ensure that more than half the world’s inhab-
itants have access to ICTs within their reach.
The Plan of Action then describes a series of action lines
in the following areas, each building on principles set out
in the Declaration:
1. The role of governments and all stakeholders in the
promotion of ICTs for development
2. Information and communication infrastructure: an es-
sential foundation for the Information Society
3. Access to information and knowledge
4. Capacity building
5. Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs (in-
cluding such issues as privacy, information security
and spam)
6. The enabling environment (both that required for ef-
fective deployment of ICTs and that potentially facili-
tated by ICTs)
7. ICT applications: benefits in all aspects of life - with
sections of text devoted to e-government, e-business,
e-learning, e-health, e-employment, e-environment, e-
agriculture and e-science
8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and
local content
9. Media
10. Ethical dimensions of the Information Society
11. International and regional cooperation.19
These action lines eventually formed the basis for the WSIS
follow-up process agreed two years later in Tunis.
The text of much of the Plan of Action derived initially from
suggestions submitted by governments to the ITU, text re-
lating to which was developed and agreed in negotiating
fora. The strength of this process is its inclusiveness, at
least where those invited to participate are concerned. Its
weakness is a lack of prioritisation and as a result (as is
often the case with such documents) these Plan of Action
sections tend to list aspirations rather than establishing
the basis for an implementation programme. The section
on capacity-building, for example, contains sixteen item-
ised points; that on the enabling environment eighteen.
In addition, much less attention was paid to the potential
downsides of information technology, than to its opportu-
nities: there are a few words only, for example, on spam;
very little on the use of ICTs in cyber or conventional crime;
nothing on the potential use of ICTs for government sur-
veillance and control.
From the perspective of this study, two sections of the Plan
of Action are particularly important, those elaborating on
the multistakeholder process and on the international
“solidarity”/policy development agenda.
The Plan of Action builds on the Declaration’s Geneva Prin-
ciple by allocating roles to stakeholders, as follows:
a. Governments have a leading role in developing and
implementing comprehensive, forward looking and
sustainable national e-strategies. The private sector
and civil society, in dialogue with governments, have
an important consultative role to play in devising na-
tional e-strategies.
b. The commitment of the private sector is important in
developing and diffusing information and communi-
cation technologies (ICTs), for infrastructure, content
and applications. The private sector is not only a mar-
ket player but also plays a role in a wider sustainable
development context.
c. The commitment and involvement of civil society is
equally important in creating an equitable Information
Society, and in implementing ICT-related initiatives for
development.
d. International and regional institutions, including in-
ternational financial institutions, have a key role in
19 ibid., section C.
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integrating the use of ICTs in the development proc-
ess and making available necessary resources for
building the Information Society and for the evalua-
tion of the progress made.20
This statement of roles represents a compromise rather
than a consensus - a form of words acceptable to those
wishing to promote and those preferring to restrict multi-
stakeholder participation in decision-making. Its implica-
tions are considered in Chapter 4.
The “Digital Solidarity Agenda” was also developed by the
Plan of Action. Again, the text here represented a compro-
mise between advocates of special funding for ICT/ICD
activities (the proponents of the Digital Solidarity Fund)
and donors concerned to mainstream ICTs in development
rather than to give them special status. It announced the
establishment of a Task Force on Financial Mechanisms,
to work under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General;
and set up procedures for the development of benchmarks
of ICT activity, including “a composite ICT Development
(Digital Opportunity) Index”.21
The second summit phase - from Geneva,
December 2003 to Tunis, November 2005
The outcome of the first phase of the summit might be
summarised, therefore, as follows:
a. Broad principles were agreed, which might be taken
as defining an international consensus on the infor-
mation society. This was ambitious and aspirational
in tone, with little implementation detail. With the ex-
ception of the “digital divide”, it focused almost en-
tirely on “digital opportunities” and paid little atten-
tion to major problems arising in the information and
ICT sectors.
b. Compromise was reached on texts concerning conten-
tious issues of human rights and freedoms of infor-
mation and expression. However, these issues re-
mained unresolved and continued to provide an un-
dercurrent of dissension during the second phase,
exacerbated by tensions over human rights and free-
dom of expression within its host country, Tunisia.
c. The two major issues of controversy during the first
phase - financing mechanisms (and particularly the
proposed Digital Solidarity Fund) and Internet govern-
ance - were referred to interim fora under the auspices
of the UN Secretary-General, with a remit to report
back to the second phase of the summit through its
preparatory process.
The preparatory process for the second phase of the sum-
mit followed the model set during the first. Once again, a
series of regional meetings was held to enable prior dis-
cussion of issues at a “continental” level (though this time
the European region did not bother with a regional
event):22
• Western Asia (Syria, November 2004)
• Africa (Ghana, February 2005)
• Asia-Pacific (Iran, May/June 2005)
• Latin America and the Caribbean (Brazil, June 2005).
With the agenda focused on a small number of specific
issues, the organisers also encouraged thematic rather
than regional discussion.
Substantive negotiations again took place through a se-
ries of PrepComs, held in Hammamet, Tunisia in June 2004
and in Geneva in February and September 2005.  This time,
however, the work of the PrepComs was more structured,
being built around the work of three smaller-scale fora
which fed their work into the PrepCom system. These in-
terim fora are described in the following sections.
Interim fora
The first and least known of these three fora was the Group
of Friends of the Chair. This Group, made up of govern-
ment representatives from six countries in each region plus
regional coordinators and representatives of the ITU, the
UN Secretary-General and the two host countries, was set
up by the first PrepCom of the second phase with the re-
mit of developing the documentary basis for negotiations
during that phase. Its critical role lay in developing what
was known as the “political chapeau”, the basis of the ul-
timately agreed Tunis Commitment which set out the
agreed ethos and vision of the WSIS project. Important
issues of debate within this context included the status
within the second phase of the text agreed in Geneva and
the nature of the follow-up process to WSIS after Tunis.
Much more contentious, at least initially, were the two in-
dependent fora established by the UN Secretary-General,
at the request of the Geneva phase of the summit, to re-
solve critical issues that could not be resolved in Geneva -
the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms and the Working
Group on Internet Governance. These interim fora played
an important - in many ways crucial - role in the evolution of
WSIS overall. Both, significantly, addressed problems - of
infrastructure finance and of Internet governance - rather
than the opportunities that Secretary-General Annan had
represented as characterising the summit overall in his
opening address in Geneva. They were, however, substan-
tially different in the means they adopted to address these.
20 ibid., section A, article 3.
21 ibid., section E, article 28.a.
22 Records of the second phase preparatory meetings
can be accessed at www.itu.int/wsis/preparatory2/index.html.
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The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM) was the
earlier of these independent fora to report. As noted above,
intense argument had centred during the first phase of the
summit around a proposal to establish a Digital Solidarity
Fund which would focus international resources on the
“digital divide”. Donor countries strongly resisted the idea
of establishing a new ICT-specific international fund, be-
lieving that development resources should be allocated
within rather than outside the Monterrey Consensus, that
existing resources for ICT investment were both sufficient
and underutilised, and that a separate funding arrange-
ment for ICTs was difficult to reconcile with their main-
streaming approach to ICD.
The remit of the TFFM, agreed in Geneva, reflected these
priorities: the Task Force was to review the adequacy of
existing financial mechanisms, and to propose “improve-
ments and innovations of financing mechanisms” in the
light of that review - including “the effectiveness, the fea-
sibility and the creation of a voluntary Digital Solidarity
Fund.”23
The structure of the Task Force, unlike that of the parallel
Working Group on Internet Governance (see below) was
comparable with many similar UN task forces and working
groups before it. Organised by the UNDP with support from
other multilateral agencies, it met only twice, relying sub-
stantially on the work of consultants rather than engaging
directly in analysis itself. Unlike WSIS, where delegations
were led by diplomats and telecoms sector specialists, the
Task Force had substantial representation from mainstream
development sectors in both donor and developing coun-
tries, and this difference is evident from a report which is
much more reflective of mainstream development thinking
than the Geneva Declaration and Plan of Action. Member-
ship of the Task Force is listed in Annex 2.
Its report24  begins by noting both the innovation and the
dynamism of the ICT sector, and its subsequent line of ar-
gument can be summarised as follows. Enabling ICT infra-
structure to be deployed and enabling it to support devel-
opment activity both depend heavily on the environment
for innovation, investment, business development and
service provision. In practice, infrastructure investment has
moved from traditional public (government and multilat-
eral agency) sources in the 1980s to the private sector in
the 1990s, benefiting from deregulation of telecoms mar-
kets. Though Northern investment has fallen significantly
since 1999, there has been an increase in Southern invest-
ment and in innovative multistakeholder partnerships -
trends that should be encouraged as the investment re-
quirements for broadband, in particular, greatly exceed the
capacity of governments and donors to invest. Less atten-
tion has been paid to applications development and ca-
pacity-building, and more investment is needed here - with
more donor involvement - if the benefits of ICTs are to be
fully realised.
Based on this analysis, the Task Force drew the following
conclusions:
1. It recommended governments to maximise the attrac-
tiveness of their environments to private sector infra-
structure investment, as the best way of securing re-
sources to extend network access and service provision.
2. It recommended improvements to processes enabling
ICD applications and initiatives, including greater pool-
ing of requirements and experience-sharing.
3. It called for innovative approaches to finance investment
in more difficult areas such as those which are geo-
graphically remote, and to meet new, more expensive
but potentially productive challenges such as regional
infrastructure and broadband network deployment.
4. It suggested a range of “improvements and innova-
tions” to existing financing mechanisms, including
better coordination of institutional funds, multistake-
holder partnerships and more effective use of domes-
tic finance.
The downgraded Digital Solidarity Fund won the barest of
endorsements from a report which firmly emphasised “the
context of available financing for the broader set of devel-
opment agendas and goals,”25  including the Monterrey
Consensus and the Millennium Declaration, and the im-
portance at a national level of incorporating ICD within Pov-
erty Reduction Strategies and similar national develop-
ment programmes.
The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was
more innovative in both membership and process than the
Task Force on Financial Mechanisms. Chaired by the UN
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for WSIS, Nitin Desai,
it brought together a wide range of people from govern-
ment, private sector and civil society and included diverse
Internet expertise. Civil society participants were chosen
through a process of dialogue with civil society organisa-
tions, which submitted a list of suggested members al-
most all of whom were accepted. Membership (which is
listed in Annex 2) was also geographically extensive and
inclusive. However, WGIG members acted as individuals,
not as representatives of any interest group, government
or agency. They met four times in formal session, holding
public sessions open to participation by all-comers and
so enabling much more extensive engagement with their
work by the private sector, civil society and the Internet
community than is generally the case in comparable fora.23 Geneva Plan of Action, section D2, article 27.f.
24 The report of the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms is available from:
www.itu.int/wsis/documents/
doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1372|1376|1425|1377. 25 TFFM report, 2004, section C2, p. 10.
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WGIG members focused in teams on issues of particular
interest to them, doing much of their work in online dia-
logue, supported by an expert secretariat. Participants in
the WGIG interviewed for this report generally felt very
positive about its processes and about their ability to par-
ticipate – as, indeed, did interviewees on the margins who
wanted to get their point of view across through the pub-
lic sessions organised by the WGIG.
The remit given to the WGIG in the Geneva Plan of Action
was that it should: 
i. develop a working definition of Internet governance;
ii. identify the public policy issues that are relevant to
Internet governance;
iii. develop a common understanding of the respective
roles and responsibilities of governments, existing
intergovernmental and international organisations and
other forums as well as the private sector and civil so-
ciety from both developing and developed countries;
iv. prepare a report on the results of this activity … for
the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005.26  
The WGIG report,27  agreed in June 2005, succinctly re-
sponds to the first three of these objectives, with the more
contentious material it might have contained relegated to
a subsidiary “background report”.28   Internet governance
is defined as follows:
Internet governance is the development and applica-
tion by Governments, the private sector and civil soci-
ety, in their respective roles, of shared principles,
norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and pro-
grammes that shape the evolution and use of the
Internet.29
This definition found its way into the Tunis Agenda, the
final WSIS report.30
The WGIG divided public policy issues relevant to Internet
governance into four categories:
a. Issues relating to infrastructure and the management
of critical Internet resources (such as the domain name
and root server systems)
b. Issues relating to the use of the Internet (such as spam,
network security and cybercrime)
c. Issues that are relevant to the Internet but have an
impact which is much wider … and for which existing
organisations are responsible (such as intellectual
property and international trade)
d. Issues relating to the developmental aspects of
Internet governance, in particular capacity-building in
developing countries.31
The report commented on issues in categories b., c. and
d., but its most important work concerned issues relating
to infrastructure and the management of critical Internet
resources - the issues that lay at the heart of the concerns
raised during the first summit process, especially over the
United States’ role and responsibilities.
Although it attempted to divide roles and responsibilities
between different stakeholders, the WGIG’s lists of these
are less clear-cut than the text later adopted in Tunis (see
below). At the heart of its report, however, lie three princi-
ples derived from the Geneva Declaration of Principles,
which formed the basis for much of the subsequent debate:
• No single Government should have a pre-eminent role
in relation to international Internet governance.
• The organizational form for the governance function
will be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with
the full involvement of Governments, the private sec-
tor, civil society and international organisations.
• The organizational form for the governance function
will involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovern-
mental and international organizations within their
respective roles.32
Alongside these principles, the WGIG agreed that there
were “two overarching prerequisites to enhance the legiti-
macy of Internet governance processes”:
• The effective and meaningful participation of all stake-
holders, especially from developing countries.
• The building of sufficient capacity in developing coun-
tries, in terms of knowledge and of human, financial
and technical resources.33
The WGIG was not able to agree on a model for oversight of
the Internet on this basis - the issue was too controversial -
but it was able to put forward four alternative models as
the basis for future discussion in WSIS itself. These were:
1. A Global Internet Council, “anchored” in the United
Nations, consisting of government representatives,
which would take over the functions currently man-
aged by ICANN, plus many of the policy and other re-
sponsibilities in categories b., c. and d. above (a model
characterised in much media discussion as the UN tak-
ing over the Internet).
2. No specific oversight organisation but perhaps an en-
hanced Governmental Advisory Committee in ICANN.
26 Geneva Plan of Action, section C6, article 13.
27 Available from: www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.doc.
28 Available from: www.wgig.org/docs/BackgroundReport.doc.
29 WGIG report, section II, para. 10.
30 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, article 34.
31 WGIG report, section III, para. 13.
32 ibid., section V, para. 48.
33 ibid., section V, para. 74.
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3. An International Internet Council (independent of the
UN) to perform the functions currently undertaken by
ICANN and perhaps any other public policy functions
that did not fall within the remits of other intergovern-
mental organisations.
4. A complex multiple governance model including a gov-
ernment-led Global Internet Policy Council, a private-
sector-led replacement for ICANN (WICANN), and a
Global Internet Governance Forum involving govern-
ments, the private sector and civil society on an equal
footing.34
Finally, whatever oversight arrangements might emerge
from WSIS, the WGIG proposed the creation of a “global
multi-stakeholder forum to address Internet-related pub-
lic policy issues.”35  As well as including non-governmen-
tal stakeholders, this would be more inclusive of develop-
ing countries. It would provide a space within which a wide
range of Internet-related issues could be discussed and
developed, but would not have decision-making powers.
This proposal forms the basis for the Internet Governance
Forum that was ultimately agreed in Tunis.
The second summit PrepComs
and Tunis summit
The negotiating process for the second phase of the sum-
mit closely resembled that for the first, at least in method-
ology. Texts were negotiated in PrepComs by national del-
egations in which diplomats, particularly those from Ge-
neva missions, tended to play the leading role. Diplomats
aside, most national delegations continued to be domi-
nated by communications ministries and telecoms sector
specialists. Private sector and civil society representatives
were still only allocated a marginal role in formal negotia-
tions (but did have limited speaking rights), though both
played significant roles in caucusing and developing texts
outside the formal process, and gained networking value,
too, as a result. Some interviewees suggested that the pri-
vate sector was significantly more apparent during phase
two than it had been during phase one.
There were, however, substantial differences in the way
that the second phase was conducted. PrepCom 1, in June
2004, set the scene for the overall process and established
the Group of Friends of the Chair. PrepCom 2, it was agreed
in advance, would focus on financing mechanisms and
PrepCom 3 on Internet governance. This sequencing of is-
sues, built around the work of the three interim fora, had
significant implications for the nature of the second phase
debate. As the negotiating process continued, PrepComs
divided much of their energies into two subcommittees -
Subcommittee A dealing with Internet governance and
Subcommittee B with everything else before the Summit.
PrepCom 3 needed to be reconvened twice, as the date of
the Tunis summit drew near, to consider the remaining con-
tentious issues concerning Internet governance and fol-
low-up activities and, as in Geneva, final resolution of these
was not reached until the last evening before the summit
was due to begin.
One of the key issues at the start of the second phase was
the determination of a number of countries that issues
dealt with in the text of the Geneva documents should not
be reopened - that the summit should move on, as the Eu-
ropean Union put it, “from principles to action”, rather than
reverting to the disputes over rights, for example, that had
been “resolved” in 2003. Once that principle was estab-
lished, the second phase could focus on three main issues:
financing mechanisms, Internet governance and the fol-
low-up and implementation of WSIS output documents.
The text on general principles of ICD, within the political
chapeau, was not particularly contentious, and these over-
all ICD issues were therefore relatively little discussed dur-
ing the second phase. Among significant developments in
this area in the long term may be efforts to establish bench-
marks for measuring ICD activities, including the ITU’s de-
velopment of a (rather telecoms- and Internet-focused)
Digital Opportunity Index. A stocktaking exercise, intended
to assess progress in ICD developments since the Geneva
meeting, provided little more than a list of initiatives re-
ported to the WSIS secretariat, rather than a substantive
basis for measuring action in the round.
As it happened, the second phase of the summit coincided
with a review of the Millennium Development Goals held
by the United Nations in September 2005, but the
synergies between the two were few. ICTs featured little in
the reviews of MDG issues by the Millennium Project and
barely at all in the review of progress towards achieving
MDGs in the UNDP’s Human Development Report.36  Little
was said at the Millennium review summit itself about
them, though a certain degree of interaction had been
established in the Geneva documents, for example in mak-
ing the terminal dates for WSIS targets consistent with the
2015 objectives of the Millennium Declaration.
The second PrepCom, in February 2005, focused on and
effectively resolved the issues concerning financing
mechanisms, at least so far as the WSIS process was con-
cerned. Issues which had proved deeply divisive at the end
of the first phase were barely raised again after that point.
In effect, the PrepCom agreed the conclusions of the Task
Force on Financial Mechanisms, and no new mechanisms
were established to finance ICT or ICD activities. The Digital
34 ibid., section V, paras. 52-71.
35 ibid., section V, para. 40.
36 See the reports of the Millennium Project at
www.unmillenniumproject.org/, and UNDP, Human Development
Report 2005 - International cooperation at a crossroads:
Aid, trade and security in an unequal world, at hdr.undp.org/reports/
global/2005.
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Solidarity Fund became a small, voluntary body - estab-
lished enough to avoid embarrassment but in a form and
on a scale unlikely to have much impact on overall devel-
opment activity. Critical to this outcome was an agreement
reached during the African regional meeting, just before
the second PrepCom, in which key multilateral agencies,
including the World Bank and the European Commission,
agreed to support regional infrastructure development in
Africa - perhaps the first stage in a rethinking of the role of
multilateral agencies in ICT infrastructure finance since
donors and the international financial institutions effec-
tively withdrew from this area in the early 1990s.
By far the most contested area of discussion during the
second summit phase was that of Internet governance,
which threatened - like the Digital Solidarity Fund during
the Geneva phase - to prevent agreement being reached
on a final set of outcome documents. Given the amount of
time devoted to Internet governance, and the way in which
international media covered WSIS 2 when it finally took
place, the Tunis event looked and felt at times more like a
world summit on Internet governance than on the infor-
mation society.
The WGIG report was not received with the same air of con-
sensus as that from the TFFM; indeed, some interviewees
(who disagreed with the tone of the WGIG) questioned
whether it had any impact at all on the subsequent debate.
The United States was adamant that the WGIG report should
not provide a basis for negotiation, though it was in prac-
tice discussed substantially by Subcommittee A. Overall,
most interviewees believed, the WGIG report did have a sig-
nificant impact. It provided perhaps the first clear defini-
tion of Internet governance and sorted some of the ques-
tions arising from the Internet into a coherent order - not
necessarily one that everyone agreed with, but one that
helped develop a common understanding and a common
framework for negotiations. While its suggested models for
Internet governance were not particularly influential, the po-
liticised nature of the debate around oversight perhaps
meant that no recommendations on this theme would have
withstood negotiations. One of the most substantive out-
comes of the summit on Internet governance, the creation
of an Internet Governance Forum, can be seen as a direct
outcome of a proposal made by the WGIG.
Negotiations in Subcommittee A of the remaining PrepComs
were intense and fraught. A small number of large develop-
ing countries - some acting as a “like-minded” bloc - led the
attack on the status quo, particularly perceived United
States control of ICANN and the root server system. The
United States and a group of supporting countries resisted.
The European Union took a third line, widely seen as a break
with the United States, built around “enhanced coopera-
tion” of Internet governance processes. Civil society focused
resources, not unsuccessfully, on seeking to secure, and
then to broaden the remit and the scope for multistake-
holder participation in the proposed Internet Governance
Forum. It was difficult even for participants to see, at the
end of the day, exactly who had won or lost what in this
particular debate.
The final issue of contention was follow-up activity. Here
again, industrial countries were anxious to avoid the crea-
tion of elaborate new institutions. The compromise reached
was one that involved many UN agencies but left the ques-
tion of control - and the potential for turf battles within the
UN system - unresolved. As with the Internet Governance
Forum, much will depend on what happens next.
The Tunis phase outputs
As with the Geneva phase of the summit, the Tunis phase
generated two outcome documents, the Tunis Commit-
ment and the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society.
The Tunis Commitment37  begins by reaffirming the con-
tent and positions taken in the Geneva Declaration of Prin-
ciples and Plan of Action, and restates the positive view of
ICTs as an instrument of social and economic development
- of “progress”, its authors might have said - which is ar-
ticulated at greater length in the Geneva Declaration of
Principles. Also reaffirmed were the special commitments
made to particular geopolitical and social groups (devel-
oping countries, small island states, women, young peo-
ple, indigenous communities, etc.).
Language here was not uncontested: there was renewed
discussion, for example, about the roles of different stake-
holders; continued discussion about the nature of refer-
ences to terrorism, cybercrime and the relationship between
proprietary and open source software; strengthened lan-
guage concerning child abuse. The digital solidarity agenda
was placed squarely in the context of debt relief and trade
reform as well as financial assistance. But, in essence, the
Commitment is a restatement of the values and principles
established in Geneva in briefer and more general terms.
The stated purpose of the Tunis Agenda38  was to move
from principles to action. It concentrates on the three core
areas of focus for the summit’s second phase: financing
mechanisms, Internet governance and the follow-up and
implementation of WSIS outcomes.
As noted above, the text on financing mechanisms was
agreed by the end of PrepCom 2 and discussion on this was
not reopened later in the Tunis phase. The text concerned
was closely modelled on the conclusions of the Task Force
on Financial Mechanisms. It affirms the importance of ICT
investment but in instrumental rather than aspirational
37 Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/
doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2266%7C0.
38 Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/
doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2267%7C0.
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terms. It places this investment firmly within the context
of wider development investment and of agreed develop-
ment instruments such as the Monterrey Consensus; sug-
gests ways in which existing investment sources could be
more effectively coordinated and/or used; urges, encour-
ages and supports ways of helping, facilitating or enhanc-
ing outcomes rather than prescribing solutions. The Dig-
ital Solidarity Fund, so contentious in the Geneva phase,
is welcomed in its new, residual form as “an innovative
financial mechanism of a voluntary nature open to inter-
ested stakeholders.”39
The text on financing mechanisms is, therefore, what might
be described as a reformist text, which represents a con-
sensus built around improvements to the status quo rather
than radical new initiatives - and lacks the sense of urgency
and priority for ICTs articulated in the Geneva Declaration
and Tunis Commitment. Some key questions - in particu-
lar, those around strategic investment in areas such as
broadband infrastructure - are raised but, effectively, re-
ferred back to pre-existing institutional fora: matters for
the multilateral development banks, for bilateral and mul-
tilateral donors, for private sector investment and public-
private partnerships, etc., rather than for special interven-
tion, specialist summits or special Funds.
The second main section of the Tunis Agenda is concerned
with Internet governance. It is less dependent on the WGIG
than is the financing section on the TFFM, though the is-
sues and options as set out by the WGIG played a major
part in its creation. Its development, as noted above, was
much the most contested area of discussion during the
second summit phase; and the rather incoherent struc-
ture of the final text reflects the last-minute nature of the
consensus that could be achieved.
It begins by adopting the WGIG definition of Internet
governance:
A working definition of Internet governance is the de-
velopment and application by governments, the pri-
vate sector and civil society, in their respective roles,
of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making
procedures, and programmes that shape the evolu-
tion and use of the Internet.40 
“The international management of the Internet,” it adds,
should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with
the full involvement of governments, the private sector,
civil society and international organizations. It should
ensure an equitable distribution of resources, facilitate
access for all and ensure a stable and secure function-
ing of the Internet, taking into account multilingualism.41
The inelegance of this second paragraph betrays its ori-
gins in textual compromise. Parts of the text on Internet
governance were fought over word by word and phrase by
phrase. That which was finally agreed recognised:
that the existing arrangements for Internet governance
have worked effectively to make the Internet the highly
robust, dynamic and geographically diverse medium
that it is today, with the private sector taking the lead
in day-to-day operations, and with innovation and
value creation at the edges.42
It recognised, too, the complexities of Internet governance,
but was unable to resolve the political contradictions be-
tween key players in the PrepCom disputes. Signatories
to the Agenda document, for example, were “convinced
that there is a need to initiate, and reinforce, as appropri-
ate, a transparent, democratic and multilateral process,
with the participation of governments, private sector, civil
society and international organizations, in their respective
roles” - a statement built around ambiguity (“as appropri-
ate”, “in their respective roles”) rather than agreement.
“This process,” it continued, “could envisage creation of
a suitable framework or mechanisms, where justified, thus
spurring the ongoing and active evolution of the current
arrangements in order to synergise the efforts in this re-
gard” (likewise note “where justified”, “in this regard”).43
The Agenda affirms that “Countries should not be involved
in decisions regarding another country’s country-code Top
Level Domain (ccTLD),”44  but does not resolve future ar-
rangements for this. “Enhanced cooperation” is consid-
ered essential, including cooperation on “the development
of globally-applicable principles on public policy issues as-
sociated with the coordination and management of criti-
cal Internet resources,”45  but the mechanisms to develop
this are deferred for consideration by those concerned, and
by a forum to be established through the office of the UN
Secretary-General (see below).
Although the section does not deal with the Internet in gen-
eral or in principle, it does address some Internet policy is-
sues outside the specific governance context. Developing
country concern about high international connectivity costs
is mentioned, for example, alongside a list of potentially
ameliorative measures. There is also text on public policy
issues such as cybercrime, spam and “abusive uses of ICTs”.
From the perspective of this report, two issues are of cru-
cial importance - the role and relationships of different
stakeholders, and the future structure for Internet-related
dialogue and decision-making.
39 Tunis Agenda, article 28.
40 ibid., article 34.
41 ibid., article 29.
42 ibid., article 55.
43 ibid., article 61.
44 ibid., article 63.
45 ibid., article 70.
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The roles of different stakeholders in Internet governance
are defined as follows:
… the management of the Internet encompasses both
technical and public policy issues and should involve
all stakeholders and relevant inter-governmental and
international organizations. In this respect it is recog-
nised that:
a. Policy authority for Internet-related public policy
issues is the sovereign right of States. They have
rights and responsibilities for international
Internet-related public policy issues;
b. The private sector has had, and should continue to
have, an important role in the development of the
Internet, both in the technical and economic fields;
c. Civil society has also played an important role on
Internet matters, especially at community level,
and should continue to play such a role;
d. Inter-governmental organizations have had, and
should continue to have, a facilitating role in the
coordination of Internet-related public policy is-
sues;
e. International organizations have also had and
should continue to have an important role in the
development of Internet-related technical stand-
ards and relevant policies.46
Inter-governmental organisations (though not govern-
ments) are explicitly encouraged “to ensure that all stake-
holders, particularly from developing countries, have the
opportunity to participate in policy decision-making relat-
ing to Internet governance, and to promote and facilitate
such participation”.47
Much of the argument about Internet governance during
the latter stages of the second summit phase concerned
the possible establishment of an Internet Governance Fo-
rum (IGF) and its potential remit. The final decision, as
noted earlier, was to ask the UN Secretary-General to con-
vene the first meeting of a Forum, which would then:
Build on the existing structures of Internet governance,
with special emphasis on the complementarity between
all stakeholders involved in the process - governments,
business entities, civil society and intergovernmental
organizations.48 
Given a wide remit, based on language some of which origi-
nated with civil society, the Forum was to develop its own
processes and procedures, with a “lightweight and decen-
tralised” management structure and an initial five-year
term. However, it was to be a discussion forum:
The IGF would have no oversight function and would
not replace existing arrangements, mechanisms, in-
stitutions or organizations, but would involve them and
take advantage of their expertise. It would be consti-
tuted as a neutral, non-duplicative and non-binding
process. It would have no involvement in day-to-day
or technical operations of the Internet.49  
In short, the nature, role and influence of the Forum were
left up for grabs. Its implications for future international
policymaking are discussed in Chapter 8.
Thirdly, the Agenda document considers implementation
and follow-up arrangements for the rest of WSIS’ agenda
issues. This area, too, was substantially debated and con-
tested during second phase PrepComs, as different agen-
cies jockeyed for position (or, in some cases, to avoid it).
Much of the text in this section reaffirms the WSIS ap-
proach to and objectives for ICTs in development, placing
it within the context of mainstream development activity
and reiterating the stated importance of multistakeholder
participation.
It is worth, firstly, looking to identify just what “commit-
ments” are actually made in the WSIS outcome texts. In prac-
tice, even in the Tunis Commitment itself, use of the word
“commitment” is relatively scarce. There are only a few
places, in any of the texts, in which the summiteers formally
commit themselves to undertake particular courses of ac-
tion, rather than recognising perceived truths, affirming be-
liefs, recommending particular approaches or calling on
governments and others to action in line with broad objec-
tives.50  The one place in which formal commitments do ap-
pear at length, and might be considered summarised, comes
towards the end of the Tunis Agenda, and is set out in An-
nex 3. If the WSIS follow-up process is meant to monitor
and encourage long-term outcomes, this comes as close as
possible to a definition of what those outcomes might be.
No “new operational bodies” are required by the Agenda
document for implementation or monitoring of WSIS out-
comes, but there is significant jostling of institutional ar-
rangements within the UN system. Instead of an overall
WSIS review agency, the UN Secretary-General was asked
to set up a UN Group on the Information Society within
the framework of the UN Chief Executives Board (CEB),
“with the mandate to facilitate the implementation of WSIS
outcomes.” The CEB should take into account, in devel-
oping this, “the experience of, and activities in the WSIS
process undertaken by” the three agencies that might be
likely to contest its leadership, the ITU, UNESCO and the
UNDP.51  ECOSOC was also asked to review WSIS outcomes
in 2006, and consider possible changes to the Commis-
sion on Science and Technology for Development. 
46 ibid., article 35.
47 ibid., article 52.
48 ibid., article 73.
49 ibid., article 77.
50 See list of commitments in Annex 3.
51 Tunis Agenda, article 103.
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1 The resolution is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/
resolutions/73.html.
Although in some ways not quite a conventional UN sum-
mit, WSIS has generally been perceived as falling within the
long line of UN summits which have addressed major chal-
lenges to the international community over many years. This
chapter of the report looks, firstly, at the structure of UN
summits in general, and their appropriateness for consid-
eration of ICT issues; then at some specific issues concern-
ing the organisation of WSIS, and how these affected rep-
resentation and other issues; and finally, suggests some
interim conclusions about the implications of WSIS organi-
sation and structure for future international ICT decision-
making. It is not concerned with the participation of differ-
ent actors, which is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
A summit for ICTs?
The possibility of a world summit on the information soci-
ety was first proposed by the ITU Plenipotentiary Confer-
ence (to insiders, the “Plenipot”) in 1998 and its organisa-
tion was led, on behalf of the United Nations, by the ITU.
The genesis of the Summit, briefly mentioned at the start
of Chapter 3, is an interesting story in itself and has been
generally misunderstood. The summit was not approved,
as most participants assumed, from substantial debate
within the “Plenipot” but through the adoption, without
discussion, on the last day of the conference, of one among
a number of proposals for which no time for debate had
been found earlier in the meeting and which were not
deemed contentious. The resolution itself was unclear
about both the scope of the “information society” and the
nature of the “world summit” it proposed.1  However, those
involved at the time say that they did not think it implied a
UN-style summit of the kind that subsequently took place;
one insider remembers most of those involved anticipat-
ing a relatively small gathering of sectoral experts and
selected heads of state which could look at the issues and
make recommendations, not least concerning the future
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Wide Telecommunications Development”, assembled by the ITU. Its
report is available from: www.itu.int/osg/spu/sfo/missinglink/
index.html.
of the ITU itself (a significant point of concern in the origi-
nal resolution). Similar meetings had been organised by
other UN specialist agencies on issues of concern to them
but also of wider interest to others in the UN family. The
ITU’s experience with the Maitland Commission in 1984/5
may also have been in some people’s minds as a prec-
edent.2
However, the idea of a concentrated world dialogue on
rapidly changing “information and communications” is-
sues - which might take summit form - was not entirely
new. As early as 1996, the European Commission organ-
ised a global Information Society and Development Con-
ference in South Africa. A multistakeholder Global Knowl-
edge Partnership was launched following international
Global Knowledge Conferences in Toronto and Kuala
Lumpur in 1997 and 2000, including UN agencies such as
UNESCO and the UNDP. Other inter-governmental agen-
cies, notably the World Bank, had begun revising their at-
titudes to information and knowledge issues during the
late 1990s, developing strategies built around the concept
of a “knowledge society”. Within the UN family, UNESCO
in particular was developing a proactive agenda on infor-
mation and communication issues, though from a rather
different - more developmental and cultural, less techno-
cratic - perspective than the ITU. Information and commu-
nication technology was undoubtedly changing very rap-
idly, and the concepts of digital dividend and digital di-
vide were increasingly debated in development as well as
technological circles. The dot.com boom was underway;
the dot.com bust was yet to happen.
Interviewees describe how the ITU’s proposal for a “world
summit”, therefore, met with significant enthusiasm in
principle in parts of the UN system and, just as importantly,
with relatively little opposition. First the UN’s Administra-
tive Committee on Coordination, representing other UN
agencies, endorsed the idea, and then the General Assem-
bly, representing member-states, endorsed the proposal
that it should become a full-scale summit, with all the au-
thority and all the paraphernalia of preparatory commit-
tees and diplomatic negotiation that entails. Once the pro-
posal for a summit of this kind emerges, it has momen-
tum. Many interviewees from governments and interna-
tional organisations described how, though they them-
selves were unenthusiastic, it was difficult for them or their
governments/organisations to argue against a summit
because that seemed to imply that the issue of the infor-
mation society was unimportant. Nevertheless, they con-
tinue to wonder whether a smaller scale initiative might
have been more effective in dealing with many of the is-
sues concerned or in generating more dynamic outcomes.
UN-style summits have become relatively common in re-
cent years - some years have seen several, perhaps partly
as a result of this kind of “summit creep”. Some have
clearly been much more successful than others - the Rio
conference on sustainable development in 1992 and the
Beijing World Conference on Women of 1995 generally
being cited as examples of success which other summits
hope to emulate. The UN itself has developed consider-
able experience in the management of summits and (less
successfully) the expectations they arouse.
Summits are, of course, extremely expensive instruments
of international decision-making. They require large invest-
ments of money and, especially, time from government
officials and subject experts over an extended period,
which represents a considerable opportunity cost, espe-
cially for smaller governments and for non-governmental
actors like those in civil society. They raise high expecta-
tions: if so much time and effort, and the political will of
so many senior people from so many countries, are con-
centrated on a single decision-making forum, people ex-
pect it to achieve great things and are correspondingly dis-
appointed if it reveals more difference than agreement
between the parties. As a result, cynics suggest, whatever
their outcomes, summits must always be described as ei-
ther “successes” or “great successes”.
However, summitry is merely one method of achieving (or
at least seeking) international agreement. Most interna-
tional policymaking is conducted in narrower, more for-
mal, often rule-based organisations like the ITU and the
World Trade Organisation; and is thought to be more ex-
peditiously handled there because it takes place within
groups that have specialist expertise. Summits are, in other
words, rather like referendums: it only really makes sense
to have them on issues that are of fundamental importance
or that cannot be resolved through the conventional inter-
national governance mechanisms that already exist.
Insiders say that this is how they are generally considered
within the UN system. What summits are best at doing is
addressing broad problems that are of fundamental im-
portance to the whole world community, where progress
is not being achieved through conventional inter-govern-
mental mechanisms, and where it seems possible that the
dramatic gesture of heads of state and government col-
lectively signing an agreement will inject a new dynamic
into efforts to resolve that problem. Climate change is a
classic example of the sort of issue for which summits have
been thought appropriate.
Historically, the justification for summits has generally
been that a particular issue has become so important that
it requires the establishment of a new global consensus.
The uniqueness of the summit format is that it can coerce
world leaders into such a consensus. If large numbers of
heads of state and government agree to gather together
in one place to set out how they are going to resolve a
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global problem, the theory goes, it is too embarrassing
for them to have nothing to sign at the end of their confer-
ence. This puts unique pressure on them to achieve agree-
ment, and the object of the whole multi-year preparatory
process is to refine issues to a point at which, often through
last-minute crisis negotiations, an acceptable compromise
consensus can be achieved. This may, in practice, be a low-
est common denominator consensus, or it may be a sub-
stantive agreement which genuinely advances global ac-
tion on an issue, but there is rarely total failure in the sense
that there is no document to endorse. The trick at the heart
of the summit exercise, as one insider described it, is to
set a final date for signature where heads of state will be
too embarrassed to leave without agreement, and to ex-
ploit the potential brinkmanship involved in this to make
the maximum amount of progress on issues that have
proved intractable.
Not everyone within the international system thought that
the information society was susceptible to this kind of
approach, for a number of reasons. One of these was in
fact suggested by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan –
though as a cause for celebration, not concern – in his
opening remarks to the Geneva summit in December 2003.
“This summit is unique,” he said; “Where most global con-
ferences focus on global threats, this one will consider how
best to use a new global asset.” But, the previous para-
graph suggests, summits have been used for problems
rather than opportunities for a reason. Problems concen-
trate minds on the choices between different ways of tack-
ling them. Opportunities are far more open: there are far
more ways that opportunities can be seized than prob-
lems can be tackled. When governments are asked how
problems might be tackled, they will respond by exclud-
ing options, which makes it possible to narrow down
choices for action. When they are asked how opportuni-
ties might be seized, they make lists which it is easiest for
summit officials to combine in ever bigger lists, rather than
to prioritise. Summits, in short, look less well suited to
deal with opportunities than with problems, not least be-
cause there is nothing urgent enough to forge consensus
at a global level between heads of state and government.
Other stakeholders tend to behave differently as well.
Faced with global problems, private sector businesses tend
to emphasise the difficulties involved in the solutions prof-
fered (consider climate change, for an example); presented
with opportunities, they are more likely to promote their
products, as they did in WSIS’ exhibition space. Problems
focus civil society attention on a narrow range of issues;
opportunities give them scope to show the full range of
their diversity of interest and approach.
Many participants in WSIS, from all stakeholder groups,
were concerned about its cost and cost-effectiveness, and
about whether the global attention it achieved added as
much value as could have been achieved through other
less expensive fora or existing channels. How many
telecentres, one interviewee put it, could you establish
with the money spent on WSIS?; how many anti-retrovirals
could you supply to those living with HIV and AIDS?
Interviews and other evidence suggest that the implica-
tions of this character of WSIS were seen in four ways dur-
ing the event as a whole.
Firstly, WSIS was treated much more seriously by devel-
oping countries than by industrial countries. The number
of heads of state and government attending the Geneva
and Tunis sessions was relatively low, but delegations from
industrial countries were particularly likely to be led by
junior ministers or even civil servants rather than by the
hoped-for heads of state and government. This would
seem to stem logically from the “opportunity” rather than
“problem” focus of the event. Industrial countries saw lit-
tle value for them in discussing the development of the
information society at home, and had less interest in dis-
cussing the information society in development than did
developing countries. They only really became engaged
in it where it impinged on international decisions that did
affect them: for example, in the allocation of development
funding or the management of a resource (the Internet)
that they considered critical to their economies. Develop-
ing countries had a much stronger interest, at least within
the plenaries where their representation was much more
senior.
Secondly, the summit received much less attention from
powerful centres within government than most other sum-
mits have achieved. National delegations were generally
built around ministries of information and communication,
supported by the Geneva UN missions of their countries.
These were the obvious departments of government to deal
with issues being handled by the ITU. However, ministries
of information and communication are usually peripheral
to the foci of power within governments: their ministers
are not key ministers, their budgets are relatively small,
their influence on presidents and ministers of finance is
pretty weak. One presidential advisor interviewed for the
project put it this way: “the ministry of communication saw
WSIS as a way of building its prestige, and we didn’t feel
the issues involved were important enough for us [at the
centre of government] to intervene, so we let them have
their heads.” The impact of this on the representation of
developing countries is discussed in Chapter 6.
Thirdly, the summit’s discussion of “digital opportunities”,
and the way this is reflected in its outcome documents,
was discursive and poorly focused. The ITU’s invitation to
governments - and regional WSIS meetings - to submit their
thoughts on opportunities which ICTs could address was
essentially a list-making exercise, and this set something
of a tone for negotiations on the content of output docu-
ments. The African WSIS bureau, the Bamako Bureau, for
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3 Some in civil society have argued that this is because civil society was
effectively excluded from participation in the drafting of the Plan of
Action. Others, however, point out that the WSIS document was less
substantive than those emerging from other summits (from whose
drafting civil society organisations were also absent); and that the
absence of development-oriented civil society organisations from the
summit preparatory process would have made it difficult for civil
society to reflect the consensus of development (rather than ICT-
focused) NGOs.
4 Approximate data derived from www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Indicators/
Indicators.aspx#.
5 Approximate data derived from www.ucc.co.ug/marketInfo/
marketstatistics.php.
example, set up after the Africa regional conference dur-
ing the first summit phase, agreed 21 “priorities” for ac-
tion. Debate about content of the output documents re-
fined the texts proposed – debating points of disagreement
(perhaps resolving them through ambiguity, perhaps de-
leting any that were too contentious), adding special ref-
erences to particular groups (women, young people, the
disabled, indigenous peoples) and particular issues. The
Geneva Plan of Action essentially compiles the contribu-
tions received and discussed in this way, but does nothing
to prioritise them - either by assessing their relative impor-
tance or by sequencing them for maximum effectiveness;
nor does it discuss the limitations, difficulties, costs or
potential conflicts between them. Certainly, it is hard to
find anyone experienced in ICD that thinks the Plan of Ac-
tion pushed the boundaries of thinking on the role of ICTs
in development or the role of ICTs in social change – what-
ever it might have achieved in terms of awareness-raising.3
Fourthly, summit negotiations actually focused in practice
not on these opportunities but on what were seen as prob-
lems - the issues of infrastructure finance and Internet
governance; to a lesser extent, the conflict between na-
tional sovereignty and information rights; and, underly-
ing these, “the problem of the digital divide”. Thus, while
much of the text of the Geneva Plan of Action is concerned
with the potential role of ICTs in development, the negoti-
ating process that accompanied it was preoccupied with
the much narrower question of the desirability of a Digital
Solidarity Fund to address disparities of investment re-
sources for ICTs and ICD. The second summit phase saw
almost no discussion of development or wider “informa-
tion society” issues in principle, but was preoccupied al-
most in its entirety, first by resolution of the disagreements
over infrastructure finance (PrepCom 2), then by the issue
of Internet governance and the question of follow-up proc-
esses. Cynics in Tunis had a case for saying that the sec-
ond phase was a summit not on the information society,
but on Internet governance, and for questioning whether
agreement on that was sufficiently important to ensure
so much attention from so many people for so many years.
Nevertheless, it was the ability of the summit process to
achieve a consensus on Internet governance that ulti-
mately enables it to be labelled a “success” today.
One further point is worth making about the subject mat-
ter for the summit. Four years is a long time for the interna-
tional community to discuss any issue. It is a particularly
long time to spend within a single process on a subject
which is changing as rapidly as information and communi-
cation technology. Within the four year WSIS timescale,
the number of Internet users worldwide at least doubled,
reaching perhaps one billion;4  teledensity in Uganda rose
from 1% to 6%;5  major new technologies were developed
with the potential to transform future ICT deployment,
while the cost of others plummeted. The ICT landscape of
2005 differed markedly from that of 2001. Yet, while the
summit documents repeatedly refer to the dynamism of
ICT markets, they themselves were remarkably undynamic.
Where the “information society” itself and the role of ICTs
in development are concerned, the texts agreed in 2005
show no significant change from those of 2003, which were
themselves based on contributions put forward in 2001
and 2002. Some interviewees have suggested that – again,
regardless of what it may have done in terms of aware-
ness-raising – WSIS may have actually slowed rather than
accelerated thinking and decision-making about these is-
sues by focusing it around perceptions from a particular,
receding moment in time.
Summit organisation: the role of the ITU
Six more specific organisational and structural issues con-
cerning WSIS were consistently raised by respondents in
interviews and questionnaires for this study. These were:
1. The role of the ITU as principal summit organiser, its
relations with other UN agencies, and the implications
of these for the summit as a whole
2. The division of WSIS into two phases
3. The role of regional meetings and preparatory com-
mittees
4. The role of the two interim fora, the TFFM and the WGIG
5. The follow-up process instituted for WSIS in the Tunis
Agenda
6. The relationship between WSIS and other international
decision-making fora on both ICTs and development.
Some of these issues are discussed in depth in other chap-
ters of this report. Representational issues concerning the
TFFM and the WGIG, for example, are considered in Chap-
ter 7 and the follow-up process is addressed in Chapter 8.
The following sections of this chapter therefore focus on
the role of the ITU, the summit’s two-phase structure, the
role of regional meetings and preparatory committees, and
the relationship of WSIS with other international decision-
making fora. The first two of these distinguish the organi-
sation of WSIS from other comparable summits, making it
perhaps more appropriate to call it a “UN-style” summit
than a UN summit per se.
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www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/73.html.
7 See UN General Assembly resolution 56/183, available from:
www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/
56_183_unga_2002.pdf.
The role of the ITU
Although it largely fitted into the standard summit format,
WSIS was not, as indicated earlier, an entirely conventional
international summit and it is worth looking at some of
the differences between it and other summits in this con-
text. In particular, the organisation of WSIS was led by one
of the UN specialist agencies, the ITU, rather than by the
UN’s central organisation.
The possibility of a world summit on the information soci-
ety was, as noted earlier, proposed by the ITU Plenipoten-
tiary Conference in 1998, though it had been raised earlier
in the 1990s in discussion within the UN system and among
some civil society organisations. This resolution described
the ITU as “the organisation best able to seek appropriate
ways to provide for development of the telecommunica-
tion sector geared to economic, social and cultural devel-
opment,” and so to facilitate “the emergence of the con-
cept of the information society in which telecommunica-
tions play a central role.”6  The idea of a World Summit
grew through iterations with other parts of the UN family
into an event of the type normally described as UN sum-
mits. The UN General Assembly gave the job of organising
this now-grander summit to the ITU in January 2002.7
The character of any summit is, of course, likely to be sub-
stantially determined by its organisational structure. In-
terviewees for the project suggest that the decision to give
the ITU the lead responsibility had five significant effects
on the organisation of the Summit and thereby on its out-
comes. Each of these has significance for this study.
Firstly, the lead role of the ITU implied a certain approach
to the content of the Summit. The ITU is a technical agency,
not just in the sense that it has a specialist issue to deal
with, but in the sense that this issue is technological. ITU
conferences, staff and study groups deal with highly tech-
nical issues like spectrum allocation, telecommunication
standards and the regulation of interconnection rates. Even
the ITU’s development arm, the Telecommunication Devel-
opment Bureau, is primarily concerned with “the devel-
opment of telecommunications” rather than with “tel-
ecommunications in development”. With the best will in
the world, the ITU lacks expertise in wider policy areas such
as human rights and mainstream development, and its
personnel tend to see ICTs as technologies (or new tech-
nologies) rather than within the cultural framework of in-
formation and communications (which preoccupies
UNESCO), the development policy framework (which con-
cerns the UNDP and other UN specialist agencies) or the
rights agenda (which preoccupies many civil society or-
ganisations). In practice, the ITU’s management of WSIS
was also undertaken by the central secretariat of the Un-
ion, working to the Secretary-General. The ITU’s Develop-
ment Bureau played only a marginal role in the organisa-
tion and content of WSIS – something which seemed odd
to outsiders, but less strange to those familiar with inter-
nal ITU politics.
Secondly, as noted earlier, the ITU’s lead role in turn af-
fected the composition of national delegations to WSIS.
Because invitations to participate were issued by the ITU,
they naturally found their way to the departments of gov-
ernment responsible for relations with the ITU – predomi-
nantly ministries of communications, information, infor-
mation technology or (at their widest) commerce and in-
dustry. Aside from diplomatic personnel, participation in
national delegations – which is discussed further in Chap-
ter 6 – came predominantly, in most countries, from these
departments of government, from the regulatory agencies
associated with them, and from the telecommunications
businesses owned or partly owned by them (mostly fixed
telecoms operators). Mainstream development ministries
were poorly represented at WSIS for a number of reasons,
discussed in Chapter 6, but one of them was that invita-
tions from the ITU only reached them if they were passed
on by the ministries that received them – and those minis-
tries tended to see the information society as their con-
cern, or perhaps their opportunity.
So, thirdly, many felt, did the ITU. The last three decades
have seen the ITU’s role and authority over its traditional
mandate greatly diminished. Liberalisation of telecommu-
nications leaves much less scope for governments to make
binding agreements; none, really, any longer for binding
agreements between state-owned monopolies. As
telecoms services have become openly traded and
telecoms infrastructure has become more open to foreign
investment, the inter-governmental dimension of telecom-
munications has become governed as much, in many ways,
by the rules of the World Trade Organisation as by a spe-
cialist sectoral body like the ITU. Standardisation of tech-
nological development has also been dealt with more and
more in recent decades by the private sector – which now
leads work in this area within the ITU, since it extended
the scope for private sector participation in the early 1990s.
ITU pessimists recognise the risk of the Union diminish-
ing to little more than a spectrum management agency –
unless of course it finds a new and wider role.
For some within the ITU – member-states and permanent
officials – the organisation of WSIS undoubtedly repre-
sented an opportunity to carve out that niche; to become
for the information society, and perhaps the Internet, what
the original International Telegraph Union was for the tel-
egraph in 1865. For organisations to seek new fields of
activity is, of course, entirely proper; whether they suc-
ceed depends on how far their aspirations chime with their
existing stakeholders and with potential partners already
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involved in areas they wish to address. In this case, the
ITU’s potential role was highly contentious. Not everyone
within the ITU itself – again member-states and permanent
officials - is convinced of the propriety of its extending its
mandate into wider areas. Industrial country governments,
for example, have been far less sympathetic to the ITU’s
evolving in this way than those of developing countries,
for reasons discussed in Chapter 5. There is genuine and
longstanding debate within the ITU about this question.
More importantly for the nature of WSIS, however, the ITU’s
potential expansion into areas of development and cul-
tural policy was contested by the UN agencies most con-
cerned with these areas. The nature of this contest was
described by some of those involved as a “land grab” by
one side or the other; and equally downplayed by others
(on both sides). The key fact is that there were underlying
tensions about expertise, roles and responsibilities. Dur-
ing the initial set-up period for the summit, there were
continuing differences between the developmental visions
of UNESCO, the UNDP and other development agencies
within the UN family and what they saw as the technologi-
cal determinism of the ITU. The compromise reached was
that the ITU organised WSIS in partnership with other
major agencies, through a High Level Summit Organising
Committee able to advise the ITU on issues beyond its
mandate. Nevertheless, inter-agency tensions remained
evident throughout both phases of the summit right up to
the discussions concerning WSIS follow-up, where they
resulted in the unwieldy, multi-headed implementation
structure which is discussed in Chapter 8.
Fourthly, although WSIS operated in the manner of a UN
summit, it was never entirely one in the normal sense. As
well as being managed by a specialist agency rather than
the United Nations central organisation, it also received
no funding from the central structure but had to raise its
own. Insiders suggest that this was the primary reason why
WSIS sessions were held over three days rather than five,
putting more pressure on PrepComs to deliver a final text
to the summit and allowing less scope for last-minute ad-
justments to be made by heads of state themselves.
The ITU’s lead role also meant that the Summit was or-
ganised from Geneva rather than New York, which had
tended to play the greater role in previous summits. UN
insiders suggest that there are marked differences of char-
acter between the UN organisations in its two core homes
– with New York emphasising the UN’s political character
and Geneva the role of specialist agencies; and with the
political centre in New York having, at best, doubts about
the organisational capacity of specialist agencies to han-
dle what is a fundamentally political event. Cultural differ-
ences within the UN, they suggest, may have exacerbated
tensions in the organisational process. Certainly, ITU in-
siders acknowledge that they found some WSIS issues –
such as human rights – difficult to handle because they
had no knowledge of them or their political nuances within
their own experience. Input from the highly experienced
former UN Under Secretary-General for economic and so-
cial affairs Nitin Desai, key organiser of many past sum-
mits, undoubtedly helped to facilitate organisational is-
sues as the summit progressed.
One further point here is that, while all UN member-states
have diplomatic missions in New York, a number of smaller
countries do not have missions in Geneva. Their ability to
play a role in WSIS may have been diminished by this.
Unlike for example in the UN’s political work and in the
WTO, participation in ITU activities is usually led by coun-
try-based rather than mission-based personnel, and this
may also have impacted on participation.
Fifthly, the ITU’s lead role created some additional chal-
lenges in addressing the participation of non-governmen-
tal organisations, particularly civil society. Over decades,
UN summits had gradually opened up some space for non-
governmental stakeholders within their formal processes,
though always within a framework in which governments
retained sole responsibility for drafting and agreeing texts.
This partial and gradual opening had been overseen by
the UN’s political process in New York, particularly
ECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council, which has for-
mal responsibility for liaison between the UN system and
non-governmental actors.8
The ITU, however, has a different tradition. The changing
nature of telecommunications in the 1980s and 1990s meant
that the ITU had to be much more accommodating to pri-
vate sector interests than other UN specialist agencies, go-
ing so far as to enable them to become “Sector Members”
and to play a full (even a leading) role in some ITU activities
(especially concerning standards), even if formal decision-
making power remained with governments (as some gov-
ernments remain determined to assert at every opportu-
nity). On the other hand, the ITU established no compara-
ble status to offer “civil society”. Civil society organisations
cannot (at least easily) play any formal part in ITU activi-
ties, such as study groups, or be accredited to ITU confer-
ences. This exclusion was challenged with some, but not
great, enthusiasm by some civil society NGOs in the later
1990s, and remained in place when the management role
for WSIS was formally handed to the ITU in January 2002.
Interviewees had different interpretations of how this af-
fected the participation of civil society in WSIS. Some ar-
gued that the ITU’s lack of understanding of civil society
organisations and concerns made it harder for these to
gain ground, particularly when hardline anti-civil society
national delegations sought to maintain ITU-style purity
within the WSIS structure. However, as Chapter 7 shows,
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the fact is that civil society participation in WSIS was sig-
nificantly greater than that in any previous summit. An al-
ternative interpretation, therefore, is that the ITU’s inex-
perience and lack of processes for handling civil society
may actually have facilitated the latter’s participation.
Without arrangements of its own to handle civil society
involvement, the ITU, in this interpretation, needed to work
through a specialist civil society bureau within the WSIS
secretariat whose very existence normalised a much
greater degree of civil society participation in WSIS than
might otherwise have happened. Certainly, the ITU tended
to leave a good deal of the responsibility for developing
civil society input to this bureau. Chapter 7 explores this
question further.
A two-phase summit
The second organisational aspect of WSIS to be consid-
ered at this point is its unique division into two summit
phases, the first culminating in the Geneva Summit of De-
cember 2003, the second in the Tunis Summit of Novem-
ber 2005. Publicly, this two-phase structure was justified
as enabling the first phase to concentrate on principles
and the second on implementation. In fact, as everyone
knew, it resulted from the UN’s failure to choose between
two competing bids to host the summit, one from the home
of the ITU, the other from the government which proposed
the original “Plenipot” resolution calling for a summit.
Few participants interviewed were convinced of the mer-
its of the two-phase approach. Most – even those enthu-
siastic about WSIS overall – were concerned about the
additional high cost of participation, both financially and
in the time of expert personnel. They found it hard to per-
suade themselves that a two-phase approach had suffi-
cient value to justify doubling this expense. On the whole,
in spite of rhetoric, it seems unlikely that the United Na-
tions would choose to repeat this way of doing things.
The central question here is one of whether, whatever the
origins of the two-phase structure, its public justification
did in fact occur: whether the principles developed during
the first summit phase and outlined in the Geneva out-
come documents were translated into action in the sec-
ond phase. In fact, as described in Chapter 3, this did not
happen. The principles agreed in Geneva were not, in the
first place, particularly incisive or coherent; they certainly
did not amount to a comprehensive, prioritised plan of
action, nor did they have any structures through which
implementation could be coordinated or monitored. In
spite of prior agreement not to do so, a few countries did
try, early in the second phase, to reopen points of princi-
ple – for example concerning human rights – but without
success. Industrial countries, in particular, were adamant
that the second phase should not cover the same ground
as the first. But, interviewees tended to agree, the estab-
lishment of principles on rights and development issues
in phase one led not to debate about implementation in
phase two but to the absence of debate about those is-
sues. Disputes over the “WSIS follow-up” process were,
in effect, debates about an implementation process which
should happen after WSIS, not during its second phase.
Language on development in the Tunis Agenda added
nothing to that in the Geneva Plan of Action – and, indeed,
the “action lines” listed in the Geneva Plan became the
basis for implementation planning after Tunis. A couple of
initiatives by the ITU – a stocktaking exercise and the pub-
lication of a Golden Book of WSIS-related initiatives – were
more concerned with advocacy for ICD than with imple-
mentation planning.
What the second phase did, in practice, was provide a
framework for the resolution of the two main outstanding
issues from the first – i.e. infrastructure finance and
Internet governance. However, few interviewees felt that
resolution of these issues necessitated a second summit
phase, rather than alternative processes built around ei-
ther new or existing spaces for debate. Similar unresolved
problems from other summits have been handed on to
smaller, focused fora along the lines of the WGIG and the
TFFM without being referred back to global summits. For
many participants from industrial countries, in particular,
the second phase became a prolonged exercise in what
they saw as damage limitation, ensuring that changes were
not made to the compromise principles established in the
first phase, and seeking to avoid what would be, for them,




The third structural issue worth considering is the role of
regional meetings and preparatory committees.
This structure forms part of the package of summit organi-
sation. It is, essentially, how UN summits are done. Input
from regional gatherings – and perhaps thematic meetings
– is assembled by the coordinating central organisation.
Documents resulting from this input are put before pre-
paratory committees, whose role it is to develop texts for
agreement, ultimately, by heads of state and government.
Debate focuses around the wording of texts: wording that
is unacceptable to some parties is gradually displaced,
when those parties insist, by wording which is acceptable
to all – either because it represents a genuine consensus
or because, through ambiguity, it glosses over differences.
Experts in drafting international agreements, from diplo-
matic missions, play the key role in this process which usu-
ally requires many iterations over the course of the pre-
paratory period. Preparatory committees are there  fore
the locus for intense lobbying by interested stakeholders;
though, when the final summit takes place, the media tend
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9 Geneva Declaration of Principles, article 2.
10 See www.un.org/millenniumgoals/#.
to give and the general public to receive the impression that
the whole agreement was put together by heads of state
and government in the course of a single week or less.
It is fairly obvious that the quality of any final agreement
here is going to depend on the quality of inputs (whether
from regional meetings or elsewhere), the quality of draft-
ing expertise and the extent of political will to reach agree-
ment. Few interviewees for this report had much experi-
ence of summits other than WSIS but those that had did
not suggest that the experience in WSIS was very much
different, in terms of quality, from that elsewhere. Inter-
viewees experienced in ICT policymaking, however, did
have some concerns. Two points are, at least, worth con-
sideration.
Firstly, regional meetings varied substantially in character
and outputs. Some involved extensive civil society partici-
pation – as in Africa; others were much more formal and
government-focused, like those in the Asia/Pacific region.
Some made substantive contributions; others had rela-
tively little to offer (such as the European meeting during
the first phase; none was held in Europe during the sec-
ond). Their contributions to the central secretariat there-
fore varied in content, style and quality; and there were
significant clashes between inputs from different regional
meetings which the central secretariat found it difficult to
resolve. Some of those involved felt that this was not the
best way to begin writing texts which ought to be coher-
ent and comprehensive approaches to the issues under
consideration.
As for preparatory committees, a great deal of time was
wasted during those for WSIS on issues that were not sub-
stantive in terms of content. The first PrepCom of the first
phase was almost entirely occupied with procedural mat-
ters: in particular, who should be allowed to take part in
what? When issues of substance were discussed, most ob-
servers with ICT experience found debates frustrating –
with a good deal of misinformation about issues and a
good deal of political posturing getting in the way of the
more substantive and better informed discussion they
experienced at fora which had decisions of immediate
importance to take. (Those involved in both tended to com-
ment that they found debates at ITU meetings and confer-
ences frustrating, too, but less frustrating than they found
those at WSIS.) PrepComs were much more dynamic and
focused when issues became politically contentious, as
in the disputes over financing mechanisms and Internet
governance. The quality of PrepCom management here,
which is to some degree a matter of chance, could be of
great significance. Many interviewees, for example, felt
that a positive outcome to the discussions on Internet gov-
ernance in Subcommittee A of the second phase PrepComs
had been possible to a large degree as a result of the way
in which that subcommittee was chaired (by the Pakistani
ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Masood Khan).
WSIS and the wider world
The final structural issue worth consideration here is the
relationship between WSIS and other international deci-
sion-making fora, both other international summits and
mainstream international ICT decision-making bodies.
The year 2005 saw not just the second phase of WSIS but
also a United Nations summit session devoted to review-
ing progress towards achievement of the Millennium De-
velopment Goals. The outcome documents from the first
phase of WSIS were clear that ICTs had, potentially, a ma-
jor role to play in facilitating achievement of the MDGs:
“Our challenge,” in the words of the preamble to the Ge-
neva Declaration of Principles, “is to harness the poten-
tial of information and communication technology to pro-
mote the development goals of the Millennium Declara-
tion.”9  A good deal of discussion had been undertaken,
within WSIS, the UN ICT Task Force and elsewhere, about
the contribution which ICTs could make to individual
MDGs, while MDG target 18 itself calls on governments
and inter-governmental organisations, “in cooperation
with the private sector, [to] make available the benefits of
new technologies - especially information and communi-
cations technologies.”10  Yet this input was barely visible
in the global development discourse that took place in the
Millennium Review Summit.
This lack of relation between WSIS and mainstream de-
velopment fora is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5. It
was not just a problem of content, however, but of struc-
ture. No significant structural links were established be-
tween the two events, which would have enabled an inter-
change of views or integration of proposals. The conjunc-
tion of a global summit which emphasised the role of ICTs
in development with a global summit which largely ignored
their relevance to development’s key goals suggests that
WSIS was never properly integrated with the international
system as a whole and in particular that it failed to address
the “paradigm gap” between ICTs and development which
is discussed in Chapter 5. It also raises questions about
whether the same lack of interaction would have been ex-
perienced if WSIS had been organised by an agency at the
heart, rather than on the periphery, of the UN system.
Much the same level of disconnection can be seen between
WSIS and other international ICT decision-making fora,
with the obvious exception of Internet governance. Cer-
tainly where the Internet is concerned, WSIS debates and
follow-up fora are likely to have a lasting impact on the
future – one which is discussed further in Chapter 5. They
may also have some impact on the future structure of the
ITU. The 2006 World Telecommunication Development
Conference – which sets the ITU Development Bureau’s
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programme for the next four years – discussed the WSIS
outcomes in depth; and the opportunities presented by
WSIS follow-up for the ITU were also a significant issue at
its 2006 Plenipotentiary Conference. But there are many,
many dimensions of international ICT decision-making that
WSIS barely touched. It is hard to see that it will have much
on the 2007 ITU World Radiocommunication Conference,
which will deal with crucial questions of spectrum man-
agement; or on the implementation of the WTO’s Basic
Telecommunications Agreement, which sets the framework
for international investment and liberalisation in telecoms
markets. As things stand, few interviewees could point to
non-Internet areas of international ICT decision-making
like these in which they expected the WSIS outcomes to
have an influential impact.
Conclusions
What does this analysis of WSIS’ structure and its implica-
tions imply for developing countries and for civil society? It
may seem pointless, after the event, to consider whether a
world summit such as WSIS was the best way to address
“information society” issues, but there is a point in looking
at whether the experience suggests any lessons for the fu-
ture. Many of the implications are discussed in more detail
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, but a few suggested conclusions
about structure are worth making here, particularly in re-
gard to developing country and civil society participation.
Firstly, the WSIS experience raises questions about the
value of summitry per se. As noted earlier, summits are
hard to argue against. By their existence, they state that
the international community views their subject as impor-
tant, as a priority. Suggesting that a particular summit pro-
posal should not be pursued is easily misrepresented as
implying that the issue it concerns is not important. In the
case of WSIS, lack of public dissent from the proposal for
the summit was accompanied by extensive private disquiet
about its appropriateness and value amongst international
officials involved in its organisation, within the private
sector, in many governments (especially in industrial coun-
tries) and in a good many civil society organisations. The
key question, this suggests, should not be whether an is-
sue is important enough to merit a summit, but whether
the outcomes from a summit are likely to be sufficiently
more valuable than those that could be achieved other-
wise to justify the high costs involved in time and money.
It is, in other words, about “horses and courses”; the big-
gest is not necessarily the best for the job in hand.
Secondly, the WSIS experience reminds us that summits
are highly political. This, in turn, means that the issues
they discuss - often complex technical issues (such as
Internet governance or global warming) – enter into an
arena of political argument in which actors adopt positions
which are determined not by the issues themselves but
by other issues of the moment. The merits of different ap-
proaches to (say) Internet governance can be caught up in
the backwash of international conflicts (such as Israel/
Palestine or the war in Iraq) or the brokering of deals in
unrelated international negotiations (such as the Doha
round of trade talks). While summits are therefore intended
for use on critical issues that require common action to
which heads of state in general affirm consent, this
politicisation means that such deals are not necessarily
based on the subject under discussion alone. Where there
is widespread misunderstanding or divergence of opinion
about the nature of the subject under discussion – as with
Internet governance – that can be an alarming prospect.
The WSIS experience suggests, in other words, that sum-
mits are not necessarily the most effective way of reach-
ing agreement on international problems. Recourse to
them should not be automatic, particularly given the ex-
pense involved. All stakeholders – governments, interna-
tional organisations and civil society organisations among
them – should assess the cost-effectiveness of summitry
before commitment. The aims of a summit process should
also be clear in advance. In the case of WSIS, many par-
ticipants felt that there was insufficient clarity about a
number of key factors: the scope and substance of the core
question (the “information society”); the management
structure for the summit (particularly the two-phase for-
mat); the role and responsibilities of different stakehold-
ers concerned. Clarification of these issues in advance
might have made WSIS more effective or more decisive;
or it might have suggested that alternative forms of inter-
national discourse would have been more fruitful. As it
was, in the words of one insider, the first phase of WSIS
spent a great deal of time circling issues whose meaning
was unclear rather than addressing real points on which
agreement might achieve results.
A key question here for the “information society” is the
pace of change. Information and communication technolo-
gies change rapidly. So does our understanding of their
implications and applications. And so does our experience
of actual use (consider, for example, the unexpected but
dynamic adoption of the World Wide Web, mobile te-
lephony or SMS). Even a two-year summit process here is
problematic. What is known at the start of 2001 may be
very different from what is understood at the end of 2003,
yet final texts tend to be based on early drafts. How much
more is this a problem when summit processes extend for
four years?
For those who are primarily concerned with ICTs, fore, in-
cluding civil society organisations, it is suggested that the
key question in determining methodologies for interna-
tional decision-making should be outcome-focused. What
will be most likely to achieve agreement?; to achieve agree-
ment which genuinely includes the concerns of a wide
range of stakeholders?; to achieve agreement which is
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likely to prove lasting and has the flexibility needed to
allow continued development in an age of rapid and un-
certain technological change? Alternative ways of reach-
ing agreement to those currently established may be help-
ful here or not. Existing channels have set precedents,
often because they have proved effective, though this
does not mean to say that they remain so, or that they
could not be improved (for example, through greater
inclusiveness). New models, such as those developed in
the Internet community, may also have much to offer. The
important thing is what will work. In the case of WSIS,
many organisations participated in it with low expecta-
tions because it was the biggest show in town and they
could not afford to miss it; but the opportunity costs were
substantial. It was a disruptive event but did not, for them,
live up to its promise.
There is also the question of international representation.
One of the reasons why summits are more favoured by de-
veloping countries than industrial countries is that they go
some way towards redressing the balance of power within
the international community. Developing countries feel that
they have more influence in summits than in the UN’s or
specialist agencies’ normal decision-making processes.
There may well be truth in this, at least at plenary stages,
and the question is discussed in more depth in Chapter 6.
However, the use of summits to bypass the balance of
power in conventional decision-making does not really
address the underlying problems that developing countries
have concerning representation – their lack of influence in
those conventional decision-making processes them-
selves. After all, it is these conventional processes that will
have responsibility for implementing summit decisions. The
relative degree of influence exercised by developing coun-
tries in summits depends, of course, on a variety of factors
– not least the degree of cohesion in developing country
participation. Nevertheless, the weaknesses in WSIS’ struc-
ture and in its outcome documents do nothing to suggest
that less attention should be paid to the conclusions that
the “Louder Voices” study reached in 2002. 
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The World Summit on the Information Society meant dif-
ferent things to different people. Prima facie, from its ti-
tle, it might have been expected to address the broad range
of changes taking place within society as a result of infor-
mation technology. These are taking place in all societies,
industrial as well as developing, albeit in different ways
and to different degrees. In practice, the Summit focused
on a relatively narrow selection of issues - the relation-
ship between ICTs and fundamental rights, that between
ICTs and development, infrastructure finance and Internet
governance - and paid little or no attention to many oth-
ers that it might have considered, such as the impact of
information technology on the relationship between state
and citizen (censorship, the “surveillance state”) or the
role of ICTs in national and international conflict. Much
more attention was paid to ICTs in developing countries
and to relations between industrial and developing coun-
tries (infrastructure finance, Internet governance) than to
the social, economic and cultural changes resulting from
the rapid evolution of ICTs and their deployment in indus-
trial countries (whose governments were much less posi-
tive about the value of a summit in the first place and so
chose not to raise issues of domestic significance within
it). Far more attention was paid to the potential value of
ICTs than to the challenges and risks they pose. At most,
therefore, it would be fair to say that WSIS was a summit
on aspects of the information society rather than on the
information society as a whole.
The concept of an “information society” is itself conten-
tious - and the “information society” as such is never
clearly defined within the WSIS outcome documents, be-
yond the definition of “a people-centred, inclusive and
development-oriented Information Society,” at the start
of the Geneva Declaration, as one where everyone can cre-
ate, access, utilize and share information and knowledge,
enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve
their full potential in promoting their sustainable devel-
opment and improving their quality of life, premised on
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.11
WSIS and its issues
c h a p t e r  5
It would have been interesting to see what answers differ-
ent stakeholders would have given if asked what they
meant by the term. The underlying concept might perhaps
be summarised as a society in which the exchange of in-
formation (i.e. communication) becomes the primary ac-
tivity that determines economic prosperity and governs
people’s lives. An information society, in this sense, can
be taken as implying the opening of a new phase in human
development, one which is as important as the Agrarian
Revolution that separated hunter-gatherer from agricultural
societies, and the Industrial Revolution that marked the
rapid growth of disparities between industrial and agricul-
tural societies in the 18th and 19th centuries. The term was
used in this sense of “progress” by some interviewees,
particularly advocates of ICT, i.e. those who see the infor-
mation society as a positive development and, often, as
an opportunity to overcome the social and international
disparities following industrialisation in a new economic
paradigm. For others, its meaning was much narrower, re-
ferring to specific changes within society rather than to the
transformation of society as a whole. Interviewees for this
project therefore had widely different interpretations of the
term, and many recognised its uncertain nature. They also
had different interpretations of its scope and that of ICTs –
concerning the extent, for example, to which they include
broadcasting. The same degree of uncertainty was very
likely true of participants in WSIS as a whole.
In practice, four issues dominated discussion in the WSIS
process, each of them concerned with a different set of
interactions between ICTs and other aspects of society and
economy and each of particular concern to a different set
of actors. These issues were:
1. The issue of information and communication rights and
their relation to the fundamental rights expressed in
other UN declarations
2. The relationship between ICTs and development
3. The financing requirements of ICT deployment (both
infrastructure and applications)
4. The governance of one specific ICT, the Internet.
11 Geneva Declaration of Principles, article 1.
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This chapter considers each of these in turn, reviewing
participation in them by developing countries and civil
society, and their impact on the longer-term development
of international ICT decision-making.
Human rights and the information society
Issues concerning human rights differed significantly be-
tween the first and second phases of WSIS. During the first
phase, they were principally concerned with the nature of
the WSIS texts’ commitment to existing human rights
standards, in particular reaffirmation of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and of commitments to gender
equity and other fundamental principles. During the sec-
ond phase, the main human rights issues revolved around
the venue for the second summit meeting and conflicts –
not least within civil society, as constituted within WSIS –
about how this should be handled.
The first phase arguments about textual reaffirmation, at
heart, concern what rights are accepted as fundamental by
the international community and what issues relating to
rights – or what nuances of those rights – need to be spelled
out in more detail or with more specificity. This is not the
place for a substantial discussion of international human
rights agreements. It is, perhaps, though, worth noting a
couple of points which had specific relevance to WSIS.
Firstly, the reaffirmation of certain core texts in new in-
ter-governmental agreements, particularly the Universal
Declaration, is essentially a question of the value and
significance of maintaining a common global set of stand-
ards or aspirations. The concept of universal human
rights, which sees them as inherent to all, has an am-
biguous place in international discourse. Declarations of
universal rights and of equality are rarely challenged in
principle, but commonly rejected or ignored in practice,
either because they conflict with cultural norms or be-
cause they conflict with the perceived authority or wishes
of governments. While almost all governments would
therefore claim to endorse fundamental rights agree-
ments such as the Universal Declaration, and the out-
comes of subsequent inter-governmental processes like
the Beijing Declaration following the 1995 World Confer-
ence on Women or the 1990 Convention on the Rights of
the Child, implementation in practice is very far from uni-
versal, and many governments feel uncomfortable with
parts of these core documents. Not explicitly reaffirming
them in new international agreements potentially dilutes
their significance, without overtly challenging the princi-
ples that they contain.
In principle, this question of reaffirmation is no different for
human rights declarations than it is for the documents spell-
ing out the agreed international consensus (or compromise)
on development policy – i.e. the Millennium Development
Goals and the Monterrey Convention. However, in WSIS as
elsewhere, these statements of development principles
have not been subject to the same reaffirmation doubt.
In the case of WSIS, the reaffirmation question was com-
plicated by the fact that the issue under discussion – the
information society – potentially extends the impact which
fundamental rights may have on society and alters the re-
lationship between the government and citizen. New ICTs
such as the Internet obviously have potential to give
greater reach to freedoms of expression than they had
before: more people can potentially communicate, share
ideas and organise collectively than previously. This rep-
resents an increase in freedom of association as well as of
expression.  Content which is restricted or forbidden within
national jurisdictions becomes more readily accessible, in-
cluding content which national governments (and perhaps
also majority opinion) considers morally or politically rep-
rehensible. Rights to information and to communication,
while implicit in established freedoms of expression, there-
fore carry additional nuances. Governments which restrict
freedoms of expression in the first place are wary of their
extension, either in the form of rights to information and
communication or through the impact of new technologies.
In practice, of course, new technologies also offer govern-
ments new opportunities to observe and control citizens’
behaviour, yet this potential was virtually unconsidered
in any WSIS forum, including (with some exceptions) civil
society. The long-term impact of information technology
on the balance of relations between the state and citizen
remains unclear: will the “information society” be one that
empowers individuals or governments, the liberation of
knowledge or the surveillance state? Fifty years from now,
it may well seem odd to those reflecting on it that a World
Summit on the Information Society spent so much time
discussing the domain name and root server systems and
so little on major transformations in the relationships be-
tween people and their governments.
During the second phase of WSIS, the issue of information
and communication rights took on a more immediate and
more “real life” character because the second summit was
to be held in Tunisia, a country with what is generally con-
sidered a poor human rights record, including a record of
obstructing access to Internet sites critical of the govern-
ment and of suppressing free expression of dissent. Not all
governments were happy about the choice of Tunisia, but
the issue had most impact on civil society. Some interna-
tional civil society organisations (CSOs) took the opportu-
nity to denounce the Tunisian authorities; most expressed
solidarity with Tunisian organisations that were harassed
and excluded from participation in the WSIS process.
Their campaigns, however, were complicated by the pres-
ence within WSIS, from the Geneva summit onwards, of Tu-
nisian NGOs supportive of their government – organisations
which were not regarded as “real” NGOs by most interna-
tional civil society organisations, but which nevertheless had
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rights to register and participate as such. They became par-
ticularly active during the first PrepCom of the second phase,
held in Hammamet (in Tunisia) in June 2004. Other civil so-
ciety participants felt their involvement there was aimed at
removing critical references to Tunisia from civil society in-
put and sought to exploit concerns about issues such as
transparency and representativity in ways that fostered
North-South divisions within the civil society group. It was
well-organised and disruptive, both organisationally and
politically. It dominated civil society discussion in the
Hammamet PrepCom, preventing strategisation around
other issues, and continued to be problematic throughout
the second phase. In particular, it hampered civil society
efforts to explore other human rights issues.
During the second summit itself, some international CSOs
worked closely with excluded Tunisian NGOs, including at-
tempts to organise alternative events outside the summit
site. These initiatives were largely prevented by the Tuni-
sian authorities.
The impact of this “Tunisia factor” on civil society within
WSIS is considered further in Chapter 7. Interviews sug-
gest that it was regarded as something of an embarrass-
ment by WSIS organisers that the second summit was held
in a country where freedom of expression was substan-
tially curtailed. To some extent, they suggest, this may re-
flect naïveté on the part of the ITU, especially, at the time
that summit venues were selected. With no experience in
human rights issues, the ITU simply did not anticipate that
the summit would focus substantially on rights issues or
that the selection of Tunisia would prove problematic. Most
participants outside civil society, however, when asked,
did not seem particularly aware of the problems being
faced by Tunisian NGOs or the difficulties this posed for
civil society as a whole.
Issues to do with human rights and, in particular, freedoms
of expression were an important part of the WSIS debate.
However, the two principal areas in which they arose were
essentially ones in which human rights advocates de-
fended established positions – the affirmation of funda-
mental statements of human rights, and the rights of Tu-
nisian civil society organisations to participate effectively
in their own country and in WSIS itself. Many other rights
issues were raised to some extent within the context of
the WSIS outcome texts. Much of the discussion around
these concerned the inclusion of specific references to
particular rights issues within the information society con-
text - either reaffirmations of existing principles or clear
statements of their applicability in a new dimension of
social and economic life. It is difficult to find much in the
texts which can be seen as an extension of human rights
principles, but equally hard to find anything that might
diminish them. As noted above, the global impact of new
ICTs and of an “information society” on the relationship
between the state and citizen received little attention in
the WSIS process as a whole. In the long term, this omis-
sion is probably the most remarkable feature of WSIS’ at-
tention to human rights.
ICTs and development
Most observers now seem to expect summits to focus on
development issues, in particular to provide a forum for
resolving differences between industrial and developing
countries. They expect them to interrogate development
questions, looking in particular at development which is
not occurring rather than developments which are. Thus,
although the “information society” is not inherently either
about developing countries alone or about relations be-
tween them and industrial countries (where the most rapid
changes associated with an information society are to be
found), most interviewees for this project expected, from
the start, that the summit would place development at the
heart of its agenda. This expectation was increased by the
interventions of UNESCO and other development-focused
agencies during the initiation phase of WSIS, when they
sought to dilute the technocratic emphasis they felt the
ITU was giving it, and to increase its social and economic
content.
The WSIS outcome documents convey no sense that the
role of ICTs in development is or has been any way contested.
The Tunis Commitment, for example, refers to “a unique
opportunity to raise awareness of the benefits that Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies (ICTs) can bring
to humanity and the manner in which they can transform
people’s activities, interaction and lives, and thus increase
confidence in the future.”12  In fact, however, the view that
ICTs have a major part to play in development in general is
neither old nor uncontested. This needs some context.
It is, first, relatively new. The much-cited Maitland Com-
mission, which called for action to increase teledensity in
developing countries in the mid-1980s, had little discern-
able impact on international development thinking. Inter-
national financial institutions (IFIs) withdrew from lend-
ing for telecommunications infrastructure in the early
1990s because they felt this could and should be funded
by the private sector. Until at least the mid-1990s, the con-
sensus in development agencies was that ICTs, including
telephony but perhaps excluding broadcast radio, were
luxuries of benefit to the wealthy and irrelevant to poverty
reduction. This view only began to change in the late 1990s,
notably around the time of the first Global Knowledge Con-
ference in 1997. The idea that ICTs are powerful instru-
ments of development is therefore recent.
Nor is it universally held. ICTs do not feature prominently
in the key instruments of international development policy
– the Monterrey Consensus, the Millennium Development
12 Tunis Commitment, article 5.
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Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS)
and other agreements reached between national govern-
ments and donors. The MDGs focus on the reduction of
income and non-income poverty, and set targets for im-
provements in basic indicators of the quality of life (such
as health, education and gender equity) rather than the
use of particular assets (such as bicycles, radios or
phones). Only MDG target 18 mentions ICTs, and does so
in the context of a goal that gathers up a few other issues
rather than giving them priority.13  Neither the reports of
the Millennium Project orchestrated by the UN nor the
Human Development Report published by the UNDP in
2005 to review progress on the MDGs pays much atten-
tion to ICTs; the latter almost none. PRS documents devel-
oped by the governments of developing countries, in as-
sociation with the World Bank and donor countries, also
pay little attention to them. As noted in Chapter 4, there
was little interaction between WSIS and the Millennium
Review Summit, also held in 2005, and WSIS’ debates and
outcomes had little impact on its conclusions.
This dichotomy reflects what is increasingly being seen as
a significant paradigm gap between ICT/ICD advocates,
on the one hand, and many mainstream development spe-
cialists, on the other. Its roots lie in the fact that few main-
stream development specialists have much experience of
the potential and limitations of ICTs, and remain sceptical
about their viability within their spheres of action, certainly
in achieving the very substantial gains put forward by ad-
vocates of new technology; while ICT specialists in gen-
eral have limited understanding of poverty issues or the
constraints posed by limited human resources, intermit-
tent electric power and conservative behaviour patterns
in limiting the impact new technologies have on social and
economic life. The former suspect what they regard as tech-
nological determinism in the latter – the idea that tech-
nologies necessarily imply progress and that, because a
technology can do something, it necessarily will. The lat-
ter suspect the former of conservatism, in particular of
unwillingness to try new methods of doing things in the
face of intractable problems. Most donors have responded
to this paradigm gap by mainstreaming ICTs, in effect sup-
porting ICT use in development programmes only where it
contributes to established mainstream objectives (such
as the MDGs and the national development planning goals
set out in PRS).
Little of this paradigm gap is evident in the WSIS outcome
documents. The Geneva Declaration does acknowledge
that ICTs should not be considered panaceas: “We are
aware that ICTs should be regarded as tools and not as an
end in themselves,” it says, adding that:
Under favourable conditions [emphasis added], these
technologies can be a powerful instrument, increas-
ing productivity, generating economic growth, job crea-
tion and employability and improving the quality of
life of all. They can also promote dialogue among peo-
ple, nations and civilizations.14
However, the surrounding text reflects the conviction of
advocates rather than the concerns of sceptics. Of course,
WSIS did not set out to address this paradigm gap.  It was
initially convened, and then overwhelmingly attended, by
those already convinced of the merits of ICTs in develop-
ment. Although they had different approaches to their
developmental role (and to the importance of technology
per se), the different agencies contesting oversight of WSIS
– the ITU, UNESCO, etc. – all did so from a pro-ICD per-
spective. The overall ethos of WSIS from the start was one
that advocated ICD, which placed it firmly on one side of
the gap and, some mainstream development sector inter-
viewees suggested, undermined interest in it as an event
that might also attract the interest of sceptics.
Some interviewees for this study whose experience
crosses the boundaries between ICD and mainstream de-
velopment – including people based in both ICD and main-
stream agencies - feel that a major opportunity was lost
here. They suggest, in effect, that by treating WSIS as an
opportunity to assert that ICTs were the future for devel-
opment, ICD advocates missed the opportunity to put their
case for this to mainstream development agencies; and
also missed the opportunity to learn sufficient about main-
stream development concerns to make their own assess-
ments more focused on these priorities. A world summit
on the information society, their argument runs, should
have been an opportunity for different perceptions of the
role of ICTs in development to be discussed in depth, and
for a closer common understanding of them to be reached.
The fact that WSIS’ outcomes were largely ignored in the
Millennium Review shows that it did little or nothing to
enhance that common understanding. The lack of any
marked new enthusiasm for ICTs in development in multi-
lateral and bilateral agencies since WSIS or for participa-
tion in WSIS follow-up – and the reduction in interest ap-
parent in some bilateral agencies – adds to this sense of
opportunity lost. If accurate, this is obviously a serious fail-
ing in WSIS as an instrument of international policy, par-
ticularly if, as discussed below, reduction of interest on the
part of donors was accompanied by greater awareness/in-
terest on the part of developing country governments.
It is worth looking at this question from two particular
angles: that of participation in the WSIS events, and that
of the Geneva and Tunis outcome documents.
13 Target 18 commits governments, “in cooperation with the private
sector, [to] make available the benefits of new technologies -
especially information and communications technologies.” See
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/#. 14 Geneva Declaration of Principles, article 9.
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Participation in WSIS varied, but focused strongly on those
with a strong ICT background. This was particularly true in
the preparatory committees, while there was more diver-
sity of participation (or at least attendance) in the plenary
summit sessions:
• Inter-governmental agencies within the UN family par-
ticipated, more or less in accordance with the extent
of their engagement in ICD: UNESCO, the UNDP, the
World Bank and its associated infoDev having a larger
presence, but agencies such as the FAO and the WHO
also showing their ICD wares in exhibition spaces. En-
thusiasm for participation varied here: many of those
interviewed within these agencies felt that it was nec-
essary for them to be present, but that the primary
value from being there would be derived from network-
ing rather than the conclusions of the summit itself.
• Industrial country delegations were led, mostly, by dip-
lomats and by commercial and industrial departments
of government responsible for the ICT sector. Repre-
sentatives from donor agencies within these govern-
ments tended to play a subordinate role, often (they
felt) very subordinate – their prime objective being not
to promote ICTs in development but to prevent com-
mitments being made which went beyond their own
assessments of them. They were less visible during
the second phase of WSIS than the first, at least after
its second PrepCom had effectively resolved the issue
of infrastructure finance. Discussion with such donor
agency representatives suggests that they were, on
the whole, less convinced of WSIS’ merits than their
colleagues from multilateral agencies.
• Developing country delegations were also generally
led by diplomats and by representatives of the tel-
ecommunications establishment (ministries of com-
munications, communications regulators, fixed net-
work operators). With some exceptions, few govern-
ments included mainstream development ministries
in their delegations. However, enthusiasm for WSIS
and for its role in promoting ICTs in development was
much stronger among these delegates than their peers
from industrial countries. Their participation is ex-
plored further in Chapter 6.
• Private sector engagement was primarily directed
through the Coordinating Committee of Business In-
terlocutors (CCBI), which brought together interna-
tional business representative bodies under the lead-
ership of the International Chamber of Commerce.
Participation in private sector engagement with WSIS
focused on businesses with particular interests in the
supply of ICTs (such as equipment manufacturers)
rather than its users (such as the financial services
sector). ICT businesses also took the opportunity of
the summit exhibition spaces to market their goods
and services. More comment on private sector engage-
ment can be found in Chapter 7.
• Civil society participation also focused on agencies
with a particular interest in ICTs – whether from a rights
or an ICD perspective. Mainstream development NGOs
– which are often particularly sceptical about the value
of ICTs for meeting grassroots needs - were mostly
absent, and did not contribute to civil society input
into WSIS. Mainstream rights CSOs were also not par-
ticularly active. Civil society participation is the primary
focus of Chapter 7.
In summary, the record of participation – as seen in list of
participants to PrepComs and summit meetings them-
selves and as discussed with participants from all
stakeholder groups – tends to confirm the view that WSIS
was more a meeting of ICT specialists than a meeting of
minds between such specialists and the wider develop-
ment community.
That view also tends to be confirmed by a review of the
Geneva and Tunis outcome documents. Both of these, as
noted above, strongly endorse the role of ICTs in future
development. A key section of the Geneva Plan of Action
lists a number of application areas in which ICTs are ex-
pected to play such a critical role, prefacing each with the
letter “e” (which, incidentally, is significantly disliked –
perhaps seen as appropriation - in mainstream develop-
ment communities): “e-government”, “e-business”, “e-
learning”, “e-health”, “e-employment”, “e-environment”,
“e-agriculture”, “e-science”.15  The detail, however, that ac-
companies these is poorly structured and has clearly been
agreed by negotiation rather than analysis, derived from
submissions by ICT rather than sectoral specialists. That
on “e-agriculture” illustrates the point - here it is in full:
a. Ensure the systematic dissemination of information
using ICTs on agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries,
forestry and food, in order to provide ready access to
comprehensive, up-to-date and detailed knowledge
and information, particularly in rural areas.
b. Public-private partnerships should seek to maximize
the use of ICTs as an instrument to improve produc-
tion (quantity and quality).16
Much of the text is also written from a supply- or technol-
ogy-led perspective, starting from what ICTs can do rather
than from the development challenges (poverty, illiteracy,
HIV/AIDS, lack of clean water, etc.) that are central to the
MDGs and therefore all mainstream development activity.
Almost all those with a development background who were
interviewed for this project felt that these texts were a poor
reflection of the substantial thought which has gone into
defining the information society and its relation to devel-
opment over the past decade, including the four years of
WSIS itself. Organisations as varied as the World Bank,
15 Geneva Plan of Action, section C7, articles 14-22.
16 ibid., article 21.
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the Canadian International Development Research Centre,
the Global Knowledge Partnership and a variety of non-
governmental organisations have generated far more so-
phisticated and coherent analyses of the potential of ICTs,
the “knowledge society” and related concepts than any-
thing in the WSIS outcome documents.17  The latter, by
comparison, provide a poorly argued case; one that is only
weakly rooted in the overarching development and pov-
erty challenges, and which, today, many already think has
an outdated feel. There is a strong sense of disappoint-
ment amongst development-oriented interviewees for this
study that the outcome of a global summit on these is-
sues should be so much less substantial, developmental
or forward-looking than work which, it is felt, could have
informed it much more effectively.
This WSIS text in fact betrays its origins. To populate the
WSIS draft documents, the ITU asked governments, other
stakeholders and regional preparatory conferences for two
kinds of input: for their views on issues for inclusion, and
for examples of success stories within their own territo-
ries. The former found their way into the draft outcome
documents, the latter into a “WSIS stocktaking” exercise.
The quality and nature of input from regional meetings was
also variable. Perhaps this approach stemmed from the
perception that WSIS was about an opportunity rather than
a problem. It failed, however, to raise questions and chal-
lenges about the role of ICTs in development, or to encour-
age debate about their potential and limitations, either
within contributing governments/countries/organisations
or within the WSIS process.
How do participants feel that WSIS has affected percep-
tions of ICT and development issues among the different
stakeholders? Opinion varies. As might be expected from
the above analysis, while some delegates were support-
ive of the advocacy approach to ICD within WSIS, others
were concerned that it lacked depth and discouraged en-
gagement with other, less committed stakeholder groups.
Certainly, few felt that WSIS did anything to foster innova-
tive thinking about ICTs in development. While innovative
thinking was going on while WSIS took place – indeed,
the four years concerned saw a burgeoning literature of
increasing diversity and quality, much of it available in the
summit exhibition areas and/or presented in the informal
discussion sessions surrounding the summit – hardly any
of this trickled through to PrepComs or to plenaries. The
WSIS outcome documents are not being displayed by ICD
proponents as authoritative statements of the role of ICTs
in development because they do not have sufficient cred-
ibility to play this role, either within or outside the ICD
community.
There is, however, general agreement among interview-
ees that WSIS did foster much greater awareness of the
potential of new technologies, particularly within devel-
oping countries (or at least amongst ICT-related decision-
makers). This, they feel, was not a result of the WSIS texts
or the negotiating process around them, but of the oppor-
tunity WSIS presented for people to meet, network and
share experience. For some, this value came from pro-
longed engagement with particular issues during the
PrepCom process. (Some civil society organisations, for
example, report increased interest in their ICD activities
and advice from developing country governments.) For
more, particularly in civil society, it focused on the infor-
mal summit that surrounded each of the two plenary ses-
sions – the combination of exhibition space, including a
great deal of space devoted to development agency expe-
rience (especially in Geneva), and a wide range of panel
discussions and presentations, the quality and sophisti-
cation of which greatly exceeded those in the summit’s
formal space. Some delegates, as well as observers, also
indulged extensively in the opportunities afforded by the
informal summit. While most participants would therefore
have gained little knowledge from the formal sessions,
many gained a good deal from the informal summit, and
reported that this would influence them in ongoing debate
and policy development at home. They felt the same would
be true of colleagues.
It will be interesting to see how this increased level of
awareness might be built on in the future. On the whole,
WSIS received scant attention in the media anywhere.
Press interest in the first summit was limited, and journal-
ists were more attentive there to press conferences by
heads of state that promised news about issues other than
the summit itself. In the second phase, press interest was
almost entirely confined to Internet governance (very of-
ten poorly understood, and sometimes along apocalyptic
lines (such as “24 hours to save the Internet”)). ICTs and
development did not feature in the media, which did not
therefore generally provide a means for the awareness-
raising experienced by delegates to trickle down to gen-
eral populations (or indeed to many in the wider develop-
ment community).
A separate impact may be seen in the decision-making
processes of developing countries themselves. Most in-
terviewees agreed that the whole WSIS experience did
raise awareness of ICTs within developing country gov-
ernments. Many of those that had not participated in DOT
Force-era enthusiasm for ICT/ICD caught a whiff of that
era’s sense of excitement about their potential. Many of
those who had participated in it had their enthusiasm re-
inforced by the pro-ICT/ICD ethos of WSIS. Although the
quality and scope of their efforts varied, some develop-
ing country governments did try to institute new multi-
stakeholder fora or spaces in which the wider community
could contribute to WSIS policymaking. This question is
17 The extensive literature on ICD issues can be accessed through such
portals as the Development Gateway (www.developmentgateway.org)
and the Communication Initiative (www.comminit.com).
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discussed further in Chapter 6, which illustrates some
country experiences from case studies undertaken for this
study, but it is worth noting now that increased interest
and enthusiasm in developing countries may not be
matched in multilateral and bilateral donors.
Some of the most intriguing, but as yet uncertain, impacts
of WSIS may be on the inter-governmental agencies and
donor governments participating in the summit. Although
development agencies had paid little attention to infor-
mation and communication technologies for development
in the early 1990s, by the time WSIS began the topic was
both familiar and fashionable. The World Bank, UNESCO
and other international agencies had developed substan-
tial policies on ICD, while other specialist agencies were
also looking seriously at its relevance to their work. Many
bilateral donors had initiated ICT/ICD programmes of their
own, from USAID’s Leland Initiative to DFID’s “Building
Digital Opportunities” and the Acacia Programme of Cana-
da’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
Some of these agencies had been involved in the G8 DOT
Force and all played some part, in some cases reluctantly,
in the subsequent UN ICT Task Force. None, however, ac-
cording to interviewees, was likely to increase its activity
in ICD as a specific result of WSIS taking place. WSIS was
never really intended to raise their awareness but that of
others, though it might have been expected to increase
coordination of agency activities (in line with general de-
velopment policy thinking on the need for greater aid har-
monisation).
Interviewees from such agencies were divided about the
impact which it has had on their agencies’ engagement
with the issues. Some felt that WSIS enhanced their abil-
ity to engage with partners and perhaps raised conscious-
ness of their work amongst their colleagues. Others con-
sidered it a diversion from what might have been more
productive ICD initiatives and suggested that it may even
have reduced subsequent interest among their colleagues:
“now that the summit is over”, said one, “they think the
issue has been dealt with and that we should move on to
other things.” This post-WSIS effect may be of particular
interest where bilateral donors are concerned. These typi-
cally have very few staff engaged on ICT/ICD work. By the
start, let alone the end, of the Tunis phase, they were ex-
hibiting “WSIS fatigue”. They were among those most
sceptical of the value of a second phase and most con-
cerned at it diverting attention away from specific initia-
tives being undertaken by their agencies.
In practice, since the end of WSIS, interviewees suggest
there has if anything been a falling away of interest in ICTs
from bilateral, and perhaps also multilateral, agencies.
Certainly, there have been few major new ICD initiatives
launched since WSIS - the Africa infrastructure initiative
described in the following section being one exception.
Fewer bilateral and multilateral agencies attended the ITU’s
2006 World Telecommunication Development Conference
than did that in 2002 - only the World Bank and UNESCO
participated from the UN family in 2006, for example, while
the UN ICT Task Force and the FAO were also present four
years earlier.18  Participation in the first meetings of WSIS
follow-up action lines (discussed in Chapter 8) has been
patchy, at best. Some bilateral agencies, notably DFID (UK),
have downgraded the status of ICT/ICD work while few –
the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) is one example
– have raised its status. Bilateral agencies are more firmly
mainstreaming ICD activity, and some (notably DFID, which
has established a substantial Government and Transpar-
ency Fund including media support)19  seem to be paying
more attention now to more traditional information and
communication roles in development (for example, to the
media) than to technology.
All of which looks, from WSIS’ point of view, rather coun-
terproductive: the summit was meant to increase funding
and resources to ICD, not to diminish them. It is too early
yet to reach any firm conclusions on this, but some inter-
viewees suggest that it may well be that WSIS (perhaps
even its first phase) represents the highpoint of develop-
ment agencies’ interest in ICTs, rather than the start of
something big. Senior decision-makers in many bilateral
agencies seem to be less convinced than they were in 2001
of the potential of ICTs to achieve major impacts on the
MDGs, at least in the short term, and to be more fearful of
diverting resources from more tried and trusted ap-
proaches at this stage. However, as previous paragraphs
suggest, this trend may coincide with a contrary increase
of interest in ICTs within developing country governments,
which may look more often to multilateral agencies for
support where it is concerned. Time will tell how this turns
out - though the WSIS follow-up process as it stands looks
poorly equipped to monitor and evaluate on our behalf.
Infrastructure finance
and Internet governance
Two issues were left unresolved by the Geneva phase of
WSIS, passed to interim fora (the Task Force on Financial
Mechanisms and the Working Group on Internet Govern-
ance), and these accounted for the majority of work un-
dertaken during the second phase.
The two interim fora were crucially important to the way
in which WSIS dealt with these unresolved issues. Much
has been made of their difference in form and style, par-
ticularly the way in which they organised discussion of their
issues and the way in which they handled multistakeholder
18 See participation lists at www.itu.int/ITU-D/conferences/wtdc/2002/
and www.itu.int/ITU-D/wtdc06/index.html.
19 See DFID White Paper, Making Governance Work for the Poor, 2006,
available from: www.dfid.gov.uk/wp2006/default.asp.
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participation. A word on this here will help to clarify some
of the points made below and in Chapters 6 and 7.
The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms followed a con-
ventional format for United Nations agencies in address-
ing the issues before it. In the case of the TFFM, the UN
Development Programme led the task force process, in
association with the World Bank and UNDESA (the UN
Department of Economic and Social Affairs). Selected,
regionally-balanced, representatives from key institu-
tions concerned with infrastructure finance - including
governments, UN and other inter-governmental organi-
sations, and the private sector - acted as members of the
Task Force. These members were not engaged actively in
research and analysis. Consultants were hired to do this
and to report to the Task Force, which then discussed their
conclusions from an essentially political perspective.
Consultation with the private sector and civil society was
limited. The Task Force report was presented to the sec-
ond PrepCom of WSIS’ second phase, where it was largely
agreed without dissent. None of this received much pub-
lic attention.
The Working Group on Internet Governance, by contrast,
was considerably more innovative in its structure and modus
operandi. Participants - much more diverse, including sig-
nificant numbers from the private sector, civil society and
the Internet community - were selected through a process
of mediated consultation managed by the UN and its ap-
pointed agents (the Working Group chair and secretariat),
with a view to inclusiveness. Working Group members acted
(or at least were asked to act, and mostly did) as individu-
als, not representatives of their institutions. They did the
Group’s work themselves, rather than hiring consultants;
held open sessions to include the views of a wide range of
other stakeholders; and debated their way to a consensus
on the various points within their remit (or, in one case, to a
set of options). Their report was received with much less
consensus but formed a vital part of ongoing argument
about Internet governance when the issue reverted to WSIS
PrepComs. Their issue received more public attention than
anything else in the whole Summit process.
Both fora were faced with the same problem: the under-
representation of key stakeholders during negotiations on
their issues during the first WSIS phase. In both cases, the
critical issue here was not what is normally understood by
multistakeholder participation - i.e. the involvement of the
private sector and civil society, though these were (of course)
excluded from formal negotiations in the WSIS process -
but the absence of more specific groups whose expertise
was vital and whose interests were directly concerned. In
the case of the TFFM, this was the donor community (main-
stream development agencies and bilateral national donors)
responsible for the allocation of development funding. In
that of the WGIG, it was the Internet community, those re-
sponsible for the provision and delivery of Internet services
and, indeed, for Internet governance itself. In both cases,
the inclusion of expertise and knowledge from these
groups was crucial to the outcome of WSIS negotiations
on the issues. These representational questions are dis-
cussed in Chapter 7.
Both fora were also crucial to the degree of success that
could be attributed to WSIS. The first summit almost broke
down entirely on the question of infrastructure finance.
Without a new forum to discuss this, there would have
been no outcome document for heads of state to sign in
Geneva. Internet governance was also a significant area
of dispute in Geneva, but it was not until the Tunis phase
that it reached the same degree of crisis as infrastructure
finance had caused before. Without a resolution of these
issues, WSIS today would be seen as a failure. The two
processes, and the issues associated with them, are con-
sidered in turn below.
Infrastructure finance
The centrepiece of the problem posed to the Task Force
on Financial Mechanisms was the proposal for a Digital
Solidarity Fund made by President Wade of Senegal dur-
ing the first WSIS phase and backed by a substantial
number of other developing countries. This proposal, if
agreed, would have established a new, probably UN-led,
fund specifically concerned with financing ICT infrastruc-
ture and applications. It was opposed by donor countries
during the first WSIS phase because they argued that it
would divert funds from other established priorities (such
as the MDGs), would be inconsistent with mainstream-
ing, and was in any case not needed since existing financ-
ing mechanisms were underused. The tussle between ad-
vocates and opponents of the Digital Solidarity Fund al-
most prevented the first summit from reaching agree-
ment: only tough last-minute diplomacy by the Swiss
PrepCom president forced through the compromise of re-
ferring the issue to an interim Task Force.
The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms has been quite
widely disparaged, not least by some civil society organi-
sations because of the narrow limits of multistakeholder
participation they experienced. In addition, it has been
quite widely suggested that the Task Force’s report had
nothing really new to say and that it had no real impact
on the outcomes of WSIS. This criticism tends to come,
however, from ICT/ICD-focused CSOs rather than from
mainstream development agencies - which have been sig-
nificantly absent from this debate. Discussions with those
who are most closely involved in international ICT/ICD
issues suggest that it is, however, a rather shallow as-
sessment. The TFFM, they suggest, was presented with
quite a complex problem, which underlay the remit it was
handed. It is worth setting this problem out in some de-
tail before looking further at the role of the TFFM and its
implications.
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International agencies and governments are alike commit-
ted to a series of international instruments which provide
a framework for the allocation of development funds (from
both multilateral agencies and bilateral donors). The most
important of these are:
1. The Monterrey Consensus (the outcome of the 2002
United Nations International Conference on Financing
for Development), which determines the overall frame-
work for development aid finance.
2. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and its pred-
ecessor documents, which establish principles for the
determination of development spending, including
national ownership of development strategies and in-
ter-agency harmonisation amongst donors.
3. The Millennium Development Goals, which establish
priority targets - focused on poverty reduction - for the
period up to 2015.
4. Poverty Reduction Strategies, i.e. national develop-
ment plans formulated - at least in theory - through
consultative processes, which provide the basis for
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief, for
World Bank financing agreements and for much bilat-
eral donor support.
None of these international agreements gives priority to
ICTs or envisages significant development (as opposed to
private sector) funding for ICT infrastructure.
Orthodox development agency thinking on ICT infrastruc-
ture investment since the early 1990s had been that this
should be left to the private sector. IFI, multilateral donor
and bilateral donor investment in this context have there-
fore been largely confined to capacity-building: assisting
governments to create the conditions for foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) by privatising incumbent telecoms monopo-
lies, liberalising telecoms markets in general and estab-
lishing independent regulatory authorities to promote com-
petition. Private sector investment in telecoms infrastruc-
ture since the 1990s has been spectacular – one of the most
substantial and successful areas of FDI yet experienced.
This has in turn achieved very considerable growth in ac-
cess to telecommunications. Teledensities (the number of
telephones per 100 citizens) had been stagnant at around
0.5% in Least Developed Countries for many years, before
the influx of FDI associated with liberalisation and the in-
troduction of mobile technology boosted them from the
late 1980s. This, again, has led to one of the fastest growth
rates recorded for adoption of any technology.
Within the development community, this strategy has been
regarded as successful, enabling available finance to be fo-
cused instead on other, more intractable, core infrastructure
requirements such as water, power and transport. Only in
the ICT sector had a perception begun growing, by the time
WSIS began, that private sector investment might be insuffi-
cient to meet the future access gap for communications,
particularly if this were interpreted to include higher value
ICTs like the Internet (whose effective use is increasingly
dependent on broadband infrastructure).
The original Digital Solidarity Fund proposal - to set up a
new mechanism explicitly for ICT infrastructure and appli-
cations - therefore lay outside both the core agreements
on international development and the tenor of orthodox
development agency thinking. Its achievement would re-
quire either reallocation of existing development funds
(which would require, in effect, reinterpretation of the ex-
isting development agreements) or the allocation of new
funding (which, were it available, donors would prefer to
focus on the established MDGs). As some interviewees
from the donor community saw it, the demand for the Dig-
ital Solidarity Fund amounted to the demand for ICTs to
be treated as a new MDG – i.e. a new priority for develop-
ment action - which would be inconsistent with the
Monterrey and MDG agreements. Consenting to it would
open up those core agreements to demands from other
vested interest groups.
While the DSF was supported by many developing country
delegations within the WSIS negotiations, donors also noted
that these delegations were mostly led by officials from tel-
ecommunications or ICT ministries, who, not surprisingly,
supported additional resources for their own areas of re-
sponsibility. They were unclear, however, if the DSF proposal
also had support from mainstream development ministries
or ministries of finance, whose priorities for funding lay in
their Poverty Reduction Strategies and other instruments
setting out national development objectives. They sus-
pected that, like themselves, many national development
leaders would be reluctant to see new resources allocated
to sectors that did not fall within their PRS priorities. Pri-
vately, some national development leaders have indicated
that this was their view, but that expressing solidarity with
a developing country proposal for change also played an
important part in determining their position on the DSF.
This series of observations suggests that two potential
contests over resources were subsumed within the wider
DSF debate: one between donors and aid beneficiary coun-
tries, which was essentially about the scale of develop-
ment resources; and one between ICT advocates/minis-
tries and mainstream development managers within both
donors and developing countries, which was essentially
about the desirability of allocating resources to ICTs.
The TFFM’s mandate, here, was crucial. Donor countries
ensured that this required it to review the use made of
existing sources of finance as well as the desirability of
something new. As the Geneva Plan of Action put it:
While all existing financial mechanisms should be fully
exploited, a thorough review of their adequacy in meet-
ing the challenges of ICT for development should be
completed by the end of December 2004. … Based on
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the conclusion of the review, improvements and inno-
vations of financing mechanisms will be considered
including the effectiveness, the feasibility and the crea-
tion of a voluntary Digital Solidarity Fund, as men-
tioned in the Declaration of Principles.20
To place the DSF proposal in the context of overall devel-
opment finance and existing finance instruments, the TFFM
also needed to bring mainstream development thinking
into the debate about infrastructure finance, rather than
leaving this to ICT specialists. Its membership structure –
drawing on the ranks of development as well as infrastruc-
ture expertise – facilitated this. So did its methodology –
using a consultancy report which focused on assessment
of existing financial instruments and considered new de-
mands in the context of past practice, and which placed
ICT infrastructure investment itself within the context of
overall development finance.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Task Force report is
grounded in more mainstream development thinking than
is the Geneva Plan of Action.21  For this reason, the report
has been considered conservative by many ICT-oriented
observers, particularly in civil society. Its approach to the
DSF itself also put this on the back burner. As described in
Chapter 3, the Task Force took the view that existing financ-
ing instruments were insufficiently used at present and that
there was scope for making further use of these and for
alternative new financing initiatives such as public-private
partnerships. It did not, therefore, endorse the DSF pro-
posal in the form that it had been promoted. Indeed, the
report dismissed the DSF proposal in very few words in-
deed, though it did “welcome” an attenuated voluntary
fund.22  Some interviewees, from some developing coun-
tries and from ICT-oriented civil society organisations in
particular, see this as a rebuff to a developing country pro-
posal from the international development establishment.
Some interviewees from that development establishment
suggest a different interpretation – that the apparent con-
servatism of the Task Force report masks the starting point
for a significant rethinking of the role of development fi-
nance in relation to ICT infrastructure. The Task Force re-
port, they say, did look seriously at the changing nature of
infrastructure finance, especially concerning remote and
rural areas and concerning higher specification networks,
recognising that the world might have reached a point in
time where private sector investment had peaked and new
technologies presented the possibility of much higher lev-
els of service becoming available through different types
of infrastructure. They argue that the alternative ap-
proaches to infrastructure finance suggested by the report,
including widened scope for public investment (whether
from governments or development agencies/IFIs) to sup-
plement (but not replace) private sector-led investment
strategies, mark as significant a change in overall thinking
about ICT infrastructure finance as the original DSF pro-
posal, and one that is more consistent with other develop-
ment finance instruments. Joint public/private partnership
investment, in particular, is mentioned in this context. While
couched in conservative language, in other words, the Task
Force report includes quite a significant movement away
from the “private sector only” consensus that had domi-
nated thinking on ICT infrastructure since the early 1990s.
One of the surprising features of the second phase of WSIS
is that the infrastructure finance issue - which had almost
prevented agreement in Geneva - barely resurfaced again
after the Task Force report. The advocates of the Digital
Solidarity Fund played virtually no part in the Task Force
for Financial Mechanisms itself, apparently by choice, and
accepted the almost total marginalisation of the DSF pro-
posal in the TFFM report without demur when it was dis-
cussed in the second PrepCom of the Tunis phase. A vol-
untary DSF was established, but has failed to make a mark
and is generally considered unlikely to do so in future.
Many interviewees considered this vestigial DSF no more
than a face-saving exercise (though one that was indeed
effective at saving face).
Why did the DSF, which had caused such a fuss in Geneva,
raise so few hackles barely six months later? One sug-
gested explanation is that the rethinking described above
within the Task Force report led shortly afterwards to a
significant change in actual practice. Keen to avoid the DSF
and to show that alternatives were viable, the World Bank
and the European Commission took the opportunity of the
Africa regional meeting for the second phase of WSIS, in
Accra in February 2005, to put forward a new infrastruc-
ture initiative for Africa: an initiative which they presented
as indicating a new, more active approach to ICT infrastruc-
ture finance by development agencies, and which gave the
proponents of the DSF sufficient value to call off the hunt
for a better Fund within the main negotiations.
This interpretation suggests, in other words, that the in-
frastructure finance issue has been more dynamic than the
general ICT and development debate described above. It
suggests that the developing country-led proposal for a
Digital Solidarity Fund was effectively bought off by the
introduction of alternatives which were more acceptable
to donors (industrial countries) but met enough of the pri-
orities of the DSF’s proponents (who also recognised that
the strength of donor hostility was unlikely to be over-
come). Subsequent publications by the World Bank and
other international actors have consolidated an apparent
shift in emphasis towards more proactive IFI investment
in ICT infrastructure, albeit within the same overall frame-
work of private sector leadership and the promotion of
sector restructuring/liberalisation.
20 Geneva Plan of Action, section D2, article 27.f.
21 The report, Financing ICTD, is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/tffm/
final-report.pdf.
22 See Financing ICTD, p. 94.
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At the heart of this issue, perhaps, lay a difference of per-
ception between developing and donor countries. Devel-
oping countries pressed hard for a particular approach to
be agreed during the first phase of WSIS, with strong lead-
ership at high level coming from the President of Senegal.
Support for this position was widespread within the de-
veloping world, coming not just from Africa but also from
countries such as India. It was also backed by many civil
society organisations, expressing solidarity with a devel-
oping country demand – though it should be borne in mind
that few of the civil society organisations involved in WSIS
were development NGOs. Developing country solidarity
was, however, weaker than it might have appeared to be.
It was Francophone West African countries in particular
that supported President Wade; privately, delegates from
other parts of Africa expressed some concern about the
original DSF proposal, and interviews suggest that these
private doubts were shared by more powerful figures in
non-ICT ministries. Ultimately, it was the developing coun-
try bloc, not donors, that blinked in Geneva and allowed
the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms to be established.
The DSF’s supporters also failed to pursue their proposal
vigorously during and after the TFFM, particularly after a
more substantive proposal for African infrastructure was
put on the table. The most apparent gain from this issue
becoming so prominent in Geneva was obtained by those
African developing countries that will benefit from this ini-
tiative, and it could be argued, therefore, that their con-
certed effort and brinkmanship in the Geneva phase paid
off. Taking this issue to the wire did lead to a reward. The
DSF per se was not essential to its proponents, though
the establishment of a voluntary fund helped to save any
face that needed saving.23   What was important was some
money on the table, and the switch in thinking on the part
of donors that accompanied it. Time will tell whether the
scope and scale of the African infrastructure initiative will
look substantial enough in years to come.
The switch in donor thinking involved here should not be
exaggerated at this stage. Nevertheless, a good many in
the development sector think it was probably overdue.
Stimulation of private sector investment proved very suc-
cessful in promoting telecommunications access in the
1990s, but has left a residual access gap that, it seems,
can only be addressed by greater intervention. Interna-
tional development agencies continue to take the view that
private sector investment, supported by restructuring and
liberalisation, will account for most required investment,
but not all.24  Private sector investment may also be insuf-
ficient to stimulate higher bandwidth access in the future.
The relative priority to be accorded this form of infrastruc-
ture remains unclear to most donors (and, if PRS processes
are to be believed, to their development partners). How-
ever, the DSF proposal was sufficient to push some into a
rethinking of their long-term strategy, initially as a way of
avoiding what they saw as a worse outcome (an independ-
ent, UN-managed fund), latterly with more conviction. This
could be described as a victory, as readily as a defeat, for
developing country solidarity. Its implications are dis-
cussed in Chapter 6.
Internet governance
When WSIS was first proposed, no-one expected Internet
governance to be one of its priorities. In fact, there was
almost no discussion of Internet governance in the first
phase preparatory process until the Western Asia (Middle
East) regional meeting - the last to be held - in February
2003. Yet, from that point on, issues to do with Internet
governance became hugely important and highly divisive.
Internet governance was one of two issues which almost
collapsed the first summit session. It predominated in the
second phase so much that some have described Tunis as
a world summit on Internet governance rather than on the
information society.
Why did Internet governance become so important to the
WSIS process? A number of suggestions were made about
this by interviewees:
Firstly, some suggest, it was an issue waiting in the wings
for the right occasion to come along. Almost uniquely in
human history, the Internet has become very important
with very little government involvement. It was other stake-
holders – at first individuals (computer experts, many with
anti-authoritarian instincts) and cooperative fora that they
established (such as the Internet Engineering Task Force)
– later joined by private sector actors, that took and
moulded the shape of the Internet (in spite of its origins in
the US military). The result was a global phenomenon
largely outside the control of governments or the remit of
inter-governmental organisations. However practical this
may have been in its own terms, it was a vacuum that the
institutions of international governance were unlikely to
leave alone for ever. Many governments wanted to take
charge of something that could undermine their own au-
thority. Some felt it inherently wrong that any major social
force should be so far outwith government control. In this
sense, the Internet governance issue might be seen as one
of the authority of governments vis-à-vis their citizens.
Secondly, where governments were engaged, they were
not equitably so. Of course, inequity in government own-
ership and engagement in international issues is nothing
unusual in itself. In this case, however, the apparent ineq-
uity was particularly marked, with the US government at
least appearing to have great potential powers over both
23 The DSF’s limited activity to date can be found at www.dsf-fsn.org/
cms/content/view/43/77/lang,en.
24 The GSM Association has suggested that private investment will
deliver access to 95% of the world’s population – see its report
Universal Access at www.gsmworld.com/universalaccess/index.shtml.
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domains and root servers, control over which, if exercised,
would impact strongly on national sovereignty. The extent
to which such powers had been exercised was minimal and
the extent to which they could be exercised in practice was
uncertain, but the issue had obvious symbolic importance
– not least as a symbol of American hegemony in a mono-
polar world, and thereby also of the international balance
of power between industrial and developing countries. This
dimension of the question might be seen as one of the
authority of governments versus other governments, par-
ticularly less powerful versus more powerful governments.
Thirdly, a good many interviewees believe, rightly or not,
that the dispute over Internet governance was driven by
ambitions within the ITU – not necessarily the ITU as a
whole, but some officials and some member-states – for
the ITU to assume the role of overseer of the Internet. In
this context, the question of Internet governance can be
seen as part of the long process of restructuring commu-
nications, in which the ITU had gradually lost much of its
authority over telecoms and in which the Internet had
emerged outside the control of established institutions and
with new institutions of its own, some of them with quite
different (and more multistakeholder) conceptions of au-
thority. This aspect might be seen as a contest of older
“international system” models of governance versus newer
(to some, subversive) models of governance being piloted
by new (and equally, to some, subversive) pioneers –
among them, ICANN.
Fourthly, some suggest, the dispute over Internet govern-
ance was driven by a further coincidence of circumstances.
Internet governance became important within WSIS around
the time of the Iraq war.25  Many of those countries that were
most hostile to the US position on Internet governance were
also those most hostile to US involvement in Iraq and US
foreign policy in general. Internet governance, to them, may
have been simply a proxy for a different foreign policy argu-
ment: its critics versus the United States.
And finally, some interviewees suggest, more controver-
sially, that the very lack of immediate crisis in Internet gov-
ernance helped to make it a point of crisis within WSIS.
There were issues of controversy in Internet governance,
certainly, but there always had been and the system, in the
old phrase, wasn’t “broke”. The Internet would continue
to evolve without a revolution in its governance. Indeed,
many – including most industrial country governments, pri-
vate sector organisations and Internet pioneers – believe
that the Internet’s dynamic growth has only been possible
because of the low level of government involvement there
has been. An argument about Internet governance would
not stop this dynamic growth. The price of arguing was
therefore low – lower than it might have been on other is-
sues – and posed less risk to those engaged upon it (though
the impact of changes that might result could be profound).
As with infrastructure finance, Internet governance was an
issue which divided developing from industrial countries.
On the whole, industrial countries were satisfied with the
level of Internet governance currently prevailing at the start
of WSIS: they felt that more governance would slow down
innovation and opportunities for investment. Developing
countries in general were less comfortable that an increas-
ingly important sector lacked inter-governmental oversight
comparable with the ITU’s historic role in telecommunica-
tions and the Universal Postal Union (UPU)’s in postal serv-
ices. Both groups of countries, however, had important
fractures within them. Much of Europe was uncomfortable
with what it saw as the United States’ aggressive defence
of its existing “powers” over ICANN and root servers; while
differences emerged between the assertiveness of a number
of large developing countries and the bulk of Least Devel-
oped Countries on the issue (discussed in Chapter 6).
The private sector broadly shared industrial country gov-
ernments’ perceptions of the issue here. Private sector
leadership, it felt, had done well by the Internet. Greater
government control, it felt, would stifle the innovation
which drove it forward. Subjection to an ITU-style stand-
ard-setting regime, rather than the fluid modus operandi
of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and similar
structures, it felt, would be particularly damaging. Suspi-
cion of ITU encroachment was particularly strong within
the Internet community. As one interviewee put it, “if the
ITU had been in charge, we wouldn’t have the Internet to-
day.” The consensus business view was set out in an In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce issues paper released
shortly after the Geneva summit:
The pace of change, the fast evolving state of the
Internet and the creation of a global information soci-
ety heighten the risks associated with premature or
unnecessary government regulation.… Business has
a strong market incentive to foster the empowerment
of users. But it will only make the necessary invest-
ments if it can trust that governments will recognize
and reinforce the leadership of business in respond-
ing to the highly dynamic nature of the Internet.26
Civil society’s view was more distinct and more divided.
On the one hand, most civil society organisations sympa-
thised with developing countries’ demand for more say
vis-à-vis industrial powers. At the same time, they were
reluctant to concede more powers over the Internet to
governments of any stamp, fearing that this would lead to
greater censorship and political control. As with human
25 The Western Asia (Middle East) regional meeting which initiated
Internet governance as a major issue took place in February 2003,
during the international political crisis preceding the March 2003
invasion of Iraq.




rights, therefore, there was some conflict within civil soci-
ety between support for a greater voice for developing
countries, on the one hand, and desire for a diminished
role for governments, on the other. The consensus view
was summarised in the independent civil society declara-
tion issued at the end of the Geneva phase:
… the Internet cannot be governed effectively by any one
organisation or set of interests. An exclusionary inter-
governmental model would be especially ill suited to
its unique characteristics; only a truly open, multi-
stakeholder, and flexible approach can ensure the
Internet’s continued growth and transition into a mul-
tilingual medium.27
Like infrastructure finance, Internet governance proved in-
tractable towards the end of the Geneva summit phase.
Unlike infrastructure finance, it did not fade away during
the second phase but became, if anything, even more con-
tentious. Like infrastructure finance, the Geneva summit
referred this issue to an interim forum.  Unlike infrastruc-
ture finance, that forum – the Working Group on Internet
Governance – adopted an innovative, multistakeholder
format which probed creatively into the issues that it had
before it.
The WGIG had the remit to:
i. develop a working definition of Internet governance;
ii. identify the public policy issues that are relevant to
Internet governance;
iii. develop a common understanding of the respective
roles and responsibilities of governments, existing
intergovernmental and international organisations and
other forums as well as the private sector and civil
society from both developing and developed coun-
tries;
iv. prepare a report on the results of this activity to be
presented for consideration and appropriate action for
the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005.28
Most interviewees – but with important exceptions – con-
sidered the WGIG to have been effective in advancing the
debate on these issues by the time it reported in June 2005.
Interviewees in general suggest that it was able to agree a
workable definition of Internet governance, and develop
a broad consensus on many of the issues before it. Excep-
tions to the consensus about this among those interviewed
tended to be those critical of the WGIG’s conclusions, in
particular those who wished to promote a more formal
model of Internet governance than that which was finally
suggested by the Tunis outcome documents.
The methodology the WGIG used, as a working group, was
comparable in many ways to the commissions which in-
formed many international policy issues in the 1980s – for
example, the Brandt Commission on international devel-
opment, the Palme Commission on common security and
the Brundtland Commission on sustainable development.
These commissions brought together a range of people
with different backgrounds, different expertise and differ-
ent social or political outlooks; treated them as individu-
als rather than as representatives of their respective or-
ganisations or communities; and addressed a substantive
issue of international concern by achieving consensus
among themselves but not necessarily across the whole
spectrum of international opinion (as, for example, a UN
summit must attempt to do). The nearest analogue to the
WGIG in recent ICT experience was probably the G8 DOT
Force of 2000-2002, composed of individuals from gov-
ernment, private sector and civil society in each of the G8
countries and eight selected developing countries.
The selection of WGIG personnel is described in Chapter 7.
At this point, however, it is worth noting that the selection
process was much more inclusive than was normal for UN
appointed fora. Private sector and civil society organisa-
tions were invited to put forward nominations, and their
nominations were, by and large, approved. This style of
appointment was adopted deliberately by the Working
Group’s chair (the experienced former UN Under Secretary-
General Nitin Desai, who had been responsible for organ-
ising many previous summits) and secretary (the Swiss
diplomat Markus Kummer) in response to the specific is-
sue. Because of the nature of existing arrangements, they
felt that Internet governance could not properly be ad-
dressed by a standard UN-style task force of representa-
tives from government and inter-governmental organisa-
tions, which would have lacked both expertise and cred-
ibility. The real experts had to be drawn into the debate.
Much the same applied to the WGIG’s working methods.
One member described the key moment in determining
how the WGIG worked as being when the chairman told
members that they were expected to participate as indi-
viduals rather than as representatives of particular organi-
sations or vested interests, and specifically that they
should use the singular personal pronoun (“I” not “we”)
when making contributions. The issues facing the WGIG
were highly politicised. Many WGIG members had strongly
held opinions, and had difficulty in understanding each
others’ perspectives on the issues. Participants recalled
that requiring them to think as individuals rather than rep-
resentatives, and to work together rather than respond-
ing to consultants’ views, encouraged members to con-
front some of their assumptions and question some of their
differences with colleagues. The outcome was not neces-
sarily agreement, but did include greater understanding
and some displacement of assumption and (in some cases)
ignorance by flexibility and knowledge. A conventional
27 Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs, p.22, available from:
www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en?&id=1179|1208.
28 Geneva Plan of Action, section C6, article 13.
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UN-style task force, interviewed participants agreed, was
more likely to have remained confrontational, and would
have been less likely to achieve (at least as substantive) a
consensus report.
Holding open sessions at which all-comers could contrib-
ute to the WGIG’s deliberations was also innovative and
constructive. As discussed in Chapter 7, this enabled im-
portant actors who had little other route into WSIS to par-
ticipate in discussions of considerable importance to them.
The quality of contributions made during open sessions
was generally high, and this increased confidence in the
WGIG process among different stakeholder groups, par-
ticularly the Internet community. WGIG members paid at-
tention during open sessions and report making signifi-
cant use of the evidence put forward in their closed dis-
cussion and drafting sessions.
The WGIG was able, in this way, to produce something that
could be described by its participants as a multistake-
holder consensus. Though WGIG members participated as
individuals, they cohered sufficiently for the WGIG report
to have something in it for most and to be something which
they felt they could promote when Internet governance
issues returned to the main WSIS PrepCom process. By
building a common understanding within a group that com-
prised the different perspectives on the issues, the WGIG
set a perimeter around the debate that followed and helped
to focus discussion during the tense and difficult final ne-
gotiating stages. While the report did not provide the for-
mal framework for these negotiations, it could not be ig-
nored and certainly influenced WSIS’ final outcome on the
subject. Whether this provides a model for other themes of
international discourse is discussed in Chapter 7.
The final negotiating stages on Internet governance were,
nevertheless, as divisive as those of the first summit
phase. They saw the opening of what was generally inter-
preted as a split between the United States and European
Union; and saw a gap, discussed in Chapter 6, develop
between the positions of larger and more powerful devel-
oping countries, on the one hand, and Least Developed
Countries on the other. The final outcome – described in
Chapter 3 – could be and was seen as a victory by differ-
ent groups of participants with widely different views, and
left much up for grabs in the post-WSIS world. All those
interviewed, however, stressed that the ability to achieve
agreement of any sort during the final WSIS PrepComs was
greatly influenced by skilful chairing of the PrepCom sub-
committee assigned to this (by the Pakistani diplomat
Masood Khan). Individuals, too, often play an important
part in determining the outcomes of international nego-
tiations, and discussions on Internet governance benefited
from three particularly skilful performers, without whom
any kind of consensus might have been much more diffi-
cult to achieve. 
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WSIS and developing countries
c h a p t e r  6
29 Data from World Bank, web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:1390200~
pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html.
International relations are built around power. Large coun-
tries with powerful economies and military might have more
influence on what happens in the world than microstates or
the impoverished. Size matters; money talks.
Most inter-governmental organisations, by contrast - and
UN summits - are structured around equality of sovereign
states. China, with 1,300,000,000 people, has one vote,
the same as Kiribati (population around 90,000); the
United States (GDP = USD 12,455 billion) the same as
Lesotho (GDP = USD 1.5 billion).29
In practice, the pressures and processes of inter-govern-
mental organisations exercise some mitigating effect on
the exercise of military and financial power; but the politi-
cal realities of population size and economic wealth, of
access to and control of scarce resources, of strategic and
military power, etc. predominate. Negotiating processes
such as those at international summits reflect and refine
the balances of power and authority between individual
countries whose status within them is made up of many
different factors - hard facts such as those already de-
scribed, but also “softer” factors such as established inter-
national partnerships, cultural and historic ties, the person-
alities and authority of governments and individual person-
alities, the quality of expertise and other input into the ne-
gotiating processes concerned. Hard facts of size, wealth,
resources etc. might be described as determining the “natu-
ral” weight of a country in this context, but it can punch
well above or below this weight – have a louder or a softer
voice - according to the impact of these softer factors.
The “Louder Voices” report, published in 2002, reviewed
the extent of developing country participation in interna-
tional ICT decision-making bodies, and in particular the con-
straints facing developing countries in respect of their par-
ticipation. The report is briefly summarised in Chapter 2.
Its insights formed one of the primary impulses behind
the present study, which has been concerned to see
whether the WSIS summit format enabled developing
countries to have more substantial impact – a louder voice -
and whether WSIS may have lasting implications for devel-
oping country participation in other ICT fora in the future.
This chapter focuses on these particular issues, and both
begins and ends with a specific look at the conclusions of
the “Louder Voices” report. These are quoted at some
length in Chapter 2 but, for convenience, are summarised
again more briefly here:
1. Most developing countries are members of es-
tablished international organisations with ICT re-
sponsibilities, such as the ITU and WTO, and are
usually represented at their meetings. However,
there is not as yet an effective connection be-
tween the agendas of these organisations, their
decisions, and the international development
goals set out in the UN Millennium Declaration.
[This point is considered in Chapter 5 above.]
2. Effective participation in decision-making is not
limited to what happens before and during
meetings. It requires sustained engagement
with issues over an extended period of time,
backed up by substantial technical, policymak-
ing and negotiating capacity.
3. Action to strengthen the ICT policy capacity of
developing countries must include action to
level the policy playing field so as to ensure that
the needs of developing countries are on the
agenda of international ICT fora and that they
are included in decision-making processes.
Three critical aspects of this concern:
a. Lack of easy, affordable and timely access
to information about ICT-related issues, de-
cision-making fora and processes
b. Logistical problems, including the frequency
and location of international meetings and
restrictions on participation (for example, by
private sector and civil society experts)
c. Ineffective use of financial resources avail-
able to support participation.
4. Weaknesses in national policymaking are, how-
ever, even more significant in leading to under-
representation and ineffective participation.
Three critical aspects of this are:
a. Lack of policy awareness, at all levels of gov-
ernment and citizenship, of the potential
role of ICTs.
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As discussed in earlier chapters, summit processes such
as WSIS are different from normal international negotia-
tions. They have a more general character than conven-
tional decision-making processes, looking at a “big issue”
rather than detail – which makes them more accessible to
those that are less fully informed about an issue. They have
less sectoral baggage, in the sense of issues and prec-
edents, alliances and animosities, that influence work in
decision-making fora such as ITU study groups or WTO
committees and working groups. They are less rules-
bound, which may create more space for creativity in ne-
gotiation – though summits, too, have over the years de-
veloped standard ways of proceeding, built around pre-
paratory committees, regional meetings and the like. They
are more political – with participation in the final summit
event often being at the level of head of state rather than
head of mission or head of government department.
Three further differences, interviews suggested, may have
the biggest impact on different ways of behaving:
• Firstly, summits are one-off events rather than ongo-
ing negotiations. They do not need to look back to what
has gone before or forward to what comes after in the
same way as continuous negotiating fora like those in
the ITU or WTO.
• Secondly, they do not have to reach firm conclusions
that bind governments’ future behaviour. The outcome
documents of summit meetings are often aspirational,
urging courses of action rather than requiring them.
Outcomes do not necessarily stick, as those who wel-
comed the Kyoto Protocol on climate change have
learnt to their regret.
• Thirdly, however, as summits are global meetings rep-
resenting the entire United Nations family, their del-
egations feel obliged, at least, to reach consensus. Dia-
logues in most international fora can be resolved, if it
comes to it, by votes. In summits, consensus is gener-
ally expected, if not necessarily required. Outcome
documents should be signed by every government, not
just by a majority – which means that, while summits
may force recalcitrant governments to agree to some-
thing that they would not otherwise have been pre-
pared to sign (as at Kyoto?), they are just as likely to
stick to the lowest common denominator of agreement.
This suggests, prima facie, that the disadvantages which
developing countries face in international decision-mak-
ing fora, as described in “Louder Voices”, may be less acute
in summits. Summit work is less technical, and less tech-
nical expertise is therefore required. Summit activity is fo-
cused on fewer specific meetings, and there is much less
need to cover simultaneous subsidiary meetings than in
conventional decision-making fora – which makes life
easier for smaller delegations. The pressure on develop-
ing countries to make concessions is weaker because “de-
cisions” made by summits are less “decisive” than those
made by (for example) ITU Radiocommunications Confer-
ences (i.e. they have less immediate or certain impact on
important stakeholders). Though votes are rarely taken,
the principle behind “one nation: one vote” is much clearer
at summits than it is elsewhere; and solidarity between
blocs of countries may be easier to achieve.
The need for consensus may also give countries which are
normally weak in international governance more influence
than they might otherwise wield. A number of representa-
tives of major countries in WSIS commented in interviews
that their main objective at the summit was to prevent de-
cisions they considered inappropriate from being taken
rather than to secure positive objectives of their own –
suggesting that the pressure to conform may be some-
what reversed in summits, acting more upon the minority
industrial countries than the (politically and economically)
weaker developing countries taking part. The shift away
from the established relationships of conventional inter-
national negotiations, the different power structure and
the higher degree of politicisation within them may make
summits particularly susceptible to “policy trading”, i.e.
to agreements between countries or blocs of countries
that, for example, country X will support a particular policy
line of interest to country Y within the summit in return for
comparable concessions in entirely different negotiations
being conducted elsewhere.
On the other hand, the observations above also suggest,
prima facie, that the outcomes of summits are likely to
have less immediate impact, and so to be less valuable to
developing countries than those of more conventional
decision-making processes. Politicisation also, obviously,
b. Lack of technical and policy capacity on ICT
issues, particularly in respect of emerging
technologies and new policy areas - such as
migration from circuit-switched to IP net-
works and indeed Internet issues in general.
c. Weaknesses in national and regional policy-
making processes, including:
i. Lack of political leadership
ii. Absence of national ICT strategies
iii. Ineffective coordination between differ-
ent government departments and agen-
cies with ICT responsibilities
iv. Lack of private sector and civil society par-
ticipation in national decision-making
v. Inadequate preparation for international
meetings
vi. Ineffective use of financial and human re-
sources.
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carries the risk that a summit will reach less optimal posi-
tions on the issues with which it is ostensibly most con-
cerned than might otherwise occur.
What does the experience of developing countries, as de-
veloping country participants described it, have to sug-
gest about these various hypotheses? The following sec-
tions look at this from two perspectives: participation in
the international summit itself, and participation in na-
tional policymaking processes related to the development
of policies for WSIS. The latter discussion leads forward
to consideration of civil society and wider “multistake-
holder” participation in Chapter 7.
Participation in the Summit
Chapter 4 briefly discussed the participation of different
delegations in WSIS.  Participation varied substantially
between countries, both in numbers of delegates and in
the composition of delegations.
Some countries paid much more attention to the WSIS
process than did others, both at plenary sessions and,
more importantly, during the preparatory committees. An
earlier APC study looked in some detail at African partici-
pation in the various meetings associated with the first
phase of the summit.30  This found, for example, that all
but five of fifty-four African countries were represented
during the initial Bamako consultation meeting in May
2002, and all but six at the Geneva summit in December
2003. Participation in PrepComs varied considerably. A few
African countries – notably Cameroon, Mali, South Africa,
Tanzania and Tunisia – were well-represented throughout,
but between ten and fifteen African countries chose not
to attend each PrepCom. Three African countries had del-
egations over sixty strong at the Geneva summit while, as
noted, six were officially unrepresented. Similar variations
in the level and scope of country participation can be found
during the second phase. Participation lists, illustrating
the numbers taking part from different countries in the two
main summit sessions and in one second phase PrepCom,
can be found in Annex 1.
Of course, the size of delegations is no clear proxy for their
degree of influence, but it probably tends to indicate the
extent to which a government was taking WSIS seriously
and saw it as an opportunity to further its own objectives,
to learn from the experience and networking opportunities
available, or to make sure that the “wrong” decisions were
less likely to be reached. In some cases, delegates sug-
gested, delegation size and level were due to the personal
priorities of national leaders. President Wade of Senegal,
for example, has sought to play a significant leadership role
within Africa so far as WSIS, and ICT/ICD in general, are
concerned. In other countries, political leaders saw much
less gain to be achieved from upgrading their national pro-
file at this event.
As well as total numbers, as suggested in earlier chap-
ters, the composition of national delegations was particu-
larly interesting. The APC study of African participation in
the first summit phase found that, in most African coun-
tries, delegations were predominantly made up of two
groups – diplomats, particularly from countries’ missions
in Geneva, who took the lead in actual negotiations dur-
ing PrepComs; and representatives of the established tel-
ecommunications sector, led by the communications min-
istries who were their countries’ primary interfaces with
the ITU, but also including substantial numbers of person-
nel from communications regulatory commissions and
from the former incumbent fixed telecommunications op-
erating companies. Participation in delegations from other
stakeholders was sparse. There was little representation
from mainstream development ministries, for example,
which might have contributed more effectively to discus-
sion of the role of ICTs in development; little from the pri-
vate sector or civil society; little or none from the broad-
casting sector, which provides the most widely available
ICT services in developing countries; little again from new
ICT markets such as mobile telephone companies and the
Internet community.
Much the same pattern prevailed in the second summit
phase. Under-representation of the Internet community in
national delegations may have been particularly signifi-
cant here given the amount of time that phase spent on
Internet governance, and the limited understanding of it
shown by many diplomats and conventional telecommu-
nications specialists.
Many interviewees remarked that the domination of many
delegations by the national telecommunications establish-
ment had an obvious effect on participation in negotiations,
and especially on developing country input. Telecoms-led
delegations found it much easier to address telecoms is-
sues than they did to focus on development questions.
When the latter arose, they were poorly equipped to present
national development priorities, or to position ICT issues
accurately within these. Their contributions tended to fo-
cus on the potential of technology rather than the problems
requiring development attention. For many development-
focused interviewees, this was an opportunity missed. WSIS
could have offered scope for developing countries to chal-
lenge the ICT sector to focus on their core development
objectives. In practice, it did not.
Women were also poorly represented in national delega-
tions. Just 19% of official country delegates in the Tunis
summit, on average, were women, the same figure as in
Geneva. Industrial country delegations were more likely
to include women than those from developing countries
30 D. Souter, “African participation in WSIS: review and discussion
paper”, APC, 2004, available from: rights.apc.org/training/contents/
ictpol_en/ictmodule.2006-05-18.6637944641/ictunit.2006-05-
19.5882667093?set_language=en.
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(72%, on average, of OECD country delegations were fe-
male in Geneva, 73% in Tunis). This gender imbalance is
by no means untypical of participation in international ICT
decision-making fora, but is at odds with the principles of
gender equality advanced in summit principles and texts.
Participation lists illustrating these figures are included in
Annex 1. A more detailed analysis of gender participation,
however, should also explore the relative status of men
and women within delegations, which is not readily dis-
cernible from the available participation lists.
As well as these general issues of participation, it is worth
looking at the participation of developing countries in the
three other key debates that took place during WSIS: on
information and communication rights, on infrastructure
finance and on Internet governance. As noted in Chapter
5, all three of these saw differences between countries
which, while by no means exclusively between industrial
and developing countries, had significant overtones within
them of this development divide.
The question of information and communication rights cuts
to the heart of relations between governments and citi-
zens. Participatory political structures place high value on
information and communication rights – on freedoms of
expression, on individual citizens’ rights to dissent, to or-
ganise, to publish what they want. Few countries, how-
ever, have fully open political cultures of this kind. Many
governments see information and communication rights
as potential threats to their authority, particularly if that
governmental authority itself is weak or if it is ideologi-
cally based on belief in government’s responsibility to rule
in the perceived interest of the people rather than at their
behest. The disjuncture between participatory and authori-
tarian approaches to government, and so to information
and communication rights, is closely paralleled in attitudes
towards the participation in decision-making of civil soci-
ety and the private sector. (It also affected relations
amongst governments, for instance in the underlying ten-
sions throughout the process that resulted from some gov-
ernments questioning the appropriateness of holding
WSIS 2 in a country that significantly constrained freedoms
of information and communication.)
The arguments between governments over information
and communication rights at WSIS should not be carica-
tured as being between industrial and developing coun-
tries but seen as lying between these different government
approaches. However, most of the leading countries which
challenged information and communication rights and
which most strongly objected to multistakeholder partici-
pation were developing countries, while most of those
which championed these were from the North. In truth,
interviewees suggest, the majority of governments on both
sides of the development divide were not particularly con-
cerned about these issues – but those that were pursued
them fiercely. (A couple of interviewees suggested that the
government of China argued so vociferously against infor-
mation and communication rights during the first phase
in order to lay the ground for later arguments about the
Internet rather than because this was such a high priority
for it per se; though clearly issues of information and com-
munication rights have a high profile in China today.)
Differences of participation in the debate on infrastruc-
ture finance have been considered in Chapter 5. The lead
role in this particular debate came from one country (Sen-
egal), supported strongly by its neighbours in West Africa,
less strongly by those in the rest of Africa, and less strongly
again by other developing countries. Financing ICTs and
ICD was problematic for the countries concerned, espe-
cially for LDCs. Those delegations that argued most forci-
bly for a Digital Solidarity Fund tended to be countries
which had difficulty – mostly because of their development
status – in securing foreign investment for ICT develop-
ment. (It should be borne in mind, however, that telecoms
sector-led delegations may not always have reflected the
views of national governments as a whole on development
finance.) With some exceptions (e.g. India), larger and
more influential developing countries which did not have
such financing problems did not play a prominent part in
the argument. The fact that it disappeared so comprehen-
sively from the agenda for the second phase of WSIS after
African LDCs had secured what they considered sufficient
gains in February 2005 (see Chapter 5) suggests that this
reflected a division of interest among developing coun-
tries as well as a division of opinion between developing
and industrial blocs.
Developing country participation in the discussion about
Internet governance is, perhaps, the most interesting of
these debates. In this case, it was not LDCs that played
the most prominent role, but a small group of larger de-
veloping countries which adopted positions particularly
hostile to the United States. These countries – notable
among them China, Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa and Iran
– share a number of common characteristics. These are
relatively large countries, with markets sufficiently large
for them to have few problems attracting external invest-
ment in the ICT sector (and so not concerned to win con-
cessions in other areas like financing mechanisms). They
could support large delegations, including personnel with
substantial expertise in the areas under discussion. They
are also active in other international fora, on other issues,
asserting their status as major players, sometimes in “like-
minded” partnerships, sometimes independently. These
characteristics distinguish them from the majority of de-
veloping countries, particularly Least Developed Countries,
for whom issues such as infrastructure investment are
much more important. A number of interviewees from LDCs,
particularly in Africa, expressed frustration that their efforts
to secure gains they considered important to them through
the Internet governance debate were frustrated by the
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politicisation of that debate by these larger and more pow-
erful development countries – “the ultras”, as one such
delegate described them. Other observers of the Internet
governance debate also commented on this distinction
between LDC and more powerful countries’ participation.
It is, of course, always dangerous to think of “developing
countries” as a homogeneous bloc rather than a category
that is sometimes useful, sometimes not. However, the
emergence of a (relatively small) group of large and more
powerful developing countries, acting assertively, either
individually or as a “like-minded” group, and sometimes
claiming to speak on behalf of developing countries as a
whole - has been a feature of a number of recent interna-
tional negotiations. The Doha round of WTO negotiations
and the development agenda within WIPO (the World In-
tellectual Property Organisation), for example, has seen
similar alliances. It is unclear whether this represents a
lasting trend or a passing phase in international discourse,
and WSIS does not really provide evidence either way,
other than to reaffirm the dangers of underestimating dif-
ferences among developing countries.
As suggested in Chapter 5, it is difficult to determine win-
ners and losers in the Internet governance debate. On the
whole, the difficult decisions involved have merely been de-
ferred. That may represent, in a sense, a victory for those
countries and stakeholders that considered them important
enough to raise the WSIS stakes, and so had most to lose
from losing. Few interviewees thought that LDCs and other
low-income countries gained much, though they did sug-
gest that a few – such as Ghana – raised their profile through
the issues and gained respect from other participants.
Regional meetings
One final area of participation is worth exploring here. As
well as global PrepComs, the preparatory process in both
WSIS summit phases included regional (in reality, more or
less continental) preparatory conferences. These varied
substantially in character. Those in Africa included quite
substantial civil society participation, while those in Asia/
Pacific, for example, were much more strongly led by gov-
ernments. Some had a dramatic impact on the course of
WSIS – notably the Middle East regional event during the
first phase, which introduced Internet governance as a
major summit theme; others were much less significant,
for example the first phase European regional event, whose
outcomes were so insubstantial that the experience was
not repeated in the second phase. The two African regional
events provide an interesting instance of how this tier of
summit preparation could engage with WSIS.
During the first phase, Africa was home to the first regional
conference, held in Bamako, Mali in May 2002, even before
the first PrepCom had begun to set the terms of reference
for the WSIS process as a whole. This was a mixed bless-
ing.  On the one hand, some participants suggested, it
enabled African countries to set the tone: to put an Afri-
can agenda on the table at the very beginning of the sum-
mit process. On the other hand, others pointed out, it
meant that the main opportunity for African regional dis-
cussion was over and done with before the PrepCom proc-
ess had begun to define the issues that would really pre-
occupy the summit. At a regional level, Africa therefore
had less opportunity to debate these issues than other
regions, and less scope to put forward a considered conti-
nental point of view. (The emergence of Internet govern-
ance as an issue from the last of the regional events made
this a significant problem for other regions, too.) The
Bamako meeting raised a number of important African is-
sues, including infrastructure investment, regulation and
enabling environments, and multilingualism. It produced
an outcome document which addressed requirements to
different stakeholders, including African governments, in-
ter-governmental organisations and the WSIS secretariat.
It also demonstrated quite impressive multistakeholder
participation, and its conclusions were substantially influ-
enced by civil society.
The Bamako Bureau which it established to represent Af-
rica collectively during the remainder of the preparatory
process, however, found it hard to sustain a comparable
network or represent such a comprehensive range of think-
ing later in the summit phase. Its presentation of 21 “pri-
orities” for Africa during the second PrepCom illustrated
the difficulty it had in focusing on Africa’s most important
issues rather than listing its concerns.31
The Africa regional conference during the second phase
took place shortly after the report of the Task Force on Fi-
nancial Mechanisms was published, and proved an impor-
tant stage in the resolution, within WSIS, of the crisis sur-
rounding the proposed Digital Solidarity Fund. Non-re-
gional donors present at this meeting had understood the
need to defuse argument about the DSF and begun to rec-
ognise some of the new challenges for infrastructure fi-
nance posed by the Task Force’s report. The regional con-
ference in Accra was an opportunity for them to put for-
ward an African infrastructure initiative which offered Af-
rican countries some of what they had been seeking
through the DSF. Together with endorsement of a limited
voluntary DSF, this was sufficient to defuse that conflict.
Although this was not necessarily apparent to them at the
time, participants in both these African regional events felt
subsequently that they had had substantial value – the
former in enabling the continent, including civil society, to
discuss issues in some depth and set the basis for future
networking; the latter in drawing forward a new alignment
31 The 21 priorities are available from: africa.rights.apc.org/
index.shtml?apc=ie_1&x=30659.
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between donors and African regional institutions such as
NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development).
This does not seem to have been complemented, however,
by much discussion of WSIS within those regional institu-
tions themselves. African input to WSIS took place at a
national and a continental level, rather than that of conti-
nental sub-regions. WSIS was not a major topic of inter-
est, for example, in gatherings of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the East African Com-
munity, or the West African economic partnership ECOWAS.
Some interviewees felt that this was an opportunity
missed, to develop a stronger sub-regional dimension to
Africa’s input and to focus on the continent’s diversity
rather than its commonalities. This is not, however, a prob-
lem that is unique to ICTs.
National policymaking processes
The “Louder Voices” study found that weaknesses in na-
tional policymaking processes were more important in
explaining the limitations of developing country partici-
pation in international ICT decision-making than deficien-
cies in the structure of international decision-making bod-
ies. Would the same be found in respect of WSIS? Coun-
try case studies were undertaken for the present study
in five varying developing countries – in Bangladesh, Ec-
uador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya – in order to address
this question. With one exception, they found processes
that were comparably weak in terms of both national and
international engagement. This section summarises the
evidence from these case studies concerning participa-
tion in international meetings, while evidence concern-
ing the national policymaking process is summarised in
Chapter 7. Copies of the country case studies are avail-
able online.32
The lead role for WSIS in all of the case study countries
was taken by a government department which was tech-
nologically oriented and usually within the telecommuni-
cations establishment – the Department of Telecommuni-
cations (DoT) in India; the Ministry of Science and Infor-
mation Technology in Bangladesh; the National Telecom-
munications Council (and Secretariat) in Ecuador; the
Ethiopian Telecommunications Authority (the national
telecoms regulator) in Ethiopia; and the Kenya Communi-
cations Commission (ditto) and then the Ministry of Trans-
port and Communications in Kenya.
It is clear from the case studies that different governments
had different perceptions of the role and value of WSIS. The
Indian country case study, for example, makes clear that
India’s Department of Telecommunications saw the sum-
mit primarily - at least during the first phase - as an oppor-
tunity to showcase India’s considerable achievements in
ICTs, though the impact of this was disappointing. “The
perception among senior decision makers” from other
departments, the case study reports, however, “was that
the agenda of WSIS was not very relevant and useful to
India’s aspirations from the summit.” Development minis-
tries ignored DoT’s invitation to participate, and only the
Ministries of Information and Broadcasting and of Infor-
mation Technology responded, their sectoral agendas
clashing to some degree with DoT’s. Private businesses
were also relatively uninvolved in official delegations,
though some of the large ICT businesses based in India
participated in their own right – as would be expected,
given the country’s international reputation for software
development and other ICT services. Nevertheless, Indian
businesses had nothing like the presence that Chinese
businesses had, for example in the exhibition area at the
Tunis summit.
Although Bangladesh starts from a much lower e-readi-
ness base than India, its government, too, has adopted
an extremely ambitious national ICT strategy, which was
the focus for considerable debate around the time that
WSIS was announced. It established national consulta-
tion processes, which are described in Chapter 7, though
these may have caused as much confusion as enlighten-
ment. During the second phase of the summit, however,
the government of Bangladesh attained some promi-
nence in WSIS as a whole - holding the PrepCom vice-
presidency for Asia, presenting position papers for dis-
cussion, trying to coordinate LDC inputs in some areas,
and - towards the end of the Internet governance nego-
tiations during the third PrepCom of the second phase -
successfully introducing new text encouraging commer-
cial negotiation of reduced interconnection rates for LDCs
and other priority countries.
National participation from Ecuador varied substantially
between the two phases of the summit. During the first,
the government made significant efforts to engage with
different stakeholders and use their input to contribute to
a national policy agenda, though, the case study reports,
“despite the efforts and the political will of the stakehold-
ers, [this process] did not allow the basic consensus
needed for the formulation of a position and priorities of
the country to be reached.” During the second phase, the
government of Ecuador was more preoccupied with its role
in information society politics in Latin America, which di-
verted official time and resources and which also concen-
trated the country’s approach on issues which the govern-
ment felt would further its ambitions in its region.
The Ethiopian government did not attend the African re-
gional meeting which kicked off the first phase of WSIS
in May 2002, though the country was represented there
by a substantial group of private sector and civil society
participants. Having missed that opportunity, the Ethio-
pian Telecommunications Authority organised a national
32 Available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/
wsis_research.
6 7
consultative workshop in early 2003, which led to the es-
tablishment of a task force and to the development of a
substantial official response to the WSIS draft texts later in
the year. However, this was not proactive, and a compara-
ble position paper developed by the government during the
second phase also offered little dynamic content on either
development issues or the two main issues being dealt with
in that phase.
According to the country case study, Ethiopia did not,
therefore, play “any significant role in defining or driving
the agenda and outcomes of global governance issues dis-
cussed at the Summit.” Ethiopia currently gives great
prominence to ICTs within development policy, but this
emphasis is built around plans for improving public serv-
ices rather than on issues such as affordability (which is
of primary interest to civil society) or competition (which
is currently very limited, but which is of great interest to
the private sector). Since WSIS, the government has been
reviewing its approach to ICTs in order to incorporate the
Tunis agenda, but the country case study reports that this
is still very much a government-led agenda.
Kenya also had a large group of participants at the first
phase African meeting in Bamako in May 2002, mostly from
the private sector and civil society though it also included
government participants. Afterwards, Kenyan delegates
recognised that they had been ill-prepared for the meet-
ing and this recognition was crucial in the formation of a
Kenya Civil Society WSIS Caucus bringing together non-
governmental groups with longstanding experience of ICTs
in development (see Chapter 7).
The government of Kenya was represented by the coun-
try’s telecoms regulator and Geneva mission in the first
WSIS phase, at least up to the final PrepCom when a civil
society representative joined the team. Participation in the
Geneva summit itself was much more substantial, a large
multistakeholder delegation led by the vice-president cre-
ating what the country case study describes as a turning
point in Kenya’s subsequent approach. Shortly before the
first PrepCom of the second phase, Kenya’s Ministry of
Transport and Communications set up a National WSIS
Plan of Action Implementation Taskforce, led by the regu-
latory commission, which aimed to:
• Initiate structured dialogue and lay down strategies
on the implementation of the WSIS Plan of action [sic]
• Articulate national common positions on the issues
to be discussed in the PrepComs towards the Tunis
Phase of the Summit
• Develop and implement mechanisms for coordinated
national initiatives and multi-stakeholder partnerships
• Facilitate national workshops to sensitise policy mak-
ers and stakeholders on their roles in the implemen-
tation of the WSIS action plan
• Facilitate and coordinate the implementation of ICT
show case initiatives and encourage the mainstream-
ing and integration of ICTs at the national development
strategy to achieve the UN Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs).33
This was followed by the creation of a new alliance be-
tween Kenyan civil society and private sector organisations
with an interest in ICT policy, the Kenya ICT Action Net-
work (Kictanet). It added a new dynamic to lobbying on
national ICT issues and significantly contributed to national
WSIS policy.
Kenyan participation in the second phase of WSIS was
substantial and substantive. The combination of WSIS with
discussions on a new national ICT policy stimulated par-
ticipation in the Summit, including more senior leadership
than in the first phase. Participation in the Summit, in turn,
the country case study suggests, improved awareness of
ICT and development issues in general and in detail, im-
proved policy coordination within government, and built
solidarity between groups that had previously contested
space for policy influence. However, the case study con-
tinues, limits to understanding and cohesion remained.
“Careful review of the participation of public sector, civil
society and private sector ... shows that the engagement
was not coherent and input to the WSIS issues tended to
be reactive rather than proactive.” Thinking about WSIS
remained focused on technology rather than the national
development context, and debate in Kenya still exhibited
many of the deficiencies discussed in Chapter 5. “Uncriti-
cal acceptance of the WSIS process and its recommenda-
tions in Kenya,” the case study concludes, “shows that
there is a long way to go to influence a global debate on a
wider set of issues regarding ICTs and development.”
This brief summary of the evidence set out in the country
case studies suggests that there was considerable vari-
ance in the experience of different developing countries
in the WSIS context. Government engagement varied both
between countries and, within countries, over time. Some
governments were able to have significant input at differ-
ent stages of the overall negotiations, but none of the coun-
try case studies reports a strongly proactive presence.
WSIS was not used by any of the five countries studied as
a way of pressing an important national agenda, though
India’s DoT clearly hoped this might be possible in the ini-
tial stages. Of the countries studied, only Kenya suggests
that the impact of WSIS may result in significant change
in the way that government engages with other stakehold-
ers in policymaking or with other countries in international
fora. Issues concerning multistakeholder participation in
the case study countries are discussed in Chapter 7.
33 Communications Commission of Kenya, “The World Summit for
Information Society Process”, www.cck.go.ke/wsis_process.
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WSIS and conventional
ICT decision-making
The experience of WSIS was, as discussed at the begin-
ning of this chapter, different in many ways from that in
conventional ICT decision-making fora. WSIS was a one-
off event, with a wide remit (if rather narrow actual de-
bate), in which the conventions of the ITU, the WTO, ICANN
and other international ICT decision-making bodies did not
apply. Did interviewees for this study think that these dif-
ferences enabled developing countries to participate more
effectively or not in the work of WSIS – and how much dif-
ference, if any, did that make? Again, it is worth looking at
this question firstly from the point of view of participation
in the international events themselves; secondly from that
of national policymaking; and thirdly in relation to overall
WSIS outcomes.
In terms of participation, it would certainly seem that de-
veloping countries played a more forceful role in WSIS than
they play in most international ICT fora. Two reasons are
suggested for this:
• Firstly, the equal status afforded to all delegations gave
them a stronger sense of power within the forum – and,
if they chose to exercise it, an inbuilt majority. While
this may also be true in theory at, for example, ITU
study groups, it is rarely true in practice because few
developing countries actually attend with sufficient
expertise or regularity. The summit was, in this respect,
more like the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, where
developing country political authority can be more ef-
fectively deployed.
• Secondly, industrial countries did not consider WSIS
particularly important to them and substantially down-
graded their participation compared with that in other
international ICT fora. The only areas in which this was
not the case concerned the two major disputes during
the WSIS process, on financing mechanisms and
Internet governance, where industrial countries did
participate more substantially in order to protect their
own interests.
As a result, some international observers described de-
veloping countries as, in practice, leading much of the pre-
paratory committee process. The voices of developing
countries in WSIS were “louder” than they were in more
conventional ICT fora. But were they more effective?
As with the more obviously sectoral inter-governmental
negotiating fora considered in “Louder Voices”, develop-
ing country participation in WSIS was led by ministries of
telecommunications or their successors (a number of coun-
tries moved towards converged ministries of information
technology, or the like, during the summit period). Interac-
tion between these ministries and those responsible for
other departments, particularly mainstream development
activities, appears to have been weak in most cases, and
certainly in those assessed in country case studies under-
taken for this project. Few countries included significant
representation from these ICT-user ministries in their WSIS
delegations. This finding corresponds to the poor knowl-
edge management – the lack of “joined-up government” -
within international ICT decision-making processes which
was described in “Louder Voices”.
Again as with the fora discussed in “Louder Voices”, inter-
views suggested that the majority of developing countries
seem to have made little effort to engage civil society and
private sector voices in national debate on WSIS propos-
als and outcomes. While the Geneva outcome documents
advocated a multistakeholder approach, this seems to
have been observed as much in breach as substance. There
was, for instance, little formal or informal multistakeholder
consultation in four of the five countries of which case stud-
ies were undertaken for this study. Even in some indus-
trial countries, where multistakeholder participation is
more established, civil society organisations reported that
arrangements for multistakeholder dialogue were weak,
and that what took place was more likely to be informal
dialogue than a formal part of the decision-making proc-
ess. However, some countries – such as Kenya, among the
case studies for this report - did experience substantial
multistakeholder involvement. This represents an advance
on the experience reported in “Louder Voices”. It will be
important to monitor whether it sets a precedent in these
countries for more conventional ICT fora in the future, both
national and international. The future performance of
Kictanet in Kenya will be particularly interesting to observe.
Interviewees, by and large, felt that the quality of exper-
tise available to delegations improved where multistake-
holder participation took place. This is likely to have been
particularly so on issues such as the Internet where gov-
ernments historically have little expertise. However, the
poor quality of the WSIS outcome documents, described
in Chapter 5, suggests that this did not have much impact
at the level of text negotiations. In fact, most delegations
relied on their Geneva missions – i.e. on diplomats experi-
enced in diplomatic rather than sectoral nuance – to nego-
tiate these texts. The format of more conventional ICT deci-
sion-making fora is likely to be more susceptible to enhance-
ments in the quality of inputs than summitry, and this expe-
rience need not therefore be taken as indicating what might
happen if delegations at these more conventional ICT fora
also took in more non-governmental expertise.
Few interviewees felt that developing countries made sig-
nificant gains through WSIS, at least in terms of stated ob-
jectives. The most obvious instance here is that of the Dig-
ital Solidarity Fund. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it
had strong support from a large number of developing coun-
tries during the first summit phase, and provided a signifi-
cant focus for developing country solidarity. However, as
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noted earlier, the DSF proposal in its initial form was simply
not pursued by its sponsors during the second phase. Some
alternative gains were nevertheless made as a result of the
pursuit of the DSF, as described in Chapter 5.
In terms of Internet governance, as in other contexts, it is
difficult to say. Developing country objectives here varied,
and a distinction needs to be drawn between the majority
of developing countries, on the one hand, and the small
but vocal group of countries that vigorously pursued this
issue. If the objective was to break United States power
over the Internet, they failed. Equally, they failed if the
objective was to draw the Internet more closely under the
wing of an inter-governmental agency. But shifts have un-
doubtedly occurred in the way the Internet will be gov-
erned in the future, which are yet to be worked out (see
Chapter 8). In that sense, therefore, changes might be
thought to have been achieved, the extent of whose im-
pact will only become apparent over time.
One final way of looking at this is to consider the list of 21
priorities for Africa agreed by the Bamako Bureau for sub-
mission to WSIS during the Geneva phase. These are set
out in the box below.
For obvious reasons, it is not possible to act on 21 priori-
ties. Priorities must be fewer in number if they are, mean-
ingfully, to be priorities. The length of this list reflects a
failure apparent in many WSIS contexts, to prioritise is-
sues on which political attention could be concentrated.
In practice, WSIS outcome texts do have something to say
on most of these issues, but in very few cases does this
text represent anything new or substantial. The Digital
Solidarity Fund could be regarded as, in the end, some-
thing of a failure for African engagement in WSIS, though
advances were made on “infrastructure” and WSIS itself
had an impact in “capacity building”. It would, in short, be
possible to tick boxes regarding content where many of
these “priorities” were concerned, but not regarding prac-
tical outcomes. It is a matter for debate whether this was
primarily due to structural weaknesses with WSIS or within
continental input to it – a debate which could valuably be
undertaken within Africa by governments, regional organi-
sations, local private sector businesses and civil society
organisations.
Conclusion
As discussed earlier in this report, WSIS differed signifi-
cantly from conventional ICT decision-making bodies in a
number of important ways. It had, for a start, a much wider
remit, looking at the whole “information society” and (at
least ostensibly) at the relationship of the ICT sector with
non-sector-specific issues such as freedoms of expression
and development policy. Its engagement with these issues,
as importantly, was less prescriptive than that of other in-
ternational fora. Unlike the ITU-T (the ITU Telecommuni-
cation \o “Standardization” Standardisation Sector) and
ICANN, for example, WSIS was never going to draw up pre-
cise rules with lasting impact on government and business.
Its decisions were at most likely to set the tone for future
international discourse and national policymaking - to af-
fect the context in which conventional ICT agencies con-
duct their business.
This combination of generalism and limited power had an
impact on participation at a national level. Developing
countries in general, and many individual developing coun-
tries in particular, participated more substantially in WSIS
than they tend to do in more outcome-focused decision-
making bodies. The equal status afforded all countries
within the summit format gave relatively weak countries
more chance to put their point of view, and gave more
powerful developing countries a ready opportunity to en-
hance their visibility and status within the developing
world and vis-à-vis industrial powers. At the same time,
the generalism of much WSIS debate made it easier for
delegations short of substantive expertise to play a part.
Industrial countries, on the other hand, by and large felt
that they had less to gain from WSIS. For them, the fact
that WSIS was not able to make substantive decisions was
• Infrastructure and maintenance of infrastructure
and equipment
• Human resource development and capacity
building
• Gender issues and women empowerment in
ICTs uses
• Partnership between public and private sectors
• Debt conversion (to back up ICTs development)
• Environmental protection
• Open and free software
• National information and communication
strategies with special support to the African
Information Society Initiative (AISI)
• Sectoral applications
• Support to NEPAD
• Digital Solidarity Fund
• Technology transfer, particularly South to
South transfer




• Relations between traditional media and new ICTs
• Legislative and regulatory framework
• Intellectual property rights
• Security
• Regional cooperation
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grounds for downgrading their presence. Not a few inter-
viewees from such countries, for example, felt that their
main objective in participation was to “prevent harm”
rather than to promote a positive agenda. As a result, it
would probably be true to say that developing country
presence was more prominent, more visible and more sub-
stantial in comparison with industrial countries than is typi-
cally the case in ongoing negotiating fora such as the ITU
- but that this resulted primarily from the lack of priority
afforded WSIS by industrial countries.
Amongst developing countries themselves, a clear distinc-
tion can be drawn between the participation of develop-
ing countries in general, on the one hand, and a category
of more powerful and more assertive countries, on the
other. Countries in this latter category - notably China, In-
dia, Brazil and South Africa - tended to be larger, to have
less difficulty in attracting foreign investment than other
developing countries, and to have well-established politi-
cal agendas to pursue alongside WSIS-specific issues (of-
ten to do with their relationship with the United States and/
or industrial countries in general). They acted to some
degree in formal collusion but also in informal alliance or
independently. Although often observed as, and some-
times presenting themselves as, articulating a general
developing country perspective, their interests did not
coincide closely with those of the mass of developing coun-
tries, particularly LDCs, which (for example) find it more
difficult to attract investment.
The appearance of this divergence amongst developing
countries - which might be characterised as one between
“emerging powers” and “other developing countries, par-
ticularly LDCs” - can be tracked in a number of recent in-
ternational fora, not least the Doha round of WTO nego-
tiations. Its implications for developing country participa-
tion are not yet properly addressed, but are likely to be
significant in future. They reflect a growing diversity in the
economic and political characteristics of what was once
called the “Third World”. A more assertive bloc of emerg-
ing powers which is more powerfully engaged in interna-
tional decision-making, on ICTs or other issues, does not
imply any increase in the influence of LDCs, and analysis
of participation will need to pay more attention to this dis-
tinction in the future.
With the exception of Internet governance bodies, and to
some extent the ITU, WSIS does not appear to have had a
significant impact on other international decision-making
bodies concerned with ICTs, or indeed development. Most
interviewees from such agencies felt that WSIS may have
raised awareness of some issues that they deal with, but
that it would not have a lasting effect on either their ac-
tivities or their institutional structure. As noted earlier,
WSIS did not break through the existing paradigm gap
between ICT and development communities: it was prima-
rily an ICT sector event, attended by ICT sector participants
and advocating an ICT sector perspective on development
issues. While present, the participation of UN specialist
development agencies was peripheral. Many mainstream
development specialists from such organisations say they
ended WSIS as sceptical about ICTs in development as they
began, and even many ICD specialists within them left Tu-
nis cynical about the degree of hype they felt it had at-
tached to ICTs. Mainstream development agencies were,
by and large, insufficiently engaged with WSIS for it to have
had much impact on them institutionally.
Regional ICT institutions also had relatively little engage-
ment with WSIS. The summit structure of regional (i.e. con-
tinental) preparatory conferences did not encourage their
engagement. The European Union, as was to be expected,
engaged with WSIS as a regional bloc, consistent with the
Union-level lead in trade issues and the principle favour-
ing Union-wide cohesion in hybrid negotiations. Other re-
gional economic blocs, however, such as SADC, did not
substantially discuss WSIS issues, nor did they form a
major part of the agenda of regional sectoral bodies such
as the African Telecommunications Union or regional regu-
latory associations. This was, perhaps, a weakness of the
WSIS process – or of summit processes in general.
Finally, a word about the ITU – as begetter and manager
of the Summit, did it also benefit in the end from playing
these roles?
In many ways, the ITU is in the throes of a prolonged crisis
of identity. Its historic role as international regulator of tel-
ecommunications and telecoms standards has been sub-
stantially diminished during the past thirty years - as liber-
alisation and globalisation have reduced the scope for in-
ternational management of telecoms and the private sec-
tor has taken over the development and also, in effect, the
enforcement of standards. ITU Councils and Conferences
have repeatedly addressed the implications of this for the
Union’s role, notably (for example) incorporating private
“Sector Members”, but have tinkered around the edges
rather than radically reforming the Union’s structure. WSIS
represented a major opportunity for the Union to reposi-
tion itself within the UN and international systems, one that
was readily recognised by the Secretary-General and the
Council. While some of the conspiracy theories advanced in
other organisations about a concerted land grab by the ITU
do seem exaggerated (and underestimate the ITU’s inter-
nal diversity and divisions), for some within the Union and
for some supporters among its member-countries, the op-
portunity to become lead agency for the information soci-
ety and/or the Internet looked like the promised land. Other
member-states, however (notably industrial countries), and
private sector members, have been strongly opposed to any
broadening of the ITU’s role.
Institutionally, most interviewees felt, the ITU failed to
make substantial gains during the WSIS process. It did not
acquire new roles where the Internet is concerned. In fact,
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opposition to its doing so may have hardened within in-
dustrial countries and civil society during WSIS, though
support remains significant among some former commu-
nist and developing countries. The nature of future Internet
governance is not resolved, however, and the ITU will con-
tinue to bid for a more substantial role. Overall, the WSIS
experience might be considered an opportunity for the ITU
to reposition itself which has left it still uncertain where
and how to reposition. Debate on this continued at the
Union’s 2006 Plenipotentiary Conference.
In assessing developing country participation in interna-
tional organisations, especially where ICTs are concerned,
it is important not to confuse two separate issues: the in-
fluence of developing countries within ICT decision bod-
ies; and the influence of ICT decision-making bodies over
the ICT sector. The latter is concerned with the scope of
international governance of ICTs; the former with the bal-
ance between developing and industrial countries in deci-
sion-making of whatever scope.
In practice, the two are often confused (not least by inter-
viewees for this project). Developing countries tend to
want to gain both more influence in decision-making bod-
ies vis-à-vis industrial countries (a question of balance)
and more influence for decision-making bodies over inter-
national developments (a question of scope). This reflects
their relative weakness both internationally and nation-
ally: rebalancing would increase the weight of attention
paid to their concerns, while increased scope would sup-
port enhanced government authority and capacity to man-
age domestic markets. Industrial countries and the private
sector tend to want a reduction in the decision-making
powers of international bodies (global deregulation), but
are divided over rebalancing: some (or at least some parts
of some) governments see rebalancing as a question of
international justice (of significance to smaller industrial
countries as much as developing ones); others are con-
cerned about the risk of technical dilution or politicisation
of decisions which should be taken on pragmatic or purely
technical grounds. Civil society organisations, meanwhile,
tend to favour rebalancing in favour of developing coun-
tries (on grounds of international equity) but also a reduc-
tion in the powers of inter-governmental organisations (dis-
trusting organisations which are dominated by govern-
ments and unexposed to multistakeholder participation).
On balance, few interviewees felt that WSIS had signifi-
cantly changed the balance of power or likely outcomes
of forthcoming negotiations in other ICT decision-making
fora, with the obvious exception of those concerned with
Internet governance (which is discussed in Chapter 8). The
ITU’s World Telecommunication Development Conference
in March 2006 spent a good deal of time discussing the
implications of WSIS and placed its Development Bureau’s
workplan for the coming four years firmly in its wake – but
it has fewer, not more resources to devote to ICT for devel-
opment (ICT4D). WSIS action line follow-up meetings have
attracted little interest (as described in Chapter 8). WSIS
is no longer on the tip of people’s tongues at international
ICT gatherings. The networks it created are dissipating
(apart from those on Internet governance). Its outcomes
simply do not have enough to say about what other ICT
fora should be doing. The evidence from those who par-
ticipated in this study suggests that WSIS is unlikely to
have a lasting impact on other international ICT fora, and
that the conclusions of the “Louder Voices” study remain
as valid as they were four years ago. 
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WSIS and civil society
c h a p t e r  7
Civil society participation in international summit proc-
esses is always controversial. The United Nations system
is predicated on the unique authority of governments.
Governments are understood, de facto and de iure, to rep-
resent those they govern. Although they are highly vari-
able in practice, the legitimacy and accountability of gov-
ernments are assumed because for inter-governmental in-
stitutions to challenge them, except in the most extreme
and universally agreed of cases, would jeopardise the fab-
ric of international discourse (and, many would say, the
stability of international relations). Governments therefore
speak, within the UN system and most other international
organisations, for their nations and their citizens; and
many governments, throughout the period since 1945,
have been very jealous of their unique authority to do so.
(This differs, of course, from the situation in national gov-
ernance, where national governments share decision-mak-
ing authority with local government, with the judiciary, with
parliamentary bodies, with a variety of semi-autonomous
quasi-governmental organisations, and with a wide range
of other social actors including civil society organisations.)
One United Nations agency, the International Labour Or-
ganisation (ILO), has a different tradition. It inherited a multi-
stakeholder character from its pre-1945 (League of Nations)
structure, one in which representatives of governments, em-
ployers and trade unions collectively negotiate and deter-
mine ILO decisions. In a very formal sense, this represents
a different way of looking at the state – seeing it more as a
partnership between different interest groups with contest-
ing perspectives out of which consensus may be reached.
This reflects, at an international level, the balance of gov-
ernance authority that pertains between different institu-
tions - legal, social and economic, as well as political - within
nation-states. Similar “social partnership” arrangements
exist, though with limited effect, within the European Un-
ion and some other international organisations.
It is difficult to envisage today’s nation-states agreeing as
formal a multistakeholder arrangement as the ILO, but the
structural difference between it and other UN agencies
points to the growing significance of stakeholder diversity
in contemporary national and international discourse. The
ILO structure sought to replicate at international level a na-
tional division between the state and opposite sides of its
specialist relationship, workers and employers. It assumed
three distinct relationships within this triangle: between
the state and employers, often but not quite the same as
private business; between the state and organised labour
– trade unions, a component of what is now called civil so-
ciety; and between the representatives of business and of
workers (the private sector and trade unions).
Multistakeholderism is the concept of decision-making
which formally engages not just governments but also other
stakeholder groups within society. Typically, at a national
level, it implies the formal (as well as informal) engage-
ment of the business community (the “private sector”) and
of organisations representing groups within the commu-
nity (“civil society”) as well as government. At an interna-
tional level, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) are
added to the mix. This is seen by many governments as a
challenge to their authority and status as the legal repre-
sentatives of their people; as a national sovereignty ques-
tion concerning relations within the nation comparable with,
say, the external national sovereignty questions raised by
membership of the European Union or by ICANN’s role in
respect of Internet domains. Some governments, however,
see it as an opportunity to harness the support and exper-
tise of the community as a whole to improve the respon-
siveness of government, the quality of decision-making and
the implementation of government services. This interpre-
tation recognises that neither appointed officials nor peri-
odic elections are good at capturing the diversity of con-
cerns and needs within society, and that incorporating the
private sector and civil society in decision-making can im-
prove the quality of government (and perhaps the likeli-
hood of re-election). This “liberal” approach to multistake-
holderism, within the country, is not surprisingly more of-
ten found in democratic than authoritarian states.
Multistakeholderism at an international level adds another
dimension to this question, which might be described as
“governmental confidence”. Governments which are con-
fident of their status with their citizens (which may mean
governmental systems rather than individual govern-
ments) are more likely to choose to include a wider range
of stakeholders in national representation abroad. Gov-
ernments which are confident of their status both within
their own countries and within the international commu-
nity are more likely to welcome formal multistakeholder
participation in international fora. Correspondingly, gov-
ernments which feel insecure at home – because they lack
democratic legitimacy, because the authority of govern-
ment has been historically weak, because they represent
the victors of civil conflict or particular vested interest
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groups – or insecure abroad – because they are small,
militarily or economically vulnerable, ideologically at odds
with mainstream opinion, emerging from international
conflict: these governments are less likely to include
stakeholder diversity in representing themselves to other
nations, and less likely to welcome scrutiny from stake-
holders other than their peers in international fora, espe-
cially human rights activists and other civil society groups.
Nevertheless, the past thirty years or so have seen two
trends in the balance of relations between the three na-
tional stakeholder categories (government, the private
sector and civil society). Firstly, the neoliberal consensus
in economic policy – the preponderance of free market
economics, particularly since the fall of communism at the
beginning of the 1990s - has increased the economic power
and the role and influence of the private sector vis-à-vis
the state, and particularly that of multinational and inter-
national companies. Secondly, civil society organisations
have grown increasingly critical of the representativeness
of government and more assertive about their capacity to
articulate alternative citizens’ perspectives - particularly
those of marginalised groups such as the poor, landless,
indigenous peoples and, most significantly, women.
These processes have been important at both national and
international levels. The influence of business has in-
creased in most countries, particularly post-communist
and developing countries, and that of multinational busi-
nesses has also increased in international trade and in-
vestment – especially in the telecommunications sector,
where privatisation and liberalisation have led to the ap-
pearance of major telecoms corporations investing in many
countries. Civil society organisations have increasingly
represented themselves as supplements to formal demo-
cratic institutions in democratic states and as alternative
forms of democratic representation where formal democ-
racy is weak. Their involvement has been highly diverse -
coming from a wide variety of organisations and alliances
with a wide range of social and political perspectives and
of representational scope.
The balance between the two principles represented here
- of governmental sovereignty on the one hand, and of rep-
resentational diversity on the other - has been debated
within the United Nations system for many years. The UN
system is, of course, built around governments. It does
not formally distinguish between categories of non-gov-
ernmental actor - private sector and civil society organisa-
tions have the same formal identity within the UN system.
However, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
provides a consultative process for accredited NGOs, of
which there are now over 2700 (though these obviously
represent only a small proportion of civil society stake-
holders). ECOSOC has in effect provided a limited safety
valve for the growing pressure from civil society for more
substantial participation in UN (and other international)
decision-making. However, many governments remain
suspicious of the representativeness, in particular, of civil
society – in terms of both its social composition and po-
litical ideology.
Summits have provided a particular focus for contention
over multistakeholder participation. Summits are inter-gov-
ernmental events: it is governments that decide the con-
tent of final texts, by which governments (if anyone) are
bound. Access to discussion about texts - to participation
in PrepComs and Summit meetings themselves - has been
jealously guarded by governments (though not all have
been adamant about this), and very little space has been
given to any non-governmental actors within formal sum-
mit proceedings. This has not prevented non-governmen-
tal actors from making themselves heard. After all, many of
the issues discussed by summits – sustainable develop-
ment, for one example; the “information society” for an-
other – require action by the private sector and communi-
ties as well as governments if change is going to come.
Some governments, particularly in the North, have been
prepared to include private sector and (sometimes) civil
society participants in their official delegations (though this
usually means that these participants are bound by col-
lective responsibility, i.e. tied to the official delegation line
rather than pursuing that of their own CSO or CSOs in gen-
eral). In the corridors, meeting rooms and coffee bars of
every summit, unattached private sector and civil society
representatives have also caucused, lobbied and inter-
acted with official delegates willing to listen to or put across
their point of view. At summit after summit, civil society
organisations have organised alternative events, some-
times called alternative summits or NGO fora, at which al-
ternative viewpoints are expressed, debated and alterna-
tive declarations agreed, which can be juxtaposed against
the decisions reached in the formal summit process.
Summits, in other words, have had formally constrained
but informally extensive non-governmental participation
for many years. Recent summits have also seen increas-
ing space granted to civil society participation within their
formal proceedings, normally mediated via ECOSOC, as
perception of the value of civil society engagement has
increased within government delegations and the UN bu-
reaucracy. The following paragraphs consider WSIS in this
context: firstly in terms of civil society experience in par-
ticipation and organisation; then, in terms of content and
the key issues that preoccupied civil society participants.
The chapter ends by reviewing the implications of the WSIS
experience for future multistakeholder involvement.
Civil society participation
WSIS was, as has been noted repeatedly in this report,
not an entirely normal summit – it was a UN-style summit
rather than a UN summit per se; a summit organised by
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the ITU with support from other UN agencies rather than
by officials from the United Nations itself. This may have
created a different space for non-governmental actors to
be represented. In any event, almost all interviewees with
experience of other summits agreed that private sector and
civil society participation in the formal summit proceed-
ings of WSIS substantially exceeded that in those previ-
ous summits. A civil society bureau was established early
in the preparatory stages of the first summit phase to in-
corporate civil society participation, and was accommo-
dated within the secretariat structure set up by the ITU. It
was intended to parallel the inter-governmental bureau’s
role in process (but not content) matters. In practice, the
civil society bureau was, by all accounts, substantially left
to its own devices to organise civil society participation,
not least because the ITU lacked experience of civil soci-
ety organisations and their ways of working. Meanwhile,
civil society participants in WSIS set up their own coordi-
nating structures, including a “Content and Themes Group”
to coordinate the work of diverse caucuses, working
groups and other content-oriented partnerships that were
established by civil society organisations.34
During the formal summit processes themselves - though
this was, at times, in the teeth of resistance from some gov-
ernments - civil society and private sector representatives
were able to make formal presentations in PrepComs and
plenary sessions. They undoubtedly influenced areas of the
final texts agreed by WSIS, partly through this formal pres-
ence, more substantially through lobbying and alliances
formed and pursued outside the formal meeting rooms.
They had more impact on the Declaration of Principles in
Geneva than on the Plan of Action; more in Tunis on Internet
governance than on infrastructure investment - though, in
this latter case, some impact on both. Private sector and
civil society actors also played significant roles in influenc-
ing some of the more specific content negotiated between
delegations, on subjects such as child protection and gen-
der equity. However, they had little involvement in discus-
sion of texts concerning implementation of the development
agenda. They also argued (not least amongst each other)
on a number of topics (such as the relationship between
proprietary and open source software).
Civil society organisation was – perhaps inevitably given
the nature of the summit process – sometimes less than
coherent and often reactive rather than proactive. CONGO,
the formal association of NGOs associated with the UN
system, played more of a role in trying to achieve organi-
sational coherence during the second phase than it had
played in the first, but, as noted elsewhere in this chapter,
the limited thematic scope of the second phase made it
less easy to bring the whole of civil society together be-
hind a common agenda that mattered to all involved.
During PrepComs, civil society organisations met in ple-
nary during the morning, while their Content and Themes
Group met each evening. Much of the time of these dis-
cussions was spent on administrative and political ques-
tions, rather than debating substantive issues (which were
more substantially dealt with in caucuses and informal dis-
cussion). Some participants complained that these regu-
lar meetings were dominated by relatively few voices and
that they offered little scope for newcomers to get involved.
The political tensions raised by the presence of Tunisian
organisations with questionable NGO credentials made
civil society organisation more difficult during the second
phase – especially around the time of the Hammamet
PrepCom in early 2005 - to a degree that caused confu-
sion and anger among many who had participated within
civil society during the earlier summit period.
There was, meanwhile, no large-scale alternative event or-
ganised at WSIS in the sense that has occurred at other re-
cent summits – for example, the 2002 Johannesburg Earth
Summit. While some outside events did take place in Ge-
neva and Tunis – there was, for example, some effort to or-
ganise events in solidarity with excluded Tunisian civil soci-
ety during the second summit – these were small, entirely
unlike the very substantial event in Johannesburg. In spite
of the problems, in short, non-governmental actors were
able to find more space to engage in the activities that most
interested them within the perimeter of WSIS than in other
summits, and this was sufficient to retain them inside the
WSIS tent rather than taking up a space without. Three ex-
planations were put forward for this by civil society inter-
viewees and others with experience of summits.
One explanation, discussed to some extent earlier in this
report, is that the ITU simply did not know how to handle
civil society involvement, having no prior experience of it
in its own events and no statutory provision of its own for
including them comparable with the sector membership
available to businesses. While more liberal towards the
private sector, therefore – at least to the ICT-oriented pri-
vate sector – the ITU has been less liberal towards NGOs.
When it came to organising WSIS, the ITU had far less ex-
perience of handling relations with civil society organisa-
tions than other UN agencies. This inexperience may have
led it to be more open, particularly given the pressures
put on it to make WSIS less technological and more devel-
opmental, in the fear of being seen to be more restrictive
than others thought necessary.
The second explanation is simply that the greater space
which was offered to civil society by the WSIS Secretariat
to (at least) explore participation sufficiently changed the
balance of advantage for many civil society organisations
between participating from within the tent and from with-
out to make the latter option insufficiently attractive to
enough organisations that might want to put an alternative
together. If the tent was more welcoming, then maybe it34 See www.wsis-cs.org/cs-overview.html.
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was worth a look inside. And once inside, the potential for
achieving things there looked better than going out into
the rain. Many civil society participants put a lot of effort
into achieving this outcome.
The third view expressed by interviewees is that perhaps
the issue of the “information society” was insufficiently
attractive in itself to a wide enough range of civil society
organisations for them to want to organise a big alterna-
tive. WSIS just was not important enough for the major
social movements, in other words – and this may have been
particularly so precisely because it was, in Kofi Annan’s
terms, an opportunity rather than a problem. The “infor-
mation society” did not inspire the same kind of antago-
nism as global warming or women’s disenfranchisement.
This interpretation is strengthened, perhaps, by the fact
that WSIS also attracted no significant anti-globalisation
protests, not even protests like those that occurred when
the G8 set up its Digital Opportunity Task Force in Okinawa
in 2000. Neither Geneva nor Tunis needed to protect them-
selves against the kind of demonstrations seen in Seattle
in 1999 or Genoa in 2001.
This is not to say that greater space for civil society input
meant great space for it. The participation of non-govern-
mental actors in the formal WSIS process was highly con-
tested as soon as the first preparatory committee began
in May 2002. A number of governments - notably those of
China and Pakistan - objected vehemently to any presence
of non-governmental actors in the PrepComs’ formal
spaces. Arguments over representation took up a large
proportion of the time of the first PrepCom (and added to
the scepticism of some participants, for example in devel-
opment agencies, about the value of the summit). The pres-
ence of the private sector was just as strongly opposed by
hostile governments as was that of civil society - and, in-
deed, common cause over their exclusion helped to bring
civil society and private sector representatives into closer
dialogue than, interviewees suggest, had been the case
at previous summits. The fact that ICT private sector busi-
nesses were accustomed to participation in ITU discus-
sions probably increased their dissatisfaction at attempts
to exclude them from comparable WSIS meetings.
The division of governmental opinion here, to a significant
degree, coincided with that on issues of freedom of ex-
pression. Most of the governments which supported civil
society participation were from industrial countries; most
of those that opposed it were from developing countries -
though there were governments in both groups that
bucked this trend. In practice, however, the consensus that
was reached did allow more space for non-governmental
presentations within formal proceedings than was the case
at previous summits. The formal position was that:
Participants from accredited civil society entities (in-
cluding NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC) and
from accredited business sector entities (including ITU
sector members) were allowed to sit as observers in
public meetings (plenary and subcommittee meetings
in the preparatory process, Plenary and committee
meetings in the Summit). Upon the invitation of the
presiding officer of the body concerned, and subject
to the approval of that body, such observers were al-
lowed to make oral statements on questions in which
they had special competence. If the number of re-
quests to speak was too large, the civil society and
business sector entities were requested to form them-
selves into constituencies, which then spoke through
their respective spokespersons.35
A number of governments, including both industrial and
developing country governments, also made a point of
including private sector and civil society representatives
within their formal delegations (although, as noted above,
this did not mean that they could express positions con-
trary to those of the delegations that included them, and
some such delegates expressed the feeling that their pres-
ence in delegations was tokenistic, that they had little real
say in how their delegations behaved).
For all the caveats, this set of circumstances represented a
gain in participatory space for non-governmental actors
beyond what might have been expected from experience at
previous summits, and one of some symbolic importance.
Civil society organisations had more opportunity to express
a view in formal sessions than beforehand. The extent to
which this might set a precedent for future multistakeholder
participation is considered towards the end of this chapter.
Whether this participatory gain made a difference to ne-
gotiations - either at the time or subsequently – depends,
obviously, on the use made of it and the attention paid to
it. Opinion among interviewees here is divided. The space
and time allocated to civil society contributions was not
great, and its allocation by the civil society plenary (on
which, see below) could, therefore, be contentious. There
was an obvious tendency for civil society speakers to try
to cover more issues than they had time available to say
something substantive about. The attention paid to speak-
ers during PrepCom and (especially) plenary sessions was
also highly variable. At times, for example during the tenser
moments of negotiations such as those on Internet govern-
ance, most delegations (as in most summits) paid close at-
tention to anything that was germane to these (and little to
anything that was not). In plenary, however, and in much of
the negotiation process, contributions from delegates are
often repetitious, and delegates in the audience pay scant
attention to them, spending their time instead in conversa-
tion, reading, preparing their own inputs or doing emails.
The ambience of summits - very large conference arenas,
distant speakers usually inaudible (in any language) with-
out headphones, simultaneous interpretation, the ready
35 “The multi-stakeholder participation in WSIS and its written and
unwritten rules”, at www.itu.int/wsis/basic/multistakeholder.html.
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opportunity for one-to-one discussions outside the formal
meeting space - also discourages attention to what is be-
ing said from the platform or the podium. It is critical, there-
fore, for speakers to be able to attract attention if they
want notice to be taken of them; and this is as much a
matter of demagogic style as it is of content. On the whole,
interviewees felt that the diversity of civil society repre-
sentation increased the attention paid to civil society
speakers and that many of the points they made were, at
least, registered by delegations. Private sector speaking
slots were less diversified, and interviewees suggested
that, while the points made in them were well-argued, this
lack of diversity meant that delegations paid less atten-
tion to them as the summit process continued.
The availability of speaking slots is not, however, the most
important locus for civil society contributions to the de-
velopment of summit outcomes. This depends much more
on the effectiveness of what amounts to lobbying activity:
seeking to influence the thinking of national delegates who
have the power to commit their countries or to use their
countries’ influence within negotiations in pursuit of par-
ticular objectives. Lobbying is a highly skilled activity in
any context, and its effectiveness depends on a number
of factors, particularly:
• The saliency of issues to both “patron” (in this case
national delegation) and “client” (lobbyist) - and the
level of risk to other objectives of the patron involved
in promoting a particular position on the issue con-
cerned.
• The level of understanding of those issues in both
parties, especially the sophistication of understand-
ing by lobbyists.
• The reliability (in terms of facts) and trustworthiness
(in terms of honest and open dealing) in each party’s
perception of the other.
• The political skills and capacity for political judgement
of lobbyists, in particular at identifying effective points
of entry into the debate, and at knowing when to hold
back or retreat from exposed positions. 
Most of these are at least as much personal as organisa-
tional skills, and a great deal of the success or failure of
lobbying depends on individual personalities being able
to forge alliances of common interest which are sustain-
able over the period of time required to pursue an issue.
The effectiveness of lobbying is greatest where these skills
are brought to bear by a coherent and skilful team of lob-
byists on a coherent partnership of delegations which have
other common interests to pursue – though individuals
can also make a significant difference.
Interviews for this project confirm the importance of all
these observations on the WSIS process. There were, to
begin with, a number of policy areas in which civil society
organisations were able to build substantive coalitions with
important national delegations. During the first phase of
the summit, for example, civil society organisations con-
cerned with rights issues shared common objectives with
the European Union and its member-states in maintaining
the integrity of established human rights principles within
the proposed outcome documents. During the second
phase, civil society input proved important in securing
agreement on the Internet Governance Forum, and civil so-
ciety language made up a good deal of that defining its re-
mit. Some specialist civil society organisations also proved
very effective at focused lobbying on their particular issues,
notably child protection agencies which significantly in-
creased awareness and secured substantive language ad-
dressing their concerns. While the ultimate value of this lan-
guage depends on its impact on implementation, these
agencies will in future be able to point to this language as
affirmation of their cause by the international community.
WSIS illustrated an anomaly here which civil society finds
in many international negotiations and which results from
differences in the objectives pursued by different
stakeholder groups. Civil society and private sector bod-
ies are more able to achieve sustainable partnerships with
governments that broadly endorse their presence in ne-
gotiations. On the whole, industrial (donor) countries are
more positive towards participation of this kind, not least
because they are more experienced with it at home. How-
ever, civil society’s objectives often involve promoting the
policy positions of developing countries which are at odds
with those of industrial or donor governments – usually
from a sense of ideological commitment, sometimes
merely from one of solidarity. In the first phase of WSIS,
for example, civil society broadly supported the Digital
Solidarity Fund proposal. It was donor countries – which
opposed it – that were, in practice much more supportive
of civil society organisations’ participation in negotiations
than the international community in general, however,
while the most vociferous opponents of civil society in-
volvement included important developing countries such
as China and Pakistan.
An alternative way of looking at this is in terms of the dif-
ferent issues that are prioritised by different stakehold-
ers. Opponents of civil society involvement in WSIS gen-
erally opposed it from a viewpoint that emphasises gov-
ernment authority over citizens’ rights. There is therefore
a sense in which the anomaly can as readily be expressed
in terms of civil society interests: in a juxtaposition be-
tween civil society concern for development, for example
(which tends to imply alliance with developing countries
and, not necessarily on the same basis, with the more de-
velopment-oriented donors) and civil society concern with
rights (where their objectives are generally closer to those
of industrial country governments and may be vigorously
opposed by some developing countries). Different civil
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society organisations prioritise rights and development
issues differently. Some interviewees suggested the cau-
cus process and the general ethos of much civil society
debate discourage open discussion on these dichotomies
and their implications for how civil society organisations
function within decision-making fora.
While this distinction should certainly not be considered
anything so crude as a division between industrial and de-
veloping countries, therefore, it does mean that civil soci-
ety organisations find it easier organisationally to partner
with individual industrial countries and with specific indus-
trial country blocs (such as the European Union) than with
comparable blocs of developing countries, even where
these countries and blocs are opposing important policy
positions they espouse (such as the Digital Solidarity Fund).
Much civil society activity within and around summits takes
place through caucuses, i.e. semi-formal associations of
organisations and activists that have broadly common in-
terests. These caucuses became prominent during the
Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995, and have
featured in many of its successors. Their purpose is to draw
together diverse entities in a formation through which they
can develop common positions and promote these with
greater critical mass. Membership is generally open to all
organisations which are recognisably civil society in char-
acter and which wish to take part in them. Caucuses also
help to build shared awareness and understanding within
civil society. The networks generated by this may have
more lasting value, though (at least before WSIS) caucuses
themselves were usually formed for individual summits
rather than as longer-term alliances.
Given this purpose, and their significance as foci for organi-
sation, the representativeness and coherence of caucuses
not surprisingly have substantial impact on the effective-
ness of the lobbying process described above. In principle,
the caucus process could work in very different ways:
• It could help to build a relatively powerful consensus,
increasing the commitment of civil society in general
to focus on causes promoted by groups within civil so-
ciety (in the case of WSIS, for example, to support the
inclusion of language concerning child protection).
• Alternatively, it could tend to reduce the range of is-
sues covered and points made concerning them to a
lowest common denominator on which general agree-
ment can be reached – like WSIS itself, therefore, avoid-
ing areas of conflict in pursuit of greater consensus.
Interviewees reported the experience of WSIS as being
rather mixed. The caucus process was generally felt to have
worked well during the first summit phase, with civil soci-
ety as a whole building up substantial esprit de corps as
its right to participate was challenged. Some caucuses
needed time to create a working atmosphere – there were,
for example, tensions in the Internet Governance caucus
between those with primarily Internet and those with pri-
marily civil society backgrounds; and over the need to rep-
resent the whole Internet-using community as well as
those with specialist expertise. Interviewees do suggest,
however, that the regional and thematic caucus structures
never really gelled, and that Northern and Southern CSOs
tended to maintain different priorities throughout.
During the second phase, the caucus system worked less
effectively and civil society behaved in a much less cohe-
sive way. Interviewees reported that a few specialist cau-
cuses continued to have a powerful impact, for example
the Internet Governance Caucus and that on child protec-
tion. There was, however, much less cohesion at the over-
all civil society level; and more divisions were apparent
within civil society, for example over issues like the empha-
sis that should be given to free and open source software.
One reason for this difference, interviewees agreed, was
the disruptive impact of participation by a large number
of Tunisian organisations, the genuineness of whose civil
society credentials was challenged by many that had been
involved during the first phase. More established interna-
tional NGOs tended to regard these Tunisian organisations
as interlopers, suspiciously close to their government and
certainly remote from the “excluded” Tunisian rights or-
ganisations and other NGOs that bore the brunt of gov-
ernment suppression. Many civil society participants felt
that this “Tunisian factor” undermined the openness of
discussion during caucus meetings and made them less
productive fora for deciding strategy, with the latter mi-
grating from caucus room to coffee shop.
Interviewees also felt that the concentration of issues dur-
ing the second summit also undermined the effectiveness
of the caucus system. With Internet governance by far the
most important item on the agenda, there was not a great
deal other than Internet governance on which to caucus –
at least where text was concerned (arrangements for WSIS
follow-up were also of significant interest). The overall civil
society caucus therefore lost focus on issues, becoming
more of an organisational tool and therefore of less inter-
est to many potential participants. More differences, po-
litical as much as ideological, were observable between
components of individual caucuses – for example between
Anglophone and Francophone members of the African civil
society caucus.
A greater difference was also suggested during the sec-
ond phase between those civil society organisations
whose instincts were to cooperate or work within the WSIS
process and those more keen to criticise its outcomes. To
some extent, this could be observed in differences of view
between civil society actors concerning the Digital Soli-
darity Fund and the report of the Task Force on Financial
Mechanisms.
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In a few cases, during the second phase, caucus organisa-
tion also became more formal. The African civil society
caucus, for example, sought to establish an institutional
structure of a kind more like that which might have been
expected from African governments. Formalisation of this
kind, some suggested, turns a caucus into a committee, a
structure of a different kind with, usually, a different kind
of purpose: more of a permanent institution than a tem-
porary alliance, something of which organisations might
seek to be members rather than simply to attend. The im-
plications of this possible development of the caucus struc-
ture are considered again towards the end of this chapter.
Participation in caucuses and PrepComs built one level of
networking between civil society organisations that were
particularly concerned with WSIS issues – especially those
concerned with issues of information rights. A further di-
mension of WSIS activity that was particularly important
to civil society was the exhibition space and informal sum-
mit held at each WSIS summit session. The exhibition
space and the very wide range of workshops, seminars,
discussion fora and presentation sessions associated with
it offered a wider range of networking opportunities to a
wider range of civil society organisations. This informal
summit drew in more development NGOs in particular –
mostly those with specific ICD projects or programmes but
also some more mainstream organisations.
The exhibition space in Tunis was significantly different
from that in Geneva. In the first summit, the ICT4D Plat-
form, sponsored by the Swiss Development Corporation,
had a strongly developmental character, including both
donor agencies and NGOs. Many NGOs with ICD pro-
grammes saw it as an opportunity to showcase these.
Spaces for semi-formal workshop sessions around the
periphery were oversubscribed, and these were comple-
mented by further sessions held within the exhibition area,
many of them by civil society NGOs. The atmosphere at
times was febrile, as interested visitors, without passes to
the (somewhat isolated) plenary itself, gorged themselves
on the variety of inputs available - which often (though not
always) had a strong advocacy component. The exhibition
space in Tunis was more like those associated with major
ITU trade conferences, such as the “Telecom” events held
annually in different geographical regions. A higher pro-
portion of stands were occupied by businesses promoting
technological solutions (including, notably, a strong pres-
ence from the Chinese business sector); a lower propor-
tion from development agencies and NGOs. The semi-for-
mal workshop programme, however, was still dynamic,
with substantial coordinated programmes of sessions or-
ganised by bodies such as the Global Knowledge Partner-
ship. Although the atmosphere around these was less fran-
tic, interviewees felt that the quality of many meetings was
very high, and often more analytical than had been the case
in Geneva. The understanding of ICT issues in these works-
hops certainly exceeded that in the main WSIS process, and
many civil society delegates, particularly those not involved
in caucusing, found it the most useful part of the whole WSIS
experience.
But we have not so far considered who was there. Civil
society is immensely diverse. It is defined essentially by
what it excludes - inter-governmental organisations, gov-
ernments and private businesses – which implies that it
includes everything else – from peasants’ organisations
and trade unions; through women’s groups, faith groups,
etcetera; perhaps to include political parties, academics,
more amorphous “social movements”. “Civil society”, in
other words, is arguably not defined by its objectives, like
governments (“to rule”) or businesses (“to make profit for
shareholders”), but bounded by the fact that it does not
share those objectives. It is therefore likely to be much
more fractured than these other stakeholder groups - po-
litically, socially, culturally, geographically, ideologically.
While its fractures are obviously recognised by civil soci-
ety actors, the ethos of civil society engagement in inter-
national institutions, where the value of common objec-
tives is self-evident, tends to obscure them. This has of-
ten caused problems for civil society representation, and
instability in civil society coalitions.
So which parts of civil society were represented in the
PrepComs, in Geneva and in Tunis? A paradigm gap simi-
lar – but not identical – to that found in government del-
egations can be found in civil society representation.
Firstly, civil society participation in WSIS was constrained
by a number of “access” factors. Even the best-funded in-
ternational NGOs found it difficult to resource participa-
tion in the paraphernalia of WSIS – PrepComs and regional
conferences requiring high travel and accommodation
costs, websites and listservs to coordinate activity, staff
time diverted from other work. These cost factors dispro-
portionately affected developing country civil society or-
ganisations, which are poor in comparison with their in-
dustrial country peers. Some fellowship resources were
available for NGOs, but these were limited, and it was diffi-
cult – as the “Louder Voices” study found with government
representatives – for organisations to achieve continuity
of presence throughout the WSIS process. Wealthier North-
ern CSOs were therefore more substantially represented
at WSIS than poorer Southern CSOs; and Northern CSOs
played a more prominent part in civil society caucusing than
their Southern counterparts. While they were conscious of
this and made considerable efforts to compensate for it,
CSO activists were unable to prevent some hostile devel-
oping country governments from claiming that civil society
represented a Northern, not a Southern perspective.
As well as being geographically unequal, the composition
of civil society representation also failed to reflect fully the
diverse areas of interest of civil society organisations that
might have played a part. There were perhaps three main
types of civil society organisation whose presence might
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have been expected and which might have substantial
expertise to contribute to the issues debated in the sum-
mit: organisations primarily concerned with a) rights; b)
ICT issues, including the Internet; and c) development. In
practice, however, organisations concerned primarily with
ICTs were much more substantially and actively present
than mainstream organisations concerned with either
rights or development issues.36
Two reasons were suggested for this. Firstly, ICTs offer sub-
stantial new space for the expression of opinion and for
networking between individuals and civil society organi-
sations. Control over this space is contested, particularly
in authoritarian states, by governments and citizens/dis-
sidents/opponents. The fact that much early Internet de-
velopment was led by people with an anti-establishment
perspective has contributed to this debate. As a result,
the Internet and ICTs were already central to the concerns
of a significant group of information rights CSOs when
WSIS was announced. A similar case obviously applies to
ICT-focused organisations, including those using ICTs in
development activity, since they have directly chosen to
work within this area. But the second reason suggested
for the disparity in representation by organisational type
is really the converse of the first. ICTs do not have the same
powerful resonance for mainstream rights and develop-
ment NGOs that they have within the ICT/Internet com-
munities. As with the official development community, in
particular, the value of ICTs in development is still conten-
tious; in fact, wariness of ICTs is probably greater in devel-
opment NGOs, which have an even stronger focus on pov-
erty reduction than official donors. Few mainstream de-
velopment sector NGOs, therefore, were present in Geneva
or Tunis; and none played a significant part in WSIS’ dis-
cussion of ICTs and development. The impact this had on
civil society’s contribution to this debate is discussed later
in this chapter.
Some countries, both Northern and Southern, included
civil society representatives in their national delegations.
Ecuador, among the country case studies for this report,
was one example. Such representatives did not always find
it easy. Some expressed the feeling that they were being
used as tokens. Others felt constrained by the principle of
collective responsibility, which meant that they were un-
able to express their organisation’s point of view, certainly
in WSIS sessions and sometimes even within delegation
meetings.
The likelihood of civil society participation in national del-
egations reflected the likelihood of participation in national
fora discussing WSIS issues. This varied substantially be-
tween countries.
Within industrial countries, a reasonably high degree of
multistakeholder participation in policy dialogue has be-
come relatively common. Relevant private sector organi-
sations, for example, are often routinely included in del-
egations to the ITU. Discussion with civil society organi-
sations involved in both development policy and rights
issues is part of normal practice. A routine culture of multi-
stakeholder engagement obviously offered opportunities
for civil society organisations of all types to have an input
into national policy development on WSIS-related issues.
This did not always lead to substantial formal consulta-
tion: in Britain, for example, formal consultation consisted
of sparsely attended meetings organised by the British
Council in the run-up to each WSIS summit. However, Brit-
ish CSOs did not, by their own evidence, feel excluded from
WSIS discussions because they were able (and encour-
aged) to make their input through the normal channels
that they had available. Experience varied in different in-
dustrial countries, but CSOs could usually make their
voices heard.
Experience in developing countries was more diverse.
Some national delegations to WSIS from developing coun-
tries included CSOs, but this varied substantially. The ma-
jority of delegations had no civil society representatives
at all. A small number of countries, however – such as
South Africa – made a point of including civil society par-
ticipants, and some also included these in PrepComs.
These countries, not surprisingly, were among those that
had implemented more extensive multistakeholder con-
sultation as part of their WSIS preparations.
As discussed in Chapter 6, five country case studies con-
cerning national WSIS policymaking processes were un-
dertaken for this project – in Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethio-
pia, India and Kenya. In each of these countries, some ef-
fort was made by government to engage with other stake-
holders in preparing for WSIS, though only one case study
– that in Kenya – suggests that this may lead to lasting
change in policymaking processes.
In India, the process of engagement in WSIS was led by the
Department of Telecommunications (DoT), which initially
saw the summit as an opportunity to promote Indian busi-
ness interests. According to the case study, DoT “had a nar-
row view of the scope and participants that could play a
leading role,” initially restricting its invitations to contrib-
ute to other government departments and the private sec-
tor, and excluding NGOs, the media and other entities. Re-
sponse to its invitations was insubstantial, even within gov-
ernment. Though business associations did play some part
in formal consultation, their contribution was never great.
The case study suggests that few Indian NGOs have been
involved in national policymaking on ICTs or have substan-
tial expertise in this area. India’s history of statism, it is
suggested, may be partly responsible for the weakness of
36 Though not entirely so: Amnesty International, Christian Aid and Plan
International were among mainstream rights and development NGOs
attending the Tunis summit.
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civil society in this area. Nevertheless, a number of Indian
civil society organisations attended PrepCom and plenary
sessions of the summit, though none were included in the
official consultation processes - themselves pretty insub-
stantial - that were held by DoT. Indian civil society re-
spondents felt that they were able to contribute on some
issues through civil society caucuses, including Internet
governance and gender issues, and to some degree to raise
awareness of Indian civil society concerns with
policymakers. However, as in other countries, they report
that their participation was constrained by lack of finan-
cial resources.37
Bangladesh’s participation in WSIS was led by the Minis-
try of Science and Information Technology, which made
some efforts to engage with the private sector and civil
society in policy development. In late 2002, the govern-
ment set up a Working Group on WSIS with representa-
tives from relevant ministries, the private sector, the me-
dia and civil society, with a secretariat based in the coun-
try’s telecommunications regulatory commission. How-
ever, the country case study suggests that this Working
Group was insufficiently inclusive, with limited private sec-
tor participation and no opportunity for non-invited NGOs
to play a part. As a result, “some of the major NGOs such
as Grameen Bank or BRAC, who also have a stake in ICT
areas, had little or no participation in the WSIS activities
in the country.” A second, apparently overlapping, consul-
tation and policy development process was set up by the
Ministry of Science and Information Technology.
Civil society may have been more engaged in Bangladesh
than India, though it was likewise constrained by finan-
cial difficulties. A number of civil society organisations
participated in official working groups and/or undertook
their own initiatives. Along with APC and OneWorld South
Asia, the Bangladesh Working Group on WSIS organised a
South Asian regional consultation meeting in January
2005. The input from this conference was submitted to
relevant regional bodies. Unusually, one consultation fo-
rum for civil society within Bangladesh was held outside
the capital, in Khulna, though the country case study sug-
gests that this was more of an awareness-raising exercise
than a truly consultative event.38
Efforts were also made by the government in Ecuador to
draw the private sector and civil society into a multistake-
holder dialogue. The National Telecommunications Coun-
cil, responsible for coordination of the country’s WSIS par-
ticipation, began to convene multistakeholder workshops
nationally and provincially from around the beginning of
2003 with the aim of guiding national input into WSIS
issues. “These initiatives,” the case study reports, “opened
new possibilities to tighten the government-civil society
relationship, ... although not always with effective, spe-
cific and efficient results.” The process faced multiple dif-
ficulties - for example due to changes in the government
team responsible, varying quality of knowledge of ICT is-
sues and uncertain financial resources to support involve-
ment by Ecuador in regional and global WSIS meetings.
“It was,” the study concludes, “an uneven, staggered proc-
ess with random and poorly-timed calls for participation
that lacked clear coordinating roles and attempted to in-
troduce participatory multisectoral working methodolo-
gies. Despite the efforts and the political will of the stake-
holders, it did not allow the basic consensus needed for
the formulation of a position and priorities of the country
to be reached.”
This national discourse vanished from the scene for twelve
months after the Geneva summit and, when reactivated in
January 2005 to provide input to the second PrepCom of
the second phase, it was more clearly dominated by gov-
ernment officials. Government participation in the second
phase of WSIS was therefore better, while that of other
stakeholders was less substantial. Although civil society
delegates were included in Ecuador’s national delegation
in Tunis, these reported finding that they were unable to
play a significant civil society role as delegation members.
Civil society organisations in Ecuador report feeling that,
while WSIS opened space for multistakeholder participa-
tion, including better access to government officials, “the
benefits of multistakeholder alliances were circumstantial
and not always effective.” Relatively few civil society or-
ganisations participated in the WSIS dialogue: “Some ac-
tors only participated in the initial stage of the first phase
in Geneva and experienced ... disenchantment; others
persevered until Tunis, with certain periods of more intense
participation. Some limited their participation to national
dynamics, others to regional and global ones, and a few
to both.” The picture, in other words, was mixed, but, over-
all, relationships between civil society and other stake-
holders were insufficiently developed to maximise the
potential WSIS offered. Lack of resources, as elsewhere,
also hindered civil society involvement. Private sector en-
gagement was, meanwhile, “sporadic, isolated and un-
planned.” Media debate was conspicuous by its absence.39
As noted in Chapter 6, the government of Ethiopia did not
attend the Bamako regional meeting which initiated
African participation in the first phase of WSIS in 2002.
However, this conference was attended by a substantial
delegation - thirteen in all - from the private sector and
civil society. Having missed its initial opportunity in
Bamako, the Ethiopian telecommunications regulator
39 Quotations and evidence from Valeria Betancourt, country case study
of Ecuador, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/
wsis_research.
37 Quotations and evidence from Rekha Jain, country case study of India,
available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/
wsis_research.
38 Quotations and evidence from Partha Sarker, country case study of
Bangladesh, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/
wsis_research.
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(ETA) organised a national consultative workshop at the
beginning of 2003, involving about fifty delegates from
different stakeholder communities. A task force resulted,
headed by the regulatory body with a small (though multi-
stakeholder) membership and the intent to establish a
regular consultation process. In practice, however, accord-
ing to the country case study, this regular dialogue did not
emerge, and “discussion on the WSIS process was con-
fined to ICT experts from key organisations,” reflecting
similar concentration of the country’s overall ICT activity.
In spite of this, the development of a substantial official
response to the draft WSIS texts in mid-2003 provided “an
opportunity for stakeholders to reflect on WSIS issues and
national development challenges.” There was less consul-
tation during the second phase of the summit, in which no
formal multistakeholder consultation was arranged.
Ethiopia did not, according to the country case study, there-
fore see much real multistakeholder involvement. What
participation did take place “was centred around govern-
ment’s agenda and influenced [more] by international de-
velopment agencies than by strong contributions from civil
society, private sector, academia and the media.” Civil so-
ciety and the private sector were not well organised, ac-
cording to the study, and tended to respond to what gov-
ernment had to say rather than articulating their own con-
cerns. To some extent, their inability to take advantage of
such formal consultative spaces as were created reflects
the historic weakness of civil society resulting from the
hostility or wariness of successive government regimes
within the country. Although Ethiopia has a wide range of
civil society organisations which could have something to
offer in terms of ICT policy, the case study concludes, WSIS
did not generate an environment more conducive to multi-
stakeholder participation. However, awareness was raised,
in particular enabling government to explore experience
in comparable countries more fully, and this may contrib-
ute positively to future ICT policy development.40
It was Kenya, among the five case study countries, that
experienced a substantive and potentially lasting increase
in multistakeholder participation.
A significant delegation from Kenya attended the 2002
Bamako African conference - mostly from civil society and
the private sector – but quickly recognised that it was ill-
prepared. A conference in Addis Ababa (co-organised by
APC and UNECA in November 2002) recommended the
creation of an East African Civil Society Organisations WSIS
Caucus. Responding to this, a Kenya Civil Society WSIS
Caucus was created, including ten organisations with
longstanding experience of ICTs in development. This es-
tablished local legitimacy, secured international funding
(from Canadian IDRC), and became a potent lobbyist within
the country, holding national civil society consultation
workshops in both phases of the WSIS process.
A further important development, after the first summit
meeting, was the creation of a new alliance, the Kenya ICT
Action Network (Kictanet), established by Kenyan civil so-
ciety and private sector organisations with an interest in
ICT policy. This highly unusual partnership, formed during
a meeting in October 2004 organised jointly by APC and
the local private sector and civil society partnerships, no-
tably the Telecommunications Service Providers Associa-
tion of Kenya, the Media Council of Kenya and the WSIS
Caucus, built on cross-stakeholder desire to have more
influential input in national ICT policy, and has been highly
successful in achieving this objective. Kictanet has added
a new dynamic to lobbying on national ICT policy and con-
tributed significantly to national WSIS thinking. However,
the country case study notes, it does not include main-
stream development sector organisations, an important
omission from the perspective of building an holistic ap-
proach to the role of ICTs in society and its development.
As noted in Chapter 6, Kenyan participation in the second
phase of WSIS was substantial and substantive. Partici-
pation in the Summit, the country case study suggests,
improved awareness of ICT and development issues in
general and in detail, improved policy coordination within
government, and built solidarity between groups that had
previously contested space for policy influence. However,
to reiterate comments reported in Chapter 6, limits to un-
derstanding and cohesion remained. “Careful review of the
participation of public sector, civil society and private sec-
tor ... shows that the engagement was not coherent and
input to the WSIS issues tended to be reactive rather than
proactive.” Thinking about WSIS remained focused on
technology rather than the national development context,
and debate in Kenya still exhibited many of the deficien-
cies discussed in Chapter 5. “Uncritical acceptance of the
WSIS process and its recommendations in Kenya,” the case
study concludes, “shows that there is a long way to go to
influence a global debate on a wider set of issues regard-
ing ICTs and development” - and civil society organisations
could play an important part in developing this wider dis-
cussion.41
The evidence from the country case studies suggests that
civil society had to struggle to be heard in most cases.
While many governments established some form of space
in which different stakeholders could contribute, the case
studies – and other experience reported by interviewees –
suggest that these were usually low-key, sometimes
tokenistic, and rarely central to a policymaking agenda that
continued to be set by governments. Perhaps they created
a precedent which could be built on in the future, but it is
40 Quotations and evidence from Lishan Adam, country case study of
Ethiopia, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/
wsis_research.
41 Quotations and evidence from Lishan Adam, country case study of
Kenya, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/
wsis_research.
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not generally apparent that the processes they initiated
are also being used for more conventional policymaking
purposes. They usually seem to have been one-offs for
WSIS, in other words. The exception to this pattern comes
from Kenya, where the establishment of Kictanet, as an
authoritative non-governmental partnership, looks as if it
may have lasting impact. Democratic engagement, the role
of individual sector champions and systematic lobbying
are all potential features of continuing multistakeholder
participation, and Kictanet’s success to date, both in re-
spect of WSIS and in influencing other ICT decisions – for
example on telecommunications regulation - suggests a
potential new direction for multistakeholder activity within
the sector in other countries. The fact that it combines civil
society and private sector participation seems to be an
important factor in building its authority with government.
Inclusion of a wider range of civil society organisations,
notably development NGOs, may add further to its potency
and its potential.
Civil society contributions
When it comes to the content of discussions during WSIS
– as in any summit – interviewees identified five main ob-
jectives for civil society:
a. To “get its message across”, whatever that message
may be - in other words, to raise the profile of particu-
lar issues that civil society (or any individual organi-
sation) considers important: with delegations, other
civil society participants and (where possible) a wider
audience
b. To articulate voices of the poor and disenfranchised
c. To maintain (i.e. resist “backsliding” on) established
United Nations agreements (for example on rights or
development priorities) and, where possible
d. To improve language concerning these established
rights and priorities
e. To introduce new language into international discourse
that will extend existing provisions – for example, by
promoting women’s rights or child protection, or by
entrenching multistakeholder dialogue for the future.
Civil society’s ability to achieve these objectives depends,
like that of any other interest group, on its ability to se-
cure wider support for them, and therefore on its ability to
use the resources available to it in order to secure that
support and its translation into text. This means reaching
beyond the core civil society constituency within meetings,
partnering and reaching agreement with representatives
of other stakeholder communities. For all civil society
organisations, it therefore involves tensions between their
role as representatives of a particular interest group (which
may be “the poor or marginalised”) and their role as ac-
tors in a process designed to achieve consensus. Critics
of one view or the other might describe this as a contest
between collaboration and utopianism. Caucuses try to
resolve this by achieving consensus within civil society,
but do not always succeed in doing so; and the latter
stages of the second phase of WSIS saw some
antagonisms emerge between those civil society organi-
sations that took a more pragmatic and those that took a
more ideological view.
The ability of civil society to engage constructively with
other stakeholders is partly political: marriages of conven-
ience can sometimes – actually, it would seem, quite of-
ten - be made which cut across differences of paradigm.
Civil society and private sector groups, for example, share
a common interest in achieving greater input into decision-
making. However, other stakeholders make clear, it is the
quality of civil society input into any process that will de-
termine how much civil society organisations are listened
to. How well do civil society proponents of any particular
proposal understand the issues concerned, the
motivations of different actors, the likely impact of wider
policy? How far are proposals based on evidence rather
than assumption or ideology? How amenable are organi-
sations to reaching pragmatic consensus with other per-
spectives? Oppositionalism sometimes plays well within
civil society, but other stakeholders say they find it very
off-putting and that it makes it less likely that civil society
proposals will enter into the texts that are finally agreed.
In the second WSIS phase, notably over Internet govern-
ance, many government and private sector stakeholders
felt that the “constructive engagement” offered by civil
society helped smooth the way to final agreement, per-
haps because it enabled them to discuss the politics of
Internet governance in a way that was less polarised be-
tween international power blocs.
Text, however, is not – or at least should not be – the
endgame here. International agreements are littered with
text that is honoured in the breach rather than observ-
ance. Ambiguous texts, texts so bland as to be meaning-
less, texts that no-one ever expects most of their signa-
tories to comply with: all of these are commonplace in
international agreements. Many interviewees recognised
the way in which the momentum of negotiations drew
them into preoccupation with the text rather than its
meaning: with achieving a form of words that secures
agreement which approximates more with their own po-
sition than with that of their disputants. Equally, they
recognised that this could easily lead them into hollow
victories: into achieving text that lacked meaning or
would never be observed. With hindsight, a lot of par-
ticipants in WSIS were critical of the WSIS final texts for
precisely these reasons, particularly lack of depth in the
case of the text on development, and ambiguity in that
on Internet governance (what, exactly, is “enhanced co-
operation”?). The WSIS texts, as noted earlier, contain
very few specific “commitments”.
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In many previous summits, civil society organisations have
produced alternative texts to that of the formal summit
itself. They did so in the first, Geneva, session of WSIS,
producing a “declaration” which set out a consensus civil
society view of what was needed to “[shape] information
societies for human needs.”42
Civil society did not produce a comparable statement in Tu-
nis until a month after the end of the summit, by which time
the attention of other stakeholders had moved on. While it
expressed pleasure at some developments within WSIS –
including increased, if precarious, participation by civil soci-
ety in the summit process, and the establishment of the
Internet Governance Forum - the tone of this final summit
statement was (as its title, “Much more could have been
achieved”, suggests) mostly one of resigned disappointment:
Overall, it is impossible not to conclude that WSIS has
failed to live up to [its] expectations. The Tunis phase
in particular, which was presented as the ‘summit of
solutions’, did not provide concrete achievements to
meaningfully address development problems.43
During the first phase, civil society interest in WSIS coa-
lesced, as it had in previous summits, as organisations
which thought they might be interested declared them-
selves, expressed their priorities and sought partners. Each
new summit, interviewees suggested, starts with this sort-
ing out of civil society interests. Civil society played a par-
ticularly prominent role in the first regional meeting to be
held, in Africa in May 2002 and contributed substantially
to its outcomes, mostly text related to ICTs and develop-
ment. The first PrepCom then changed the emphasis, fo-
cusing strongly on the issue of who should be represented
within the WSIS process and requiring civil society to con-
centrate too on defending its right to take part. Challenges
to the inclusion of references to established human rights
instruments also concentrated attention on that area of
civil society interest. These, rather than development ques-
tions, held the main attention of WSIS and its civil society
participants during the remainder of the first phase.
Civil society contributions to content in this period there-
fore concentrated on the defence of established rights of
expression and the relationship between ICTs and the over-
all rights agenda, in which context they found themselves
in informal alliance with industrial country governments.
During the first phase, civil society input was directed much
more towards the Declaration of Principles than towards
the Plan of Action, from whose negotiation they were ef-
fectively excluded, and in which the major contributions
came from governments. Where it was expressed, civil
society input was strongly in tune with the very positive
view of ICTs’ role in development expressed within this text,
but – as noted earlier in this chapter – any such input came
from those civil society organisations which were already
strongly committed to that role, and did not engage main-
stream development NGOs which are more sceptical. An
opportunity to address this paradigm gap was missed
within civil society as well as within governments.
Civil society engagement in the second phase was rather
different. Rights-based organisations continued to defend
the relationship between ICTs and basic rights and to seek
extensions to those rights within the text. Some niche CSOs,
such as child protection and disability agencies, increased
their profile in the WSIS process and achieved significant
gains in terms of their own objectives. ICD-oriented CSOs
had less to do, because the development components of
the text agreed in Geneva were not revisited in the second
phase. As we have noted repeatedly, this focused on two
main issues, financing mechanisms and Internet govern-
ance. What input did civil society make into these?
During the first phase, when the Digital Solidarity Fund was
proposed by the President of Senegal, civil society’s instincts
were to support the proposal, seeing it as a significant pro-
posal from the South (which therefore represented a po-
tential shift in international influence) and as a challenge to
the established paradigms of development policy (which
many CSOs consider, unsurprisingly, to be dominated by
the North and by multilateral institutions which are also
Northern-dominated). However, this amounted more to ex-
pressions of solidarity than to contributions of significance
to the content of the debate. Privately, a good number of
civil society representatives were sceptical of the DSF for
reasons shared by (for example) liberal European donors.
Civil society did not play as significant a part in the work of
the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms as in the WGIG,
though some civil society organisations (including APC) were
directly involved, arguing, inter alia, for greater mutual en-
gagement between the financing and policy agendas. Many
civil society organisations were critical of what they saw as
its conservatism – in particular, its reaffirmation of the pri-
mary role of private sector investment in extending connec-
tivity and its rejection of a development instrument (the DSF)
that might be Southern-owned/led. Civil society actors did
lobby for new approaches to infrastructure investment dur-
ing the Africa regional preparatory meeting of the second
phase and the subsequent second PrepCom, though there
were divisions amongst them over the DSF and the report
of the TFFM. The fact that the proponents of the DSF did not
pursue the matter after the second PrepCom of the second
phase, for reasons discussed in Chapter 5, meant that there
was little scope for further civil society engagement with it,
beyond a general sense of frustration that the “develop-
ment establishment” had “won”.
Internet governance was another matter. Financing mecha-
nisms were historically largely matters for government;
42 The Geneva civil society declaration is available from: www.itu.int/
wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en?&id=1179|1208.
43 “Much more could have been achieved”, p. 4, available from:
www.worldsummit2003.de/download_en/WSIS-CS-summit-
statement-rev1-23-12-2005-en.pdf.
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many in civil society saw the Internet as part of their own
world, a creation of individuals and non-governmental
partnerships rather than of governments (or, come to
that, the private sector). There were many intellectual and
ideological cross-currents between information rights-
based civil society organisations and Internet pioneers.
Many information rights-based organisations saw the
Internet as a crucial opportunity to extend freedom of
expression (with some, though less, attention to the
threat of Internet censorship).
The Internet, in other words, corresponded closely to the
non-governmental or anti-governmental tendencies
within civil society. CSOs might be expected to defend
free-spirited, multilateral alternative models of interna-
tional governance like the Internet Engineering Task
Force. At the same time, however, many in civil society
shared the resentment of developing countries at the
apparent authority over the Internet held by the United
States. This included its apparent authority over ICANN
(in spite of the fact that ICANN’s governance model was
more open to non-governmental stakeholders than, say,
the ITU or its postal equivalent, the UPU). In general, civil
society opinion here wanted to see both a reduction in
United States influence (which was in line with develop-
ing countries’ objectives) and a reduction (or at least no
increase) in government influence over the Internet
(which was not), and certainly no increase in influence
for the (CSO-unfriendly) ITU (which some countries saw
as the natural home for Internet governance, as it had
historically been for telecommunications).
This was quite a complex web. Interviewees suggested that
two things were crucial to civil society’s effectiveness
within the Internet governance debate.
One was the structure adopted for the WGIG, which is de-
scribed in Chapter 6. This was a much more CSO-friendly
structure than the TFFM: one in which civil society was in-
vited to select representatives, most of whom were ap-
proved; where those representatives were given space to
contribute fully, on equal terms with representatives of
other stakeholder groups; and where civil society language
contributed substantially to the final report. The WGIG was
therefore seen as a major advance for civil society influ-
ence in an important international negotiation. This may
only have been possible because governments already
lacked authority over the Internet and so were more will-
ing to concede space on it to other stakeholders – a point
discussed in Chapter 8 – but it had real value for civil soci-
ety. In particular, it gave civil society advocates a much
stronger position of authority from which to lobby for their
language during the final PrepComs of the second phase.
The second factor cited as crucial was the Internet Gov-
ernance Caucus, which brought together civil society and
other Internet specialists in common cause to argue in
favour of the broad objective of an Internet more free from
US authority yet not subject to more governmental or in-
ter-governmental control. This caucus had three advan-
tages. Firstly, it contained a very high level of expertise
on the issues that it dealt with, coming from members of
the Internet community. Secondly, many of its Internet-
focused participants were used to working with each
other in other contexts. Thirdly, it benefited from the rela-
tively similar views on the roles of governments and non-
governmental actors which were shared by many in the
Internet community with many within civil society organi-
sations, especially those concerned with information
rights. The result was a powerful and authoritative cau-
cus, which was well-equipped by its knowledge and range
of skills to lobby effectively within what became an in-
tensely political debate. Civil society engagement un-
doubtedly helped to see off, at least within WSIS, pro-
posals for a more authoritarian governance regime (which
was also opposed by most industrial country govern-
ments and the private sector); it helped secure agree-
ment on the Internet Governance Forum as part of the
post-WSIS approach; it also contributed a significant
amount of language to the final WSIS text on Internet
governance, including the mandate of that Forum.
With hindsight, participants in this debate could argue quite
strongly for the benefits of constructive engagement in com-
parison with, say, those of developing and issuing an alter-
native civil society statement from the summit’s margins.
In the Geneva phase, civil society had a wider range of
issues to discuss. The whole character of the “informa-
tion society” seemed up for grabs, and there were points
of principle to argue on a wide range of issues around
which civil society could coalesce. The hostility of many
government delegations to civil society presence also fos-
tered a sense of community and solidarity. Civil society
input focused on rights issues, and had relatively little
impact on the text on development. These factors were
less apparent in the Tunis phase, which focused much
more narrowly on Internet governance – an issue in which
civil society found other ways of influencing outcomes
(in the WGIG and through dialogue with government del-
egates sharing many Internet community objectives). The
majority of civil society organisation and caucusing were
also weaker in the second phase, but the Internet Gov-
ernance Caucus provided a powerful instrument which
could be used, with significant success, to advance posi-
tions commonly held within civil society.
The private sector
Before considering the lessons for civil society organisations
emerging from this experience, it is worth looking briefly at
the comparable experience of the private sector. As noted
earlier, while the UN system makes little distinction between
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the private sector and civil society, this is not the case with
the ITU, which has had private sector “Sector Members”
closely involved in much of its work since the early 1990s.
While not entirely uncontroversial within the ITU – some
governments are very clear about the limits to private sec-
tor involvement when final decisions are reached – this
might have been expected to give the business community
an inside track on representation. The hostility which ICT
businesses actually experienced during the first PrepCom
of the first phase may have taken both business representa-
tives and the ITU aback, and certainly did much to foster a
“common cause of the excluded” with civil society.
Private sector participation in WSIS was dominated by the
Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors (CCBI)
which was made up of the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC) and ten or more other international business
organisations and individual firms. It was set up by its
members to act as “a vehicle through which to mobilise
and coordinate the involvement of the worldwide business
community in the processes leading to and culminating in
the Summit.”44
Interviewees for this report from all sectors agree that the
CCBI was highly effective at representing its members,
though there was some criticism of lack of diversity in the
content and presentation of business views when these
could be formally put to PrepCom and plenary sessions. One
advantage of representation through the CCBI was that,
because the membership of the ICC and its other member-
organisations included non-ICT as well as ICT businesses, it
was able to put forward perspectives that reflected busi-
ness interests across the board. However, in practice, it was
ICT businesses that participated in the CCBI as in wider de-
bate around WSIS. Some interviewees also questioned
whether the CCBI was able effectively to represent the views
of a wider business community, in particular whether it had
sufficient understanding of the interests of small and me-
dium sized businesses, and businesses based in develop-
ing countries, as well as those of large international con-
cerns. Business observers feel that it became more repre-
sentative, in both passive and active senses, as the WSIS
process went on, though it was always disadvantaged by
the different rhythms of business and summit proceedings.
In terms of participation outside the CCBI, there were clear
distinctions between sections of the private sector that
were and were not well represented – much as there were
with civil society. Not surprisingly, it was ICT businesses
that participated in lobbying and in exhibiting. Business
users of ICTs, including major user groups like the financial
services sector, were poorly represented other than through
their membership of the CCBI and its constituent organisa-
tions, in spite of the fact that they might be expected to be
considerable beneficiaries of the “information society”.
Outside formal CCBI contributions, therefore, business
input had a supplier rather than a consumer perspective.
This added to the similar supply-led emphasis in WSIS
overall, which resulted from the ITU’s management role
and the skewed nature of participation in national delega-
tions. Even within the ICT sector, there was a marked dis-
tinction between manufacturing businesses, which were
well represented, and service providers, which were less
likely to be present, either in the exhibition areas or in the
negotiating space.
The exception, where service providers were concerned,
was the presence of former national telecoms monopo-
lies, particularly in developing country delegations. Many
of these are only partly private sector today if they are pri-
vate sector at all. A consequence of this was that the busi-
ness component present within developing country nego-
tiating fora was primarily made up of the most conserva-
tive and traditional part of the ICT sector – those busi-
nesses holding fixed network telephony licences, many still
holding monopolies and/or controlled by state bureauc-
racies. Few developing countries included significant rep-
resentation from the mobile telecoms sector or from the
Internet community within their delegations. Industrial
countries, however, were likely to have more such repre-
sentatives, who usually shared perspectives on issues like
market liberalisation and Internet governance with the
governments in whose delegations they participated.
One section of the business community that was relatively
poorly represented, ironically, was the Internet community,
especially Internet service providers (particularly from de-
veloping countries) and those parts of the Internet commu-
nity which do not fit straightforwardly into either business
or civil society categories - organisations such as Internet
registries, for example, which operate as, in effect, non-profit
businesses. These latter organisations are intensely affected
by debates on Internet governance, and their under-repre-
sentation was a potential weakness of the Internet govern-
ance debate within WSIS. Those that did take part suggested
that their peers failed to understand the potential signifi-
cance for them, in the unregulated Internet, of an inter-gov-
ernmental summit. If so, they were dangerously naïve. In
practice, the relative openness of the WGIG, particularly its
public sessions, did allow such Internet organisations to
have significant informal input, but even so the number of
participants from this community was small. As is often the
case, those who wish to promote multistakeholder par-
ticipation need to take care to encourage the engagement
of significant stakeholders with narrow interests which
may not form part of broader discussions but which are
fundamentally affected when these broad discussions
tackle narrow questions.
CCBI and wider business input into WSIS focused on a small
range of common objectives. Large businesses did not want
to see greater regulation, by and large, particularly44 From www.iccwbo.org/policy/ebitt/id2343/index.html.
S e c t i o n  B  .  A n a lys i s
8 6 W h os e  S u m m i t ?  W h os e  I n fo r m at i o n  S oc i et y ?
over the Internet which they felt had delivered the goods
for business because of the openness with which it has
developed. In this, they have common cause with civil soci-
ety and industrial country governments. They are strongly
in favour of private sector-led investment and of its facilita-
tion through the privatisation and liberalisation of ICT mar-
kets. They want light rather than intrusive regulation – regu-
lation that will foster competition rather than imposing pub-
lic policy obligations on them. They see themselves as con-
tributing to development by their investment and pursuit
of business objectives, not as instruments to be used by
governments to deliver development outcomes. These views
– confined to a much smaller range of WSIS issues than
those expressed by civil society - were consistently articu-
lated through the CCBI.
The relationship between civil society and the private sec-
tor within WSIS was an interesting one. The early part of
the first phase saw sustained attacks on the participation
of both civil society and the private sector from a number
of governments, which led to the exclusion of both from
meetings at which they felt they had a right to be present.
This common exclusion, interviewees from both camps
observed, built bonds of solidarity between civil society
and private sector groups, supported by a number of posi-
tive personal relationships across the stakeholder divide.
Although there was always going to be a distance between
civil society and the private sector – both in the range of
issues they were interested in addressing and the perspec-
tive from which these might be addressed – a significant
degree of partnership continued throughout the summit.
Internet governance was another area in which civil soci-
ety and the private sector had some common cause against
the risk, as they saw it, of greater government control. The
implications of this for the relationship between civil soci-
ety and the private sector are discussed further in the fi-
nal section of this chapter.
WSIS and multistakeholderism
The costs and benefits of participation in WSIS are still
debated within civil society.
• Some participants from civil society feel that signifi-
cant gains were made: some in terms of holding the
line on information rights or inching towards a more
open future for Internet governance; some in terms of
raising issues and advocacy of ICT rights and ICTs in
development; some in terms of building their own ca-
pacity and understanding of ICT issues (and of sum-
mit-style negotiations); some in terms of networking,
in particular the building of bonds between civil soci-
ety organisations that will be useful in the future.
• Others are more critical of the high costs involved in
participation, in terms of both money and human
resources - the actual cost of being part of summit
processes, and the opportunity cost in other work
which could not be undertaken as a result.
It is probably easiest just to say that the experience var-
ied. Some organisations invested relatively little and
gained a good deal; others feel the opposite was true. On
balance, few think that the summit as a whole was the
best way of spending that amount of money, either in prin-
ciple or in the specific context of the “information soci-
ety”. A lot of money, many feel, was spent on pretty lim-
ited outcomes. On the other hand, once a summit is de-
clared, it is very difficult for many CSOs to opt out. Those
that prioritise the issues under discussion see it either as
an opportunity to press their cause or as a process from
which they cannot afford to be absent (though those whose
interest is more marginal might so choose). While almost
every government will attend, therefore, civil society par-
ticipation tends to be more skewed in favour of the already
committed, and so less representative of civil society as a
whole. (The relative absence of mainstream development
NGOs has already been noted as a problem here.) Busi-
ness organisations tend to take a more hard-headed view,
based on the potential contribution of participation to the
bottom line.
The desirability of multistakeholder participation in deci-
sion-making is one of the more important structural issues
within current thinking about international discourse. Anxi-
ety about the representativeness of governments and
about their ability to cover all facets of any question has
led to significantly more widespread support for the view
that other major stakeholders – essentially the business
community and civil society – need to participate in na-
tional decision-making and that their participation will sig-
nificantly enhance its quality. In practice, governments
share authority with other social actors within national
decision-making spaces: with very rare exceptions, they
do not claim the monopoly on representation or authority
that many governments claim at an international level.
Some governments and inter-governmental organisations,
however, also see value in incorporating the business com-
munity and civil society alongside governments and inter-
governmental organisations in international decision-mak-
ing spaces, although their ability to advance this is con-
strained by the hostility of governments which do not con-
cede multistakeholder space at home or do not see this
as transferable into the international sphere.
Other governments remain adamantly opposed to this di-
lution of the exclusiveness of their authority.
WSIS has been cited, however, as a significant point within
the longstanding debate about multistakeholderism within
international decision-making. Certainly, the WSIS outcome
documents strongly endorsed the principle of multistake-
holderism. The Geneva Declaration of Principles included
what became known as the Geneva Principle on this:
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We recognize that building an inclusive Information
Society requires new forms of solidarity, partnership
and cooperation among governments and other stake-
holders, i.e. the private sector, civil society and inter-
national organizations. Realising that the ambitious
goal of this Declaration - bridging the digital divide and
ensuring harmonious, fair and equitable development
for all - will require strong commitment by all stake-
holders, we call for digital solidarity, both at national
and international levels.45
The Tunis Agenda reiterated this principle, and incorpo-
rated it in its proposals for following-up both Internet gov-
ernance and general post-WSIS activities:
We are convinced that there is a need to initiate, and
reinforce, as appropriate, a transparent, democratic,
and multilateral process [concerning Internet govern-
ance], with the participation of governments, private
sector, civil society and international organizations, in
their respective roles.46 …
We encourage the development of multi-stakeholder
processes at the national, regional and international
levels to discuss and collaborate on the expansion and
diffusion of the Internet as a means to support devel-
opment efforts to achieve internationally agreed de-
velopment goals and objectives, including the Millen-
nium Development Goals.47 …
Building an inclusive development-oriented Informa-
tion Society will require unremitting multi-stakeholder
effort. … Taking into account the multifaceted nature of
building the Information Society, effective cooperation
among governments, private sector, civil society and
the United Nations and other international organiza-
tions, according to their different roles and responsi-
bilities and leveraging on their expertise, is essential.48
These statements went further than might have been ex-
pected from other summits, though rhetoric did not nec-
essarily imply implementation. Some civil society observ-
ers were initially critical of the extent of multistakeholder
participation governments accepted in the Multistake-
holder Advisory Group set up to establish the Internet
Governance Forum – though the IGF itself, when it met in
Athens in late 2006, paid exemplary attention to multi-
stakeholder principles.
The rhetoric of the WSIS outcome documents does, how-
ever, reflect what interviewees from all sectors recognised
as significantly greater multistakeholder participation in
WSIS than in previous summits. The civil society bureau
for WSIS had significant responsibility for facilitating civil
society participation in PrepCom and summit sessions, per-
haps more than it would otherwise have had because the
ITU lacked experience in handling civil society and its ways,
while civil society’s own structures determined how and
by whom the space available should be used. Civil society
and private sector speakers had more space in which to
make formal contributions in PrepComs and plenary ses-
sions. More national delegations were more interested in
liaising with other stakeholders over the issues, and non-
governmental stakeholders themselves may have been
more willing to lobby and to reach consensus – perhaps
because this looked more possible – than to argue and to
state their opposition. At any rate, no-one thought that
WSIS set back the cause of multistakeholder participation.
The locus of greatest multistakeholder involvement sug-
gests one of the reasons why this might be so. Much has
been made of the multistakeholder character of the WGIG,
in particular the opportunity given to civil society to nomi-
nate its own representatives and the openness created
within the WGIG’s internal debates by focusing these on
individual rather than representative participation. Every-
one interviewed about their part in the WGIG felt that
stakeholder differences became less important as the
Group worked more intensively together and were not as
significant to the final outcome as would have been the
case if the WGIG had been conducted more traditionally.
The question is not so much what was the effect of this
modus operandi, but why it happened and whether it sets
a precedent for future summits or negotiations.
A couple of observations made by some of those involved
are important here.
• One is that governments may have been more willing
to cede ground to other stakeholders in the case of
Internet governance because they had less to lose; in
fact, they did not actually hold the ground concerned
in the first place, and they may have actually needed
the participation of other stakeholders in order to
refashion an area of governance that was outside their
control. They would not, therefore, by implication, have
considered allowing so much multistakeholder partici-
pation in an area of policy that was more traditionally
under the control of governments and inter-govern-
mental organisations, such as infrastructure finance.
• The other is that the WGIG methodology is particularly
well attuned to a particular set of problems. As an is-
sue, Internet governance is both highly technical and
highly politicised. Many of those involved in the Internet
governance debate combined entrenched views on
what should happen with real ignorance of the techni-
cal structures whose governance they discussed. The
informal modus operandi adopted by chairman Desai
and secretary Kummer in these circumstances allowed
people with strongly divergent views to learn from one
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another in a way that more formal proceedings (or con-
sultants’ reports) would not have done, and so facili-
tated coming together in both knowledge and under-
standing of different perspectives. The implication here
is that other international issues which share this com-
bination of technical complexity and politicisation may
be susceptible to similar ways of working – climate
change and genetically-modified foods spring to mind
– but that these ways of working would have less im-
pact on issues where technicalities are simpler and/or
ideological divisions are less profound.
Some of the particularities of Internet governance here
might apply more widely to information and communica-
tion issues in general. WSIS may, in other words, offer more
of a precedent in how future ICT decisions are made with-
out setting any precedent for other areas of international
discourse.
Within the ICT sector, much is likely to depend on how the
multistakeholder principles in the WSIS outcome docu-
ments are translated into practice by, for example, the
Internet Governance Forum and the action-line follow-up
processes established by the Tunis Agenda. The Global
Alliance, which follows on the work of the UN ICT Task
Force, has also inherited similar multistakeholder princi-
ples. However, this does not necessarily have much im-
pact on other international ICT decision-making fora.
The evidence reported in Chapters 5 and 6 suggests that,
with the obvious exception of Internet governance bod-
ies, the content of the WSIS outcome documents has not
had much impact on the issues being discussed within
these pre-existing decision-making agencies: that WSIS
is, in practice, a one-off event; and that it had too little to
say with too little depth about the issues with which they
are concerned. There is little evidence to date, either, of
any of the multistakeholder principles adumbrated in the
WSIS documents affecting the working methods of main-
stream ICT agencies. For the present, the “Louder Voices”
conclusions seem again to be maintained.
One inter-governmental agency that did find itself explor-
ing its own representative structures as a result of WSIS,
however, was the ITU. Although, when charged with run-
ning WSIS, it had considerable experience of private sector
involvement in decision-making, it had little understanding
of civil society. The ITU discussed a number of possible re-
forms to its structure at its quadrennial Plenipotentiary Con-
ference, held towards the end of 2006 in Antalya, Turkey,
including the possibility of greater civil society involvement.
Somewhat cautiously, the Antalya “Plenipot” resolved to
initiate a “study on the participation of all relevant stake-
holders in the activities of the Union related to the World
Summit on the Information Society.” This may or may not
lead to greater space for meaningful civil society participa-
tion; time will tell.49
At a national level, the evidence of most of the country
case studies undertaken for this report does not show any
substantial changes taking place within the WSIS period
itself. However, one of those case studies – that of Kenya
– does show significantly greater engagement by civil so-
ciety organisations in policymaking; and it is clear (e.g.
from their WSIS delegations) that similar broadening did
take place in at least a few other countries. Many civil so-
ciety participants do in fact feel that WSIS may have a sub-
stantial impact on their ability to engage in national poli-
cymaking debates, resulting from a combination of fac-
tors – notably the experience they have had of engaging
during the WSIS process itself (in those countries where
some multistakeholder participation did occur); the pos-
sibility that national government officials will respond more
positively in future, given the emphasis on multistakehol-
derism in the WSIS outcome documents; greater knowl-
edge of the range of ICT issues which they have gained
through WSIS; and better networking with other civil soci-
ety organisations and the Internet community within their
countries (as in Kenya). These observations relate to the
ICT sector rather than to civil society interaction with gov-
ernment more generally.
As for international civil society networking, it is still early
to say how extensively that may be affected by WSIS in
the long term. The first phase of WSIS undoubtedly saw
the building of many new partnerships and of consider-
able esprit de corps among civil society participants. With
the exception of those working on Internet governance,
this tended to dissipate somewhat during the second
phase. Since WSIS ended, interviewees report, it has been
hard to maintain networks that were set up during WSIS,
again with the exception of relationships around Internet
governance where there is still a good deal of momentum
to events. The implications of all of the findings in this
chapter for future civil society engagement with the issues
are discussed in Chapter 8. 
49 The “Plenipot” resolution is at www.itu.int/council/groups/pp06-
plen7.html. A review of the ITU’s activity post-WSIS can be found
in the chapter by D. MacLean in Global Information Society Watch,



















Action Line Possible moderators / facilitaros
C1. The role of public governance authorities ECOSOC/UN Regional Commissions/ITU
and all stakeholders in the promotion
of ICTs for development
C2. Information and communication ITU
infrastructure
C3. Access to information and knowledge ITU/UNESCO
C4. Capacity building UNDP/UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD
C5. Building confidence and security ITU
in the use of ICTs
C6. Enabling environment ITU/UNDP/UN REGIONAL COMMISSIONS/UNCTAD
C7. ICT Applications
C8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic UNESCO
diversity and local content
C9. Media UNESCO
C10. Ethical dimensions of the Information UNESCO/ECOSOC
Society
C11. International and regional cooperation UN regional commissions/UNDP/ITU/UNESCO/ECOSOC
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This final chapter is divided as follows:
• It begins with a summary of the findings set out in the
earlier chapters and a brief set of conclusions about
the overall impact of WSIS on developing countries and
civil society.
• It then raises a number of issues and challenges fac-
ing different stakeholders, particularly in developing
countries and in civil society.
• Finally, it makes a series of recommendations about
actions which might be taken to enhance participa-
tion by these stakeholders. These recommendations
are comparable in purpose to those in the 2002
“Louder Voices” report.
While the content of this entire report is the responsibility
of its author, this is even more true of these conclusions
and recommendations, which are intended as much for
discussion within APC as beyond it.
Conclusions
From 2001 to the end of 2005, WSIS dominated interna-
tional discussion of some important ICT issues. While it
did not cover the full range of questions that might be
considered part of the “information society”, by any
means, it did bring a large number of people together to
discuss some important aspects of this, particularly – its
secretariat would suggest – the role of ICTs in develop-
ment. What did it achieve?
It was suggested in Chapter 4 that summits are almost
always described as “successes” or “great successes”. To
be considered “failures”, they have to fail most abjectly:
people are reluctant to accept that they have invested so
much time and money to achieve little or nothing. WSIS is
not widely regarded as a failure, nor as a “great success”.
Opinion varies about just how much was achieved, but the
nearest approximation to an average of opinion among
interviewees for this project would be, perhaps, that it was
“modestly successful”. How and where might this be so?
It is important, first, to recognise how narrowly WSIS
avoided failure. The first summit preparatory process was
minutes away from collapse over the issue of the Digital
Solidarity Fund at the end of its final reconvened PrepCom.
For much of the final stages of negotiations during the
second phase, many participants did not expect sufficient
compromise to be achieved on Internet governance. Ei-
ther of these circumstances could have gone the other
way, and, if they had, WSIS would have been considered
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a failure indeed. Of course, brinkmanship like this is not
unusual in challenging international fora, and many fac-
tors affect each forum’s ability to progress beyond differ-
ences to some form of consensus. Much of the responsi-
bility for the compromise reached on each occasion within
WSIS seems to have been due to the high degree of pres-
sure to avoid failure; some to the skill of individuals (in-
cluding meeting chairs) in securing compromise.
So, to some degree, the “success” of WSIS could be said
primarily to lie in avoiding failure. Significant, if not over-
whelming, change could be said to have occurred in the
two major areas of dispute whose resolution preoccupied
the second phase – infrastructure finance and Internet
governance.
In the case of infrastructure finance, although this was
probably underestimated at the time, the report of the Task
Force on Financial Mechanisms and the pressure which
developing countries applied over the Digital Solidarity
Fund led to movement in the focus of debate on ICT infra-
structure finance. For the first time in a decade, the devel-
opment establishment began to review the relationship
between public and private finance in this sector, includ-
ing the potential role of IFI and donor funds. This is begin-
ning to mesh with reconsideration of the legal and regula-
tory frameworks required for ICT infrastructure develop-
ment in a new phase of ICT restructuring (built around the
deployment of new wireless and broadband networks
rather than the privatisation and liberalisation of fixed line
telecoms). In years to come, WSIS and the TFFM may be
seen as playing a pivotal role here; perhaps as being a
tipping point. “Modest success” may, in due course, de-
velop into something more. On the other hand, it may not.
In the case of Internet governance, different observers have
different views. Some think that WSIS took a significant
step in shifting the balance of power within the Internet,
though with little immediate effect. Others think that noth-
ing changed. Most people on both sides (all sides) of the
argument left Tunis fairly happy with the outcome – which
implied that the argument would continue in the new fora
that the summit established: the Internet Governance Fo-
rum and whatever mechanisms define “enhanced coop-
eration”. Experience in the year following WSIS was mixed.
The meaning of “enhanced cooperation” remained unclear,
while the first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum
largely eschewed this controversy in favour of developing
broader understanding of Internet issues and differences
of opinion on them (in which it was notably successful).
WSIS therefore did not transform Internet governance, but
it has created more space for debate. How that space will
be used is yet open to question.
One way of looking at this is to see WSIS not as a revolu-
tionary moment in Internet development but as a step in
the long-term evolution of the Internet. The Internet was,
after all, originally, designed in and for the United States
military. Governance and authority over its development
have expanded outwards from that narrow origin to include
- successively - academics, geeks and commercial busi-
nesses. The “Internet community” resulting from this has
developed organically rather than by the fiat of any gov-
ernment authority, national or international. Decisions
about the development of Internet standards are made
collectively by groups, often made up of individuals rather
than representatives, on a basis of mutual tolerance and
intolerance: attention is paid to the competent while the
incompetent speak to themselves alone. Where more for-
mal governance is required, as with domain names, com-
promises were reached between this essentially non-gov-
ernmental structure and the statutory authority required
for enforcement.
All evolving governance processes build on legacies; they
retain vestiges of what was present in the past. Like con-
stitutional monarchy in Western Europe, these vestiges can
simultaneously be symbolic and retain significant roles or
influence. They can be displaced either by revolution or
evolution. The last twenty-five years of Internet develop-
ment can be seen as the gradual evolution of the Internet
from an instrument of US polity to a global resource - and
the same can be said of Internet governance. Authority
has gradually moved away from the United States as the
Internet has developed, and can be expected to continue
moving further away as the Internet becomes more truly
global in character (in infrastructure, content and user
base). Nevertheless, features of Internet governance re-
sulting from its legacy remain, and ICANN’s status, and
that of the root server system, vis-à-vis the US government
are among these. At present, they are both symbolic and
(potentially) significant. Over time, evolution of the
Internet, particularly its globalisation, are likely to make
them more wholly symbolic and less truly significant; how-
ever, at present they are certainly considered both in many
countries, particularly developing countries - and there-
fore a threat to national sovereignty.
It seems important, looking at this from the perspective of
those countries, not to confuse two separate issues which
are often confused in this debate: the authority of the United
States vis-à-vis other countries in respect of Internet gov-
ernance (an issue of sovereignty and international relations);
and the authority of governments over the Internet (an is-
sue of national governance, particularly the balance of
power between the citizen and the state). Many govern-
ments in WSIS pursued both an increase in governmental
authority and a decrease or removal of the perceived legacy
powers of the United States. Industrial countries and the
private sector were much less concerned about the US’
legacy powers, but more concerned to avoid increased regu-
lation of the Internet, national or international. Civil society
organisations tended to favour diminution of US legacy pow-
ers and avoidance of increased regulation (though, in their
case, on grounds of citizens’ rather than business rights).
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There were, therefore, a lot of different objectives cutting
across these two central (national and international) dimen-
sions of Internet governance.
The argument during WSIS over Internet governance - and
particularly over ICANN and root servers - can be seen as
an attempt to remove the remaining US powers over the
Internet, and so globalise Internet regulation at a stroke.
This would have been a revolutionary moment in the de-
velopment of Internet - the equivalent, say, of the comet
landfall that ended the Cretaceous era or the end of the
ancien régime in France in 1789. The difficulty with it for
industrial countries and the private sector was not that it
would have diminished US authority (though that was an
issue in the United States) but that it would have increased
regulatory intervention in the Internet, since it implied re-
locating authority over aspects of the Internet from places
where they were merely potentially subject to government
intervention (by the US) to places where they would be
actively subject to regulation by either new or existing
bodies (such as the ITU). Industrial countries and the pri-
vate sector were particularly averse to the possibility of
ITU-style regulation and standard-setting being imposed
on the Internet, where they thought it would constrain
rather than facilitate the dynamic innovation that has made
it so successful.
The “enhanced cooperation” approach advocated by the
European Union and adopted in the Tunis final documents
can be seen in this context as an endorsement of evolu-
tionary change. This perhaps explains why so many par-
ties to this dispute could consider themselves to be victo-
rious (or at least not to be defeated). It allowed Internet
governance conservatives in the United States to retain a
sense of US leadership; radicals in developing countries
to retain the prospect of building a new, more inter-gov-
ernmental (and more interventionist) model of Internet
governance; and proponents of gradual change to envis-
age a continuation of the laissez-faire “governance-lite”
approach which they prefer. The likelihood is that “en-
hanced cooperation”, if it means anything, will mean the
continued gradual diminution of the United States’ effec-
tive superior power over the Internet which has been tak-
ing place for the past twenty-five years, without its being
replaced by an inter-governmental agency along the lines
of the UN model; but this will continue to be a process of
gradual evolution.
This suggests, then, that WSIS may seem, with hindsight,
to have a lasting legacy in both infrastructure finance and
Internet governance. Would the developments concerned
have happened anyway without WSIS intervening? Opin-
ion on this, too, is divided, but the consensus is probably
that the status quo in both cases was becoming unsustain-
able anyway and that it would therefore need to be ad-
dressed; i.e. that the existing mechanisms for infrastruc-
ture finance would be stretched too far by the potential of
new networks and that the pressures for change in Internet
governance arrangements were building up to a point where
they could ultimately erupt. In both cases, this suggests,
WSIS may have brought forward changes that were likely
to come about, one way or another, within the medium term.
It may not, however, have been the most cost-effective way
of doing so, or more likely to achieve outcomes as good as
those that might be achievable through other fora.
As for development, the content of the WSIS outcome docu-
ments – as discussed in Chapter 5 – is thin. Far more ar-
ticulate, incisive, memorable and useful statements of the
potential (and limitations) of ICTs in development were pro-
duced during the WSIS period by individual multilateral or-
ganisations (the World Bank, the UNDP, UNESCO, GKP etc.),
donor governments (DFID, SDC, etc.) and developing coun-
try governments (a succession of ICT strategies which,
though sometimes criticised for being over-ambitious, gen-
erally had a much more analytical and cohesive feel than
the Geneva Plan of Action). ICD specialists interviewed for
this project were generally disparaging of the content of
the WSIS outcome documents, thought these already
looked substantially outdated, and did not think them use-
ful in persuading mainstream development sector col-
leagues of the merits of ICTs. In the twenty years before
WSIS, the Maitland Commission’s 1984/5 report “The Miss-
ing Link” was increasingly often cited in discussion about
the evolution of thinking on ICD, though it would seem more
rarely read by those that cited it.1  The WSIS outcome docu-
ments may come to share this fate.
WSIS does not seem to have changed much, therefore, in
the content of the ICD debate, though this has clearly
moved on in other areas. The World Bank and others are
rethinking some of the policy and regulatory issues asso-
ciated with enabling frameworks. The UNDP and others
are focusing on building more effective approaches to
mainstreaming, built around better understanding be-
tween ICT and mainstream professionals. Donor countries
are reviewing – and in some cases reducing – their com-
mitment to ICD. Developing countries are beginning to in-
tegrate ICTs more substantively into Poverty Reduction
Strategies and similar documents. However, these have
not been WSIS-driven processes so much as processes
driven by the same enthusiasm for ICD which led to WSIS
in the first place. They would, most development special-
ists seem to think, have happened anyway; and some think
that WSIS may have slowed down their development by
focusing debate on a rather limited range of perceptions
that were pulled together during its first year.
Where WSIS does seem to have had an effect on the ICD
debate, according to interviewees, is in awareness and in
networking. Developing country interviewees, in particular,
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felt that WSIS had increased substantially the information
and knowledge available to them, to their colleagues and
fellow participants, and thereby to decision-makers in gen-
eral within their countries. They felt this better understand-
ing would improve the quality of decision-making and that
the wider range of engagement in ICTs resulting from WSIS,
which varied in scale from country to country, would also
help to make decision-making more inclusive. This view is
supported by evidence from some, but not all, of the coun-
try case studies undertaken for this report.  In terms of
networking, participants undoubtedly gained considerably
from greater access to a wider range of experience and
expertise, and this helped to build a broader base for net-
working support in future. Civil society, in particular, gained
from this aspect of the summit. However, networks require
maintenance if weak as well as strong relationships are to
survive the end of summits. WSIS does not have self-sus-
taining networks extending beyond its own life, with the
exception (in a sense) of the Internet Governance Forum,
and the value of this networking will tend to dissipate un-
less other networks can build upon it. There are candidates
for this role; whether they succeed in taking up the oppor-
tunity is to be seen.
The above paragraphs suggest that WSIS had a limited but
significant impact in certain policy areas. What it did not do
was substantially address many other areas of what could
be considered the “information society”. It tended to as-
sume that there were powerful links between ICT invest-
ment and economic growth, but did not explore this rela-
tionship, where it was most likely or how it might be fos-
tered, in the sense that these issues have been considered
by the OECD. It described a range of positive potential so-
cial impacts of ICTs but had little to say about the risks, in
particular where relations between the state and citizen are
concerned. Discussion about rights was largely based
around the defence of established freedoms of expression,
rather than changes and potential conflicts which may arise
as a result of widespread use of new technologies. WSIS
was, in other words, seen by most of its participants as an
opportunity to advocate the use of ICTs rather than to ex-
plore their implications for the future; to propose an infor-
mation society than to try and understand one.
Which, in a sense, takes the discussion back to the origins
of WSIS itself. As pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, the origi-
nal resolution of the ITU “Plenipot” was not necessarily
thought to mean a summit of the kind that eventually tran-
spired.  At the time, many thought it meant a smaller scale
event involving heads of state and experts, drawing up a
report for consultation. Summits, historically, have been
large scale events which address big problems for which
broad and universal agreements are required on the best
ways to move forward. They are not good at developing un-
derstanding in depth, particularly of complex issues which
pose new challenges. Smaller fora are better at that, some-
thing which the WGIG demonstrated. It is interesting to
speculate, in hindsight, whether a more sophisticated and
more lasting outcome might have been achieved by a com-
bination of the summit with an international commission
that investigated the issues with depth and rigour.
To summarise the views of interviewees on WSIS as a whole
(insofar as this is possible). It had limited achievements,
but was not a failure. It advanced some debates, but did
not address others. It cost a great deal of money, and the
costs of future summits to their participants should be more
carefully considered before they are agreed. (In particular,
a two-stage summit was unnecessary. The difficult issues
of infrastructure finance and Internet governance might
have been resolved during the first summit if the second
had not opened up the opportunity for delay. The second
summit added nothing to the first except a resolution of
these issues.) On balance, there were gains, but they could
almost certainly have been achieved at lesser cost.
Challenges and recommendations:
developing countries
Developing country participation in WSIS is discussed in
Chapter 6. This analysis suggests that developing coun-
tries played a more prominent part in WSIS than indus-
trial countries, though primarily because the latter lacked
incentives to prioritise the summit. Developing country par-
ticipation, however, was led by what might be described
as the telecommunications establishment – ministries of
communications, telecommunications regulators and fixed
network operators – in cooperation with the diplomats nor-
mally involved in inter-governmental drafting. Little part
was played in most developing country participation by new
ICT sectors (mobile businesses and the Internet commu-
nity), broadcasters, mainstream development ministries or
civil society. A distinction was also apparent between a
small number of larger and economically more powerful
developing countries, possessed of substantial ICT exper-
tise and able to exert significant influence either alone or
in partnership with one another; and smaller, weaker de-
veloping countries, particularly LDCs, who found it more
difficult to press their agenda. Aside from the overall de-
velopment text, which was largely bland and insubstan-
tial, developing countries pressed for two objectives, nei-
ther of which was fully achieved though each had partial
outcomes in the direction sought: the Digital Solidarity
Fund, which generated some new approaches to infrastruc-
ture finance; and the removal of US authority over ICANN
and the root-server system, which led to some movement
in the evolution of Internet governance.
Developing country delegates did agree, however, that
they and their countries gained substantially in network-
ing, information and awareness from the WSIS experience,
and that this would have lasting implications for national
decision-making.
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The “Louder Voices” report listed a number of reasons why
developing countries lacked influence in international ICT
decision-making. These included, in particular, those set
out in the box below.
As a summit, WSIS was of course very different from the
normal run of international decision-making fora; it dealt
in generalities, not specifics; was of less critical interest
to industrial countries; tended to politicise issues rather
than to focus on technical solutions. It seems therefore,
this report suggests, to have had relatively little impact
on permanent ICT decision-making fora – though increased
awareness of the issues may encourage greater develop-
ing country participation in those fora in the future.
At the international level:
a. Lack of easy, affordable and timely access to
information about ICT-related issues, deci-
sion-making fora and processes.
b. Logistical problems, including the frequency
and location of international meetings and re-
strictions on participation (for example, by
private sector and civil society experts).
c. Ineffective use of financial resources available
to support participation.
At the national level:
a. Lack of policy awareness, at all levels of gov-
ernment and citizenship, of the potential role
of ICTs in development.
b. Lack of technical and policy capacity on ICT is-
sues, particularly in respect of emerging tech-
nologies and new policy areas - such as mi-
gration from circuit-switched to IP networks
and indeed Internet issues in general.
c. Weaknesses in national and regional policy-
making processes, including:
i. Lack of political leadership
ii. Absence of national ICT strategies
iii. Ineffective coordination between differ-
ent government departments and agen-
cies with ICT responsibilities
iv. Lack of private sector and civil society par-
ticipation in national decision-making
v. Inadequate preparation for international
meetings
vi. Ineffective use of financial and human
resources.
Developing countries had less challenge participating in
WSIS than they do in the wider range of ICT negotiations.
Summits are, self-evidently, important. Presidents and
heads of government expect their countries to be repre-
sented. UN agencies invite broad participation. All coun-
tries have missions in New York to facilitate their repre-
sentation in other UN summits; most countries (though
not all) had missions in Geneva which could facilitate
theirs in WSIS. Although expensive, developing countries
almost universally, therefore, attended WSIS and played
some part in it: speaking in plenary sessions, participat-
ing in caucuses, etc. Very few countries did not attend
the plenary summit events (174 out of the UN’s 192 mem-
ber-states had official delegations in Geneva, 168 in Tu-
nis). Participation in PrepComs was a little sparser (143
national delegations attended the first PrepCom of the
first phase, for example; 149 the second PrepCom of the
second phase), and delegations were considerably
smaller, but nevertheless a considerable majority of gov-
ernments took part. Although it was expensive, the
money for participation was found; the logistics chal-
lenges were overcome.
If the international factors described in the box above were
not so prominent in WSIS, many of the national factors
concerned were apparent. What impact did the WSIS ex-
perience have on these?
Firstly, WSIS did, by all accounts, increase awareness of
the potential of ICTs in development amongst government
officials and, to a lesser extent, other parts of the com-
munity. Government officials were directly involved in
WSIS, and required to demonstrate that governments
were taking WSIS issues seriously; and demonstrate this
they therefore sought to do. Almost all developing coun-
try interviewees for this report felt that greater aware-
ness had been achieved and would have an impact in the
future. However, this did not reach far down the decision-
making ladder. Media attention to WSIS, in most coun-
tries, was minimal. The absence of multistakeholder en-
gagement in WSIS policymaking, in many countries,
meant that the breadth of awareness and information
transfer was less than it might have been. In a fast-mov-
ing sector such as ICTs, too, knowledge rapidly falls out
of date.
Secondly, while WSIS was not primarily concerned with tech-
nical detail, it did provide spaces in which greater policy
and technical expertise could be acquired by developing
country representatives. This was partly a result of WSIS
discussions – it would be difficult to engage seriously in
the Internet governance debate without acquiring some
greater understanding of Internet governance issues – and
partly of the opportunity to network with regional experts
from other countries. However, the overall policy focus and
the politicisation of WSIS debate probably meant that less
capacity was built than might have been.
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Developing countries were stronger and better repre-
sented in WSIS than they were in the other ICT decision-
making fora assessed in “Louder Voices”. Nevertheless,
interviews and country case studies for this report sug-
gest, many of the same weaknesses were to be found in
national and regional policymaking processes.
• While political leadership in some countries was strong
– Senegal is a good example – in many countries WSIS
was left in the hands of the telecommunications es-
tablishment rather than those of central government.
While ministers may have been involved, these were
not usually powerful ministers; and the attention paid
to WSIS by the most important centres of government,
such as ministries of finance, was weak.
• National ICT strategies have been developed in many
countries in the years since the “Louder Voices” re-
port was published. However, as noted in Chapter 5,
they are often poorly integrated into Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategies and other national development plans.
The predominance of the telecommunications estab-
lishment in participation at WSIS meant that relatively
little of the development debate there fed back into
mainstream development activity in-country; and, in
many countries, mainstream development concerns
were poorly articulated in policy debate concerning
WSIS.
• Both interviews and country case studies suggest
that ineffective coordination between government de-
partments continued during WSIS. As well as having
little or no mainstream development participation in
WSIS meetings, many countries appear to have un-
dertaken little in the way of policy coordination on
WSIS issues at a national level. With some notable
exceptions, country presentations at WSIS offered
the perspective from the communications ministry
rather than an holistic view of ICTs and development
across the board.
• Some developing countries – including Kenya, among
the country case studies for this report – opened up
new spaces for participation by the private sector and
civil society in national decision-making. However,
this experience does not appear to have been very
widely shared, in spite of significant efforts to secure
participation by civil society in quite a number of
countries.
The challenges for developing countries in future interna-
tional ICT decision-making are therefore likely to remain
much as they were at the time of the “Louder Voices” re-
port:
• Lack of awareness of the potential (and limitations) of
ICTs in much of the political establishment and in so-
ciety more generally
• Lack of technical and policy capacity, particularly in
areas of emerging technology, and lack of capacity to
assess the likely impact and cost-effectiveness of ICT
reforms and ICD interventions
• Lack of integration between national ICT strategies and
national development plans such as Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategies
• Poor knowledge management, in particular inad-
equate coordination between government depart-
ments responsible for the ICT sector and for main-
stream development objectives
• Lack of private sector and civil society (multistake-
holder) input into decision-making – a result both of
their absence from official decision-making processes
and of their own limited capacity
• Inadequate preparation for international meetings,
including the lack of coordination with regional part-
ners
• Ineffective use of financial and human resources.
Effective participation in international decision-making
fora is a highly complex matter, illustrated by the follow-
ing graphic derived from the “Louder Voices” report:2
The illustration might be summarised as follows. Effective
delegations benefit from powerful and coherent national
and regional policy formulation processes which identify
priority issues, coordinate and synthesise the views of dif-
ferent stakeholders and establish a position which can be
sustained through lobbying and negotiation over the
weeks and months preceding a decision as well as at the
decision-making meeting itself. These policy formulation
processes are in turn underpinned by deep policy struc-
tures – the analytical capabilities that allow policymakers
to understand the implications of different options and
choose the most effective strategies for their countries.
Without this comprehensive range of tools, participation
in international fora will be weak.
It will always be difficult for developing countries to secure
this degree of complexity and comprehensiveness in poli-
cymaking, not least because expert human resources are
in short supply, but this does not mean that much cannot
be done to improve the quality of representation. One key
issue is prioritisation. Major industrial countries need this
level of policymaking across the board because they have
deep interests in many different areas of ICT policy. Devel-
oping countries, by and large, have fewer interests. They
can afford to prioritise – to identify the limited range of
issues on which decisions are sufficiently significant for
2 The following paragraphs draw on an article entitled “Louder Voices
and the International Debate on Developing Country Participation in
ICT Decision-Making”, to be published in William J. Drake & Ernest J.
Wilson III, eds. Governing Global Electronic Networks: International
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them to invest substantial resources, and to focus explic-
itly on those issues: developing the policy capacity re-
quired to have an impact, involving the full range of stake-
holders in national policymaking. They can also seek to
secure the support of regional peers and wider develop-
ing country groupings which can have more impact if they
act collectively in informal as well as formal decision-mak-
ing gatherings, and provide fuller support to the delegate
or delegates attending all of the fora involved.
Interviewees for the “Louder Voices” study believed that
it was more valuable for a developing country to have real
influence in two or three areas of real significance to it
than to have an ineffective presence in a larger number of
decision-making processes – particularly if the lead role
on different issues of importance could be shared between
countries within a region, with each developing appropri-
ate expertise on behalf of the regional group as a whole.
They were also clear, however, that far too little
prioritisation along these lines took place, and that avail-
able expertise was currently spread too thinly and too in-
discriminately to have the impact that their governments
desired. WSIS may have helped developing country del-
egations to improve their understanding of issues and their
networks, but this analysis was not disputed by interview-
ees for this study.
The cost of participation remains, of course, a major factor
inhibiting developing country participation in international
fora. It was among the factors identified by interviewees
for the “Louder Voices” report, although a number made
clear their feeling that resources could and would be found
to support participation, at least within governments, if the
issues involved were considered sufficiently important.
Many also expressed concern about the poor utilisation
of funds made available to support participation by inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs) concerned about de-
veloping countries’ under-representation. Some fellow-
ships – i.e. funding for travel and participation costs – were
available to some developing countries to facilitate par-
ticipation in WSIS (as they are, for example, within the ITU).
However, the attendance lists for WSIS show that some
developing country governments sent very large delega-
tions irrespective of cost.3  Civil society participation from
developing countries was more substantially inhibited by
cost than government delegations.
Overall, then, it is suggested that the “Louder Voices” rec-
ommendations concerning developing country participa-
tion in permanent ICT decision-making fora stand today
much as they did in 2002. These include recommendations
to both international fora themselves and developing coun-
tries participating in them. In particular (quotations from
the earlier report in italics; amended text and additions
unitalicised):
1. International ICT fora should
¬ promote awareness of the potential and limi-
tations which ICTs have by providing compre-
hensive, publicly-accessible, non-technical in-
formation on the relevance of their activities
to the development agenda;
3 See Annex 1.
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¬ provide independent, authoritative technical/
policy research and analysis of major issues
to be decided;
¬ hold meetings in developing regions in a way
that minimises travel costs for developing
country participants;
¬ avoid simultaneous scheduling of important
events;
¬ ensure that their procedures allow all sources
of developing country policy and technical ca-
pacity to participate in decision-making,
whether they come from government, the pri-
vate sector or not-for-profit organisations.
• Developing country governments:
¬ should take action to:
> improve information flows and policy co-
ordination between different government
departments and agencies with ICT respon-
sibilities and those with mainstream devel-
opment roles;
> promote informed public discussion and
debate through both general and special-
ised media;
> include all relevant stakeholders in policy-
making on an issue-by-issue basis and
through permanent consultation fora;
> encourage participation of experts from the
private sector and civil society in national
delegations to international decision-mak-
ing fora;
¬ and should review their current practices with
respect to meeting preparation, delegate se-
lection, participation, accountability and fol-
low-up with a view to ensuring that these prac-
tices result in the most effective use of finan-
cial resources through the optimum deploy-
ment and development of technical and policy
capacity.
Capacity-building is, of course, crucial to success in this
area, and a specific recommendation concerning capac-
ity-building, related to both developing countries and civil
society, is included towards the end of this chapter.
Challenges and recommendations:
civil society
Civil society participation in WSIS is discussed in Chapter
7. It was, in many ways, substantially more effective than
in comparable previous summits because more space was
made available for it within the summit’s formal structure.
Being more engaged in the formal processes, civil society
organisations were able to make more gains, notably in
the inclusion of some text in the final outcome documents.
There was less oppositionalism from civil society than seen
at many summits, and civil society did not issue a collec-
tive critique of the WSIS experience until a month after
the event. Civil society organisations also gained substan-
tially through opportunities for networking (during the
extended, four-year, preparatory process) and for informa-
tion sharing and improving understanding (through the
exhibitions and “informal summits” accompanying each
main summit session). However, civil society participation
was uneven: Southern CSOs were under-represented com-
pared with Northern CSOs, especially during PrepComs;
and mainstream development NGOs were conspicuous by
their absence, undermining the credibility of much civil
society input on development questions.
Issues concerning civil society participation at the national
level have been considered in the previous chapter. At the
international level, the challenges raised for civil society
by the summit – and by comparable future events – seem
to fall into two main categories: concerning whether to par-
ticipate, and how to do so.
The former relates largely to the cost and cost-effectiveness
of participation. The cost of taking part in international de-
cision-making processes is high – as described for devel-
oping countries in the previous section. Participation in
WSIS involved not merely a presence at two plenary sum-
mit sessions – that alone was expensive, but would have
gained no influence on its own – but involvement in a four-
year process, including a substantial number of international
meetings and all of the interaction required with other civil
society organisations in order to make participation worth-
while. The diagram derived from “Louder Voices”, which is
included in the previous section, is as relevant to civil soci-
ety participation as it is to that of developing countries.
No civil society organisation can afford to take a decision
to spend so many resources on one activity with ease. Few
developing country civil society organisations, in particu-
lar, can afford to do so, unless they are sponsored by do-
nors. The costs alone therefore dictate that only the best-
endowed and the most determined civil society organisa-
tions will play a full part in a summit like WSIS (especially
if, as in WSIS, a two-phase approach effectively doubles
the cost). Civil society participation is therefore always
likely to be skewed as described above.  Assessments of
cost-effectiveness also come into play. In practice, in WSIS,
civil society organisations focusing on information rights
and ICD were more likely to see engagement in WSIS as
more cost-effective for them than civil society organisa-
tions primarily concerned with mainstream rights or de-
velopment issues. Mainstream development organisations
also had another, bigger priority: the Millennium Review
Summit, which also took place in 2005.
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The first challenge for civil society, therefore, concerns what
it collectively can do to correct the distortions in civil society
participation arising from this skewed representation. This
challenge has two dimensions (in addition to issues concern-
ing the social representation of participation, e.g. by gender):
• Firstly, at an international level, there is the dimension
of geography. Civil society participation in WSIS was
less representative of the South than participation in
official delegations. This under-representation of the
South was more marked in PrepComs - and so in input
to negotiations - than at the summits themselves. It was
reinforced by the greater likelihood that Northern gov-
ernments undertook formal or informal consultation
processes than that Southern governments did so, and
by the higher technical and negotiating skill levels in
Northern than in Southern civil society. It is even more
marked in WSIS follow-up processes. This undermines
civil society’s claim to speak on behalf of the disadvan-
taged within negotiations. (At national level, it is paral-
leled by the over-representation of metropolitan and
the under-representation of provincial civil society in
national decision-making processes.)
• Secondly, at both national and international levels,
there is the dimension of thematic diversity. Discus-
sions at WSIS potentially affected a wide range of civil
society organisations - in particular, those involved
directly in ICTs, those concerned with rights issues,
those working in mainstream development. In prac-
tice, at both national and international levels, main-
stream development NGOs had very little involvement
in civil society engagement with WSIS. This was as true
of industrial as of developing countries. The result was
that civil society input into WSIS’ discussions on the
application of ICTs in mainstream development lacked
mainstream development NGO participation.
One response to this challenge has been to appeal for ex-
ternal funding of civil society participants, but this includes
the risks discussed above in respect of developing coun-
try participation. Also, while it addresses the question of
cost, it does not address that of cost-effectiveness. If an
organisation does not consider it cost-effective to use its
person-time to attend a meeting, paying for it to do so does
not make it cost-effective.
Turning next to a second challenge. The central question
concerning how to participate, in past summits, has tended
to be a choice between participation within the main
stream of discussion and declamation from without. Ex-
clusion from the main decision-making forum in past sum-
mits has encouraged the latter, but WSIS offered more par-
ticipation space “within the tent” than its predecessors
had done. Civil society’s demand for multistakeholder in-
volvement in decision-making – not just in summits, but
also in permanent decision-making fora like the ITU or WTO
– implies that civil society as a whole wishes to move from
outside the tent to inside, from a position of opposition to
a position of constructive engagement. This in turn raises
a number of challenges for civil society, in particular con-
cerning unity of purpose and representational character.
It is worth looking in more detail at the implications of
multistakeholderism in order to address these.
Multistakeholder participation in decision-making might
be said to do three things:
• To supplement democratic input
• To improve the quality of understanding of particular
issues and the concerns of particular groups, which
are otherwise marginal to decision-making processes
• To improve the quality of decision-making and the con-
sent of citizens to decisions made.
These advantages of multistakeholder engagement in de-
cision-making are recognised within the shared decision-
making structures in most national contexts, but less rec-
ognised in international decision-making.
Civil society advocacy of multistakeholder processes,
within WSIS and elsewhere, has been built around the
demand for a voice - to supplement the democratic articu-
lation of public opinion in more democratic societies; to
substitute for it in societies that are less democratic; to
ensure the articulation of minority as well as majority,
marginalised as well as advantaged, concerns and views,
etc. The absence of a voice is the immediate issue; less
attention has (naturally enough) been paid to the use that
could be made of it if and when multistakeholder proc-
esses are put in place.
The purpose of a voice, however, is not simply to articu-
late an alternative perspective to that held by government,
business or any other stakeholder, but to engage in politi-
cal debate with them and seek to achieve shifts in policy
and practice which are consistent with civil society’s broad
objectives. Multistakeholderism, in other words, is not a
synonym for the more effective articulation of opposition.
Like democracy, it implies engagement and compromise
with alternative points of view, at least in building areas
of common understanding or perimeters of consensus
within which future policy options can be developed. The
WGIG illustrated this meaning of multistakeholderism ef-
fectively in the way that it developed mutual understand-
ing between people with different stakeholder perspec-
tives and thereby shaped subsequent debate.
In practice, multistakeholder engagement requires con-
sent to a set of rules within which multistakeholder partici-
pation takes place. These may be formal (who votes) or in-
formal (how people treat each other), but a functioning
multistakeholder forum must have an ethos which em-
braces diversity of opinion and a multistakeholder decision-
making forum must have formal mechanisms and the in-
formal consent of its participants for making decisions.
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WSIS experience suggests that civil society as a whole has
not yet sufficiently debated its engagement in this proc-
ess. As an umbrella, the term civil society covers both or-
ganisations that are strongly positive about engagement
with other stakeholders and those that are more hostile
to both or either governments and businesses. Active
multistakeholder processes are likely to throw this differ-
ence of approach into much higher relief. They are still
highly controversial among governments, and many gov-
ernments will be happy to see them fail. Unless there is
effective engagement with new steps towards multistake-
holder engagement then the trend towards it could re-
verse. The willingness of (at least most members of) all
stakeholder groups to engage constructively with one an-
other, which was notably demonstrated at the first meet-
ing of the Internet Governance Forum in late 2006, could
have importance well beyond the ICT sector.
The second challenge for civil society is how it handles
this transition in ethos in moving into multistakeholder en-
vironments; how, in other words, it understands “construc-
tive engagement”. Divisions of opinion on this were not
terribly apparent during the majority of WSIS, but did be-
come more evident towards the end as compromise was
being reached in Internet governance. Now that they are
beginning to have a voice, civil society organisations within
the ICT sector need to think about how to handle differ-
ences of view about how to use it most constructively. This
could be important, for example, if the review of the na-
ture of stakeholder roles initiated by the 2006 ITU Pleni-
potentiary Conference opens up new spaces for civil soci-
ety participation in its decision-making processes.
Many governments, as noted above, remain suspicious
of civil society participation in decision-making. For some,
this is because they fear that civil society will expose their
unrepresentativeness or breach barriers to popular par-
ticipation and freedom of expression in their own territo-
ries. Interviews with government and IGO participants in
WSIS, however, make clear that the reasons for suspicion
of civil society are more complex than this, and these need
to be understood by civil society organisations as they
campaign for and enter into stronger decision-making
roles.
The nature and meaning of “civil society” differs mark-
edly between countries. In many, civil society organisa-
tions are considered hostile by governments: either be-
cause they are (in practice) opposition organisations, or
because they represent social groups which are excluded
from power or considered hostile by government (trade
unions, women’s groups, ethnic minorities, religious en-
tities), or because they articulate policies or demand
rights (such as freedoms of expression, association and
behaviour) which are not granted within the society in
question. These are essentially political issues relating
civil society to governments and inter-governmental
agencies, and exist in many ways because civil society is
doing its job.  However, the term “civil society” has also
been used by organisations which seek themselves to
suppress social freedoms, or which have abused their
position to exploit the communities they claim to repre-
sent. And civil society is often regarded as suspect be-
cause of problems of uncertainty about the quality of
representation. Civil society organisations often repre-
sent particular social groups - women, workers, young
people, consumers, etc. - which are, by definition, not
representative of society as a whole. Collectively, a coa-
lition of all civil society actors within a country may be
broadly representative of society as a whole, but equally
it may not: it may, for example, be disproportionately rep-
resentative of the powerful or (conversely) of the
marginalised, of particular ethnic or religious groups, of
men or women, of the landed not the landless, the em-
ployed rather than the unemployed.  Civil society’s po-
litical character, collectively, may be broadly consistent
with that of society as a whole, or it may not; in which
case it may be either pro- or anti-government. In some
societies, civil society organisations may even be surro-
gates for the state - an issue that arose concerning local
NGOs during the Tunis phase of WSIS.
These criticisms are similar to those made of private sec-
tor representation: that, for example, the CCBI and its part-
ners in the WSIS process represented bigger international
businesses rather the private sector as a whole. How rep-
resentation is perceived is as important here as how it is
actually constructed. The third challenge for civil society,
therefore, is to recognise and address concerns within
other stakeholder groups about the quality of representa-
tion that it, collectively, offers, in order to build confidence
in it as a player within multistakeholder processes and so
take advantage of the opportunities they represent. A key
issue here is the need for individual civil society organisa-
tions to recognise that civil society’s credibility depends
on its diversity; that there is, in fact, no single civil society
perspective on a particular issue (such as intellectual prop-
erty rights); and in particular that attempts to appropriate
the authority of civil society to individual agency objec-
tives undermine both credibility and civil society’s ability
to act collectively.
Fourthly, most of the debate about multistakeholderism
within civil society has concerned the relationship between
civil society and government (or inter-governmental organi-
sations). Much less attention has been paid to the rela-
tionship between civil society and the private sector. This
is natural: it is governments and IGOs that are felt to deny
civil society a voice. In addition, many civil society organi-
sations are ideologically hostile to private business. The UN
system, however, regards both groups as effectively one –
“non-government” as opposed to “government”. The first
phase of WSIS showed strong antipathy by some govern-
ment delegations to both civil society and private sector
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participation; and led to substantial cooperation between
civil society and private sector representatives in jointly
demanding a voice. Partly as a result, there was much more
constructive dialogue between civil society and the pri-
vate sector during the remainder of WSIS than had been
the case in previous summits.
This is something that offers some scope for the future.
Debates at WSIS showed that there were a number of ar-
eas in which civil society and the private sector had com-
mon cause, notably but not exclusively in terms of partici-
pation in decision-making itself. These included issues
such as openness to innovation, liberalisation of state-con-
trolled infrastructure and government control over content,
developing better understanding of the way ICT markets
work and the interrelationship between policy, service pro-
vision and consumer behaviour. There is scope, largely
unexplored, for cooperation in the future in these and other
areas. Formal mechanisms for building on this are weak,
though good personal relationships do exist, as a result
of WSIS, across this stakeholder divide. However, many
civil society organisations have ideological reservations
about the private sector. The fourth challenge is, there-
fore, whether and how civil society and the private sector
build their relationship within an increasingly multistake-
holder environment.
A fifth challenge concerns the quality of civil society in-
put. Most of the issues discussed in international ICT fora
are highly complex technical questions. Detailed and so-
phisticated understanding of them is necessary to achieve
credibility. Most debates are dominated by articulate peo-
ple, highly informed about these issues and supported by
strong research and analytical teams. It is difficult to break
into this inner circle of ICT policymaking – as new delegates
to ITU study groups are quick to find – and easy for domi-
nant decision-makers to dismiss new participants as ig-
norant or misinformed.
If the struggle for the right to participate is won, how civil
society announces its arrival will have a major impact on
its influence in the medium and longer term. Other stake-
holders will look for a positive approach and for substan-
tial understanding of the issues. This is much more impor-
tant in permanent decision-making fora, which deal in
detail, than in summits, which deal in broad principles.
For civil society to be effective, therefore, its first priority
will have to be identification of those aspects of ICT policy
which merit concentrated attention and the resources
needed to address these effectively. A scattergun ap-
proach, built around assumptions rather than knowledge,
or principles rather than pragmatism, is unlikely to build
influence. Criteria for the selection of priority issues need
to be developed. These might include:
• Issues where outcomes are of high significance to citi-
zens (such as access, connectivity and information
rights)
• Issues where civil society has a common shared per-
spective (i.e. few internal disagreements) and a dis-
tinctive point of view
• Issues which are currently being handled in a highly
technocratic manner but in which broader social and
environmental issues, for example, could enhance the
outcomes of decisions reached.
Capacity-building obviously lies at the heart of this chal-
lenge.
Finally, WSIS suggests a number of challenges concern-
ing the modalities of civil society participation.
The diversity of civil society makes coherent participation
more difficult for it than it is for a relatively homogeneous
stakeholder group like the private sector. No interviewee
from civil society for this project thought it feasible for civil
society to operate in WSIS through an umbrella group like
the Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors
(CCBI). CONGO – the Conference of NGOs in Consultative
Relationship with the United Nations – sought to encour-
age CSO participation in WSIS, but has no policy coordi-
nating role. The civil society caucus structure provided the
nearest equivalent to CCBI’s coordination but its role was
more to reflect the diversity of civil society interests and
to broker support within the wider civil society commu-
nity for the articulation of particular points than it was to
develop a common set of ideas and principles. It was only
in smaller and relatively narrow specialist caucuses – on
child welfare or disability, for example - that civil society
could achieve comparable unity of purpose to that exhib-
ited by the private sector.
The more diverse civil society is, in short, the more diffi-
culty it is likely to have in establishing a common position
on issues of controversy within it, except where these are
concerned directly with the representation of civil society
itself. And where common positions are established, they
are less likely to be the result of considered and informed
debate: there is more risk than there is in more homoge-
neous groupings that agreed positions will be either low-
est common denominators or uncritical endorsements of
the (perhaps controversial) views of particular civil soci-
ety entities participating in a particular forum.
The second phase of WSIS also saw differences of view
emerge about the permanence of caucuses. Previously, cau-
cuses have been specific to the summit concerned. Conti-
nuity was required, however, for a two-phase summit, and
this gave the caucus structure more of an air of perma-
nence. At least one regional caucus sought to develop
structures such as an executive committee which are more
appropriate to permanent organisations than to time-lim-
ited groupings. Similarly, the Internet Governance caucus
continued to function after WSIS, as a preliminary to the
Internet Governance Forum.
S e c t i o n  C  .  R e com m e n dat i o n s
102 W h os e  S u m m i t ?  W h os e  I n fo r m at i o n  S oc i et y ?
The fact that WSIS was held in two phases inevitably in-
creased the continuity of those caucuses that were es-
tablished. They did not simply need to maintain continu-
ity through a series of preparatory committees, but also
over two plenary sessions: a four-year process which is
very long in terms of civil society activity. Interviewees
are agreed that this helped substantially to increase net-
working among civil society organisations and certainly
established some new bilateral relationships and work-
ing associations which may have considerable longevity.
However, there is disagreement about whether WSIS cau-
cuses themselves should be maintained post-WSIS. The
Internet Governance caucus is a case in point. This has,
in effect, continued working in relation to the WSIS suc-
cessor body, the Internet Governance Forum, and it seems
likely that some comparable caucus to that established
during WSIS will be necessary for civil society coordina-
tion in relation to the IGF. However, this need not be con-
tinuous with its predecessor. The potential constituency
for the IGF is different from that for WSIS – perhaps more
narrowly confined to Internet governance issues, poten-
tially more widely inclusive among Internet-oriented
agencies. If the existing caucus does continue into the
IGF, it is difficult to see that it will not become more for-
malised and permanent in character – perhaps a kind of
civil society bureau rather than a caucus in the sense that
it has been to date.
The sixth and final challenge for civil society therefore con-
cerns how it develops and maintains continuity of think-
ing and strategisation in international organisations, es-
pecially if it does gain greater space for participation. In-
terviewees have, for example, reported that it has proved
difficult for civil society organisations to maintain net-
works and relationships established during WSIS in the
post-WSIS period without the framework of WSIS meet-
ings in which to operate – with the exception of the
Internet governance arena. It may be that civil society
needs to look for more permanent ways of sharing exper-
tise and in particular sharing experience between partici-
pants in different ICT fora, in order to maximise the value
that can be obtained from such multistakeholder partici-
pation that evolves.
Recommendations on capacity-building
Capacity-building, as noted earlier, is crucial to multistake-
holder participation. If a multistakeholder forum is to func-
tion effectively, its participants need to have confidence
in the capacity of that forum to reach conclusions which
are built on informed understanding of the issues with
which it is concerned; that the quality of decision-making,
in other words, should be based on the knowledge that is
available within the forum rather than the ignorance of its
least-informed participant. Lack of expertise constrains the
participation of those who are poorly-informed, but it also
reduces the quality of decision-making, in particular the
likelihood that consensus can be reached on more inno-
vative approaches. The challenge here is to ensure that
multistakeholder fora are both inclusive and informed.
In fact, two capacity challenges are involved here – one
concerning information and knowledge per se; the other
concerning the multistakeholder participation processes
themselves. Participants in multistakeholder processes
need to understand what they are talking about; but they
also need to understand why other stakeholders have dif-
ferent perspectives and different priorities from them-
selves, and how to work with those other stakeholders in
order to identify viable destinations and viable ways of
reaching them.
The first of these challenges – basic information and
knowledge – was identified strongly in the “Louder
Voices” report. Developing country participants have
found themselves disadvantaged in many international
fora because they lack basic technical or policy under-
standing of the issues that are being discussed. They sim-
ply are not able to keep track of all of the issues involved,
or to engage in discussion about them with the depth of
expertise of key actors in industrial country or private
sector delegations. These difficulties are compounded by
insufficient presence in discussions (for example, partici-
pation in plenaries but not in side meetings at which the
real action takes place); by limited coordination with
other developing country delegations facing similar prob-
lems; and by poor knowledge management within the na-
tional decision-making environment (for example, differ-
ent personnel attending different meetings in the same
decision-making chain; lack of dialogue between govern-
ment departments). Civil society participants face many
of these same problems (though they may have better
networking than can be found between official delega-
tions from different countries), as do others seeking to
enter decision-making spaces from which they have pre-
viously been absent or excluded.
A number of initiatives are needed to address these de-
ficiencies, several of which are discussed in the “Louder
Voices” report. Critical among them is the need for new
participants to access reliable, up-to-date information
on issues under discussion in decision-making proc-
esses and on the progress that has been made within
those processes towards resolving them. Inter-govern-
mental organisations are often much better at explaining
themselves and their concerns to insiders than to outsid-
ers. Both formally and informally, they tend to push new-
comers to the margins rather than welcoming them into the
fold. Key actors often look to newcomers more as voting
fodder for their propositions than as potential contributors
to more diverse discourse. Overcoming these problems re-
quires a lot of effort on the part of “newbies”. It would be
very much easier for them, however, if they had available
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information sources on whose accuracy, timeliness and
impartiality they could rely. The “Louder Voices” report
saw this as a crucial element in any effort to extend par-
ticipation in technical and policy decision-making, and
APC has initiated discussion with other stakeholder
groups on such information sources within the context
of the Internet Governance Forum.
But knowing the issues is never sufficient on its own. It is
also important to understand the processes through which
decisions are made. The processes of international dis-
course are often arcane, and capacity-building is needed
for newcomers on these, too, as well as on the issues them-
selves. Just as important as the formal processes, how-
ever, can be the ethos of decision-making within particu-
lar institutions. New actors, particularly those who have
been excluded from processes in the past, often have a
negative perception of the processes in which they have
not previously participated. To function effectively within
these processes, even if continuing to reject them, it is
important for newcomers to understand their ethos, the
reasons why they are considered effective by existing par-
ticipants, and ways of maximising effectiveness within
them. Moving from exclusion to participation can demand
quite a substantial re-evaluation of process issues and
attitudes to process.
Finally, it should be recognised that the objective of secur-
ing multistakeholder engagement in decision-making is
to gain the opportunity not for a fight to the death between
competing perspectives but for joint participation in the
search for a way forward that is acceptable to all, or at
least has the consent of at least the large majority – a way
forward that can be shared between perspectives. Multi-
stakeholder decision-making fora are not natural environ-
ments for ideologues, but for pragmatists. This can be
uncomfortable for new participants with a strongly ideo-
logical bent. The opportunity to learn about and under-
stand others’ perspectives is, however, crucial to their en-
gagement in such fora. One of the WGIG’s strengths was
that it provided this opportunity. Much the same experi-
ence was repeated for many participants in the first meet-
ing of the Internet Governance Forum in October/Novem-
ber 2006, an event which many participants left saying that
they now understood more clearly why those who had dif-
ferent perspectives from themselves held those different
points of view.
WSIS follow-up
As noted in Chapter 3, the WSIS outcome documents make
relatively few formal “commitments”, although a substan-
tial summary of specific commitments could be drawn from
article 90 of the Tunis Agenda. This set of commitments
can be found in Annex 3. The Tunis Agenda also commits
summit signatories:
to review and follow up progress in bridging the dig-
ital divide, taking into account the different levels of
development among nations, so as to achieve the in-
ternationally agreed development goals and objec-
tives, including the Millennium Development Goals, as-
sessing the effectiveness of investment and interna-
tional cooperation efforts in building the Information
Society, identifying gaps as well as deficits in invest-
ment and devising strategies to address them.4
The Tunis Agenda initiated three main follow-up processes
for WSIS:
• A formal reporting mechanism was established, to be
coordinated by a UN Group on the Information Soci-
ety, reporting to the Chief Executives Board, and
ECOSOC, reporting to the General Assembly
• The UN Secretary-General was asked to facilitate the
establishment of an Internet Governance Forum, to
consider a range of Internet issues
• A series of action line initiatives led by different inter-
national agencies was agreed as the basis for imple-
menting the other WSIS outcomes.
Both the Internet Governance Forum and the action-line
follow-up process were described in the WSIS outcome
documents as “multistakeholder” initiatives, though nei-
ther was formulated beyond this in much detail. This final
section of the report looks at these two areas of WSIS fol-
low-up that were agreed in Tunis, and considers how they
fit into a wider post-WSIS scenario for both developing
countries and non-governmental actors.
 
The Internet Governance Forum
Internet governance was the most contested policy area
within WSIS. Given the intensity of disagreement about
what should happen after WSIS, it is hardly surprising that
the follow-up processes were themselves controversial.
They consisted, on the one hand, of a commitment to “en-
hanced cooperation” which would “enable governments,
on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsi-
bilities, in international public policy issues pertaining to
the Internet”5  and, on the other, to the creation of an
Internet Governance Forum which could discuss Internet
issues but without decision-making powers. This Forum
was given the mandate to:
a. Discuss public policy issues related to key elements
of Internet governance in order to foster the sustain-
ability, robustness, security, stability and development
of the Internet.
4 Tunis Agenda, article 119.
5 ibid., article 69.
S e c t i o n  C  .  R e com m e n dat i o n s
104 W h os e  S u m m i t ?  W h os e  I n fo r m at i o n  S oc i et y ?
b. Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with dif-
ferent cross-cutting international public policies re-
garding the Internet and discuss issues that do not
fall within the scope of any existing body.
c. Interface with appropriate intergovernmental organi-
zations and other institutions on matters under their
purview.
d. Facilitate the exchange of information and best prac-
tices, and in this regard make full use of the expertise
of the academic, scientific and technical communities.
e. Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways and means
to accelerate the availability and affordability of the
Internet in the developing world.
f. Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakehold-
ers in existing and/or future Internet governance mecha-
nisms, particularly those from developing countries.
g. Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention
of the relevant bodies and the general public, and,
where appropriate, make recommendations.
h. Contribute to capacity building for Internet governance
in developing countries, drawing fully on local sources
of knowledge and expertise.
i. Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodi-
ment of WSIS principles in Internet governance proc-
esses.
j. Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical Internet
resources.
k. Help to find solutions to the issues arising from the
use and misuse of the Internet, of particular concern
to everyday users.
l. Publish its proceedings.6
This mandate, which derives largely from civil society text,
left a good deal to be settled. It contained, potentially, a
great deal of work, though the IGF lacked the resources to
cover these in detail, and most participants in WSIS were
reluctant to see it acquiring too great a degree of author-
ity, at least before they knew what it would do.
The IGF, therefore, was not intended to be a governance
agency itself, but rather an agency that could consider is-
sues of governance. It “will”, the Tunis Agenda declared
“be multilateral, multi-stakeholder, democratic and trans-
parent. To that end,” it “could” (note the change of verb):
a) Build on the existing structures of Internet governance,
with special emphasis on the complementarity be-
tween all stakeholders involved in this process - gov-
ernments, business entities, civil society and intergov-
ernmental organizations.
b) Have a lightweight and decentralised structure that
would be subject to periodic review.
c) Meet periodically, as required, [perhaps in parallel with
other UN conferences].7
There was a lot here that was contested. Some wanted to
confine the IGF’s role narrowly to issues that are univer-
sally thought of as Internet governance. Some saw it as
an opportunity to continue the arguments about the fu-
ture of ICANN, and about the potential for other organisa-
tions – such as the ITU – to oversee the Internet as a whole
(even though this was outside the terms of the Tunis con-
sensus). Others wanted the IGF to exploit the breadth of
its mandate, to discuss wider issues which are not gener-
ally thought of as Internet governance per se but cut into
the mandates of other WSIS follow-up processes and those
of other inter-governmental bodies – issues such as infra-
structure, applications and content, privacy and security.
The initial format for the IGF was hammered out at a cou-
ple of preparatory meetings, led by the same top manage-
ment team (Nitin Desai and Markus Kummer) that coordi-
nated the WGIG, now reappointed to this role by the UN
Secretary-General. The IGF Advisory Group met in May
2006 and agreed an overall theme – “Internet Governance
for Development” – and four subsidiary themes – open-
ness, security, diversity and access – for the first meeting
of the Forum, scheduled for the end of October 2006. “Ca-
pacity-building,” they agreed, would be “a cross-cutting
priority.”8
In practice, the first meeting of the Internet Governance
Forum is generally considered a considerable success.
About 1500 people attended the three-day meeting in Ath-
ens in October/November 2006, from the whole range of
stakeholder communities, including very senior figures in
Internet affairs past and present. Perhaps uniquely in an
event held under UN auspices, no distinctions were drawn
between government officials and IGO personnel, private
sector and civil society participants. Everyone was treated
equally, and this equality was essentially an equality of
individuals at least as much as of stakeholder groups. Dis-
cussion centred not on formal propositions but on panels
of experts drawn from across the stakeholder spectrum,
facilitated by journalists who raised with them controver-
sial issues of concern to members of the audience. As a
result, as one very experienced IGO official put it to the
author, hardly anyone spoke in the kind of code that masks
controversy which is so common in other UN fora (not least
among them WSIS). Discussion was also very broad, rang-
ing across the whole range of Internet questions, certainly
not restricted to those falling readily within what is nor-
mally understood as “governance”.
In many ways, this reflected the ethos of the WGIG; not
surprisingly, perhaps, as the same top management team
that led the WGIG was responsible for leading the IGF.
6 ibid., article 72.
7 ibid., article 73.
8 www.intgovforum.org/meeting.htm.
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Multistakeholderism was central to how it worked, and in
some cases rather formally so. Panels were always made
up of multistakeholder groups, and multistakeholder or-
ganisation was also a prerequisite for sanctioning works-
hops on the forum fringe. This had considerable impact
on the overall atmosphere at the meeting, and the fact that
most participants felt that they left Athens knowing more
about issues that were often very controversial than they
had known when they arrived – and, in particular, know-
ing more about why others thought the way they did. The
IGF, in short, made it easier to explore others’ paradigms,
less easy to demand agreement with one’s own.
Of course, a fundamental factor in this was the fact that
the IGF had no decision-making powers. It is much easier
to explore ideas if you are not asked to vote for them at
the end of the week; much easier, too, to form collabora-
tions (or “dynamic coalitions”) across stakeholder divides,
though how successful those that were formed prove to
be in practice remains to be seen. The basic concept of a
non-decision-making forum will remain, and this gives the
IGF capacity to act as a global capacity-building forum on
the Internet (particularly in the sense of sharing perspec-
tives and ideas), though the format will need to develop
year-on-year if it is not to become stale. 
Action line implementation
Follow-up activity for the remainder of the WSIS agenda
was spelt out in paragraphs 99 to 122 of the Tunis Agenda.
These include a number of different tiers and types of
activity, described together as “a mechanism for imple-
mentation and follow-up at national, regional and inter-
national levels.” The overall framework for this was sum-
marised as follows:
a. At the national level, the Agenda encourages govern-
ments to incorporate national e-strategies within na-
tional development plans, and to include commen-
tary on ICD within relevant country assessment re-
ports.
b. At the regional level, the Agenda recognises the po-
tential for regional IGOs and UN regional commis-
sions to organise follow-up activities in conjunction
with governments, and the desirability of these in-
cluding all stakeholders.
c. At the international/global level, the Agenda requests
UN agencies and other IGOs to “facilitate activities
among different stakeholders, including civil society
and the business sector, to help national govern-
ments in their implementation efforts.”
It was agreed that WSIS follow-up “should not require
the creation of any new operational bodies.” This was
consistent with donor countries’ perception of the impor-
tance of mainstreaming ICT/ICD, and with their earlier
rejection of a UN-managed Digital Solidarity Fund. How-
ever, specific follow-up activities were agreed, including
the following:
1. The UN Secretary-General and Chief Executives Board
were asked to set up a UN Group on the Information
Society, made up of UN family entities, “to facilitate
the implementation of WSIS outcomes,” with leader-
ship of this Group to come from amongst the ITU, the
UNDP and UNESCO.
2. The Secretary-General was also asked to report
through ECOSOC to the General Assembly by June
2006 on “the modalities of the interagency coordina-
tion of the implementation of WSIS outcomes.”
3. ECOSOC was asked to review the mandate and com-
position of the UN Commission on Science and Tech-
nology in the light of WSIS’ outcomes, “taking into
account the multistakeholder approach.”
4. The ITU’s ICT Opportunity Index and Digital Opportu-
nity Index were endorsed alongside other sets of indi-
cators on ICT performance.
Finally, the Agenda said the following about broader multi-
stakeholder follow-up of particular activities:
The experience of, and the activities undertaken by,
UN agencies in the WSIS process - notably the ITU,
UNESCO and the UNDP - should continue to be used
to their fullest extent. These three agencies should play
leading facilitating roles in the implementation of the
Plan of Action and organize a meeting of moderators/
facilitators of action lines [i.e. the action lines included
in the Geneva Plan of Action]….
  The coordination of multi-stakeholder implementation
activities would help to avoid duplication of activities.
This should include, inter alia, information exchange,
creation of knowledge, sharing of best practices, and
assistance in developing multi-stakeholder and pub-
lic/private partnerships.9
Responsibility for action lines was allocated between agen-
cies as set out in the box below.
The initial allocation of responsibility for action line leader-
ship appears to have originated in discussions during 2004.
It is not clear if, at that time, this was expected to form the
framework for a follow-up process in due course. It certainly
reflected inter-agency rivalries within the UN system, and
these surfaced again during the final negotiations and in
the aftermath of WSIS as, firstly, approximate equality was
required between the three main UN agencies concerned
(the ITU, the UNDP and UNESCO) and, secondly, non-ICT-
specialist agencies (such as the WHO and the FAO) as-
serted their primacy over the ITU in follow-up processes
concerned with their specialist areas. The ITU downgraded
9 Tunis Agenda, articles 109-110.
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its role, particularly in respect of action lines C7, following
an inter-agency meeting in February 2006, with the result set
out in column three of the table in the box above.
This somewhat amorphous collection of activities has
been slower than the Internet Governance Forum to get
underway. A meeting of UN agencies in Geneva in Febru-
ary 2006 refined the list of lead agencies for these action
lines (see above) and suggested procedures, principally
for information exchange between lead agencies. This
was followed (not, it may be noted, preceded) by a multi-


























Action Line Initial proposed moderators/facilitators
Moderators/facilitators agreed in February 2006
C1. The role of public governance authorities ECOSOC/UN Regional UNDESA
and all stakeholders in the promotion Commissions/ITU
of ICTs for development
C2. Information and communication ITU ITU
infrastructure
C3. Access to information and knowledge ITU/UNESCO UNESCO
C4. Capacity building UNDP/UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD UNDP
C5. Building confidence and security ITU ITU
in the use of ICTs
C6. Enabling environment ITU/UNDP/UN REGIONAL UNDP
COMMISSIONS/UNCTAD
C7. ICT Applications
C8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic UNESCO UNESCO
diversity and local content
C9. Media UNESCO UNESCO
C10. Ethical dimensions of the Information UNESCO/ECOSOC/WHO UNESCO
Society
C11. International and regional cooperation UN regional commissions/ UNDESA
UNDP/ITU/UNESCO/ECOSOC
RESPONSIBILITY FOR WSIS ACTION LINES
attended by around 50 participants - mostly from the lead
UN agencies with some participants from Geneva mis-
sions, civil society and the private sector. Substantial
concerns were expressed at this meeting by both civil
society and private sector participants concerning the
difficulty which they would face in participating effec-
tively in such a disparate process, and recommending re-
structuring of the action lines into clusters. Civil society
and private sector participants were also concerned
about the mechanistic character of the procedures agreed
between UN agencies; the weakness of modalities for
multistakeholder participation; and the apparent focus
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society should have mandated a follow-up process that
is structured so incohesively. Many of the issues for
discussion within action lines are cross-cutting, and
require interaction between them. Civil society sug-
gestions for clustering have been welcomed by some,
but not all, senior figures in action line leadership, and
clustering will be challenging to achieve, especially
where action lines have different UN lead agencies.
3) The large number of action lines makes it very difficult
for many stakeholders to participate effectively. No
civil society organisation has the resources to partici-
pate effectively in more than a few such action lines.
Few, if any, developing country governments will do
so - though some may participate in meetings held in
Geneva through their Geneva missions, these missions
will not provide the continuity of specialist input re-
quired for any proactive work. The private sector, too,
is likely to be largely absent. Narrowly defined action
lines, in other words, are unlikely to attract substantial
multistakeholder involvement, especially if they seem
to add less value than other activities which are cur-
rently underway. Participation at the initial meetings in
Geneva during 2006 was numerically sparse, with suf-
ficiently little representation from developing countries,
civil society and the private sector for meeting chairs
to express concern about the capacity of meetings to
make decisions on future action line activity.
4) The value added by action lines will be limited if they
are confined to activities such as “information ex-
change” and “sharing of best practices”, as suggested
in the Tunis Agenda and by some UN agencies and
governments in action line meetings. There are three
principal reasons for this:
• Like all summits, WSIS’ outcome documents fo-
cus on issues where there was agreement. While
there is value in monitoring the implementation
of agreed approaches, there is more value, for po-
tential participants, in addressing challenges and
areas of disagreement which did not form part of
WSIS’ overall consensus. These are not suscepti-
ble to a “stocktaking” approach.
• WSIS is over. In a fast-moving area such as ICT/
ICD, potential participants in the action lines need
and want to look forward to 2008 rather than back
to 2003 (when the text within individual action
lines was agreed). Focusing on the WSIS outcomes
will look increasingly unattractive if it means di-
verting resources from more important and more
immediate new issues.
• To be worthwhile, stocktaking must be based on criti-
cal evaluation. Listing activities has relatively little
value, particularly where it consists of inviting gov-
ernments (and other stakeholders) to contribute
of lead agencies on “stocktaking” rather than proactive
approaches to implementation.
The first “facilitation meeting” of any action line (C2 – “In-
frastructure”) was held in Doha during the ITU’s World Tel-
ecommunication Development Conference (WTDC). This
was attended by about 40 people, including some national
delegations, but had almost no representation from civil
society or development agencies, and none from other UN
family IGOs, which were not present in Doha.10  Most other
action line processes held their first meetings in Geneva
during the fortnight surrounding the first “World Informa-
tion Society Day” (an extended World Telecommunication
Day, 17 May 2006). These were also sparsely attended.
The last few action lines did not meet until October 2006.
 Participants in these May meetings felt they were a mixed
bag. Some saw quite spirited discussion between a vari-
ety of stakeholders and generated some interesting ideas
about future activity. Others struggled to keep the conver-
sation going. None looked like the beating heart of a dy-
namic process that would prove a substantial legacy for
WSIS. Follow up for most has been minimal, though
UNESCO has established online facilities for those action
lines where it holds the lead. Future meetings were not
scheduled on the WSIS website (still maintained by the
ITU), at the end of January 2007, though it is expected
these will be held in May 2007.11
Many participants felt that the May 2006 meetings illus-
trated a number of weaknesses in the action line struc-
ture, which are likely to determine whether or not these
will form an effective follow-up process. Key points made
in this context include the following:
1) The purpose of the action line process is unclear. For-
mally, it is billed as being to do with “implementation”.
However, the action lines themselves cannot imple-
ment anything - they have neither the mandate to do
so from participating agencies nor the resources re-
quired. In practice, implementation is a matter for IGOs,
governments and other actors who may participate in
action line meetings; while the action lines themselves
are, at best, mechanisms for information exchange,
monitoring and interchange of ideas. There is little en-
thusiasm for such activity among some important ac-
tors, notably bilateral development agencies.
2) The number of action lines - nine or sixteen depending
on how they are counted - and their diverse leadership
arrangements make it difficult for them to address the
issues concerned cohesively. It is ironic that a summit
which emphasised the holistic nature of the information
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their “success stories”. Information exchange is
unlikely to be comprehensive and can too easily
become mutual self-congratulation, adding noth-
ing to real understanding of the complex questions
that need to be addressed.
In addition, it is difficult to see how action line meet-
ings can match other established meetings and online
spaces as fora for “information exchange” and “shar-
ing of best practice”.
5) The present structure for the action lines does not ad-
dress the paradigm gap between ICT and mainstream
development issues. The action line meetings in May
2006 were dominated by ICT/ICD professionals. While
mainstream sector professionals may participate in
sectoral applications sub-line activities (which were
slowest to get underway), their presence is needed
throughout the follow-up process if that is to address
information society issues from a development rather
than an ICT sectoral perspective. The ITU’s original role
as sole lead in the C2 (Infrastructure) action line is a
case in point: as the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms
demonstrated, infrastructure is a matter of finance and
of socio-economic development (from demand to ap-
plication) as much as of technology.
6) The action lines have no resources. No funding is avail-
able from the UN to make them work, and WSIS im-
plementation is not likely to be seen as sufficient of a
priority in itself for any other agencies to fund it, even
for an individual action line.
With hindsight, in short, it would seem that too much at-
tention was paid during the WSIS PrepCom discussions
about follow-up to resolving potential conflict between
agencies, and too little was paid to the effectiveness of
the structure agreed - especially to its cohesion and
inclusiveness. By the time of the first group of action line
facilitation meetings in May 2006, it was clear that con-
siderable change had already occurred in a number of ar-
eas - for example, in IGO approaches to infrastructure fi-
nance - and that implementing WSIS was already begin-
ning to look to many participants like last year’s rather than
next year’s agenda. “Real” WSIS follow-up, in other words,
was already taking place - internationally in contexts such
as the World Bank and European Union African infrastruc-
ture initiatives, and in national programmes such as the
“e-Lanka” initiative in Sri Lanka.
In addition, an international multistakeholder community
was already in process of establishing the Global Alliance
on ICT and Development, as a successor to the UN ICT
Task Force, with a mandate to facilitate and promote the
integration of information and communication technology
into development activities through a “multi-stakeholder
cross-sectoral platform and forum that will bring together
all stakeholders representing relevant constituencies.”12
While opinions are divided about how useful or effective
the Global Alliance will be, it looks more like a post-WSIS
multistakeholder forum, addressing ICT/ICD issues
holistically and on the basis of an evolving agenda, than
the follow-up process designated by the WSIS outcome
documents. Certainly, it looks more comparable with the
Internet Governance Forum than do the action lines. If it
secures the participation at a senior level of many who
may otherwise have been prepared to put time into indi-
vidual (or, more likely, clustered) action lines, then there
has to be a likelihood that it - rather than the mechanisms
established by the Tunis Agenda - will play the substan-
tive WSIS follow-up role (if that role is taken up at all). On
the other hand, civil society has significant reservations
about the extent to which the Global Alliance will prove to
be inclusive.
Potential actors in the action line follow-up process there-
fore have serious questions to ask about participation - in
particular: “is this likely to prove effective?” and “is this
likely to distract us from other, potentially more produc-
tive activities?” This applies across the stakeholder spec-
trum - to governments (including both developing country
and donor governments), IGOs, the private sector and civil
society organisations. At the very least, civil society and
other actors should carefully monitor the Global Alliance
and ensure that they generate effective input into it pro-
portionate to its apparent likely effectiveness, as that
emerges during the coming year.
At the same time, however, some actors have felt obliged
to make an effort to see what will emerge from the action
line process and may continue to do so in the short term.
This was, after all, set up as a multistakeholder initiative,
and it would be difficult for civil society simply to opt out
of it. The action lines, it is clear, are unlikely to be able to
undertake any comprehensive monitoring of WSIS out-
comes. However, they did potentially provide a space for
multistakeholder discussion of issues, and it initially
seemed possible that they could generate worthwhile dia-
logue if they focused more narrowly, and more proactively,
on target issues. This at least seemed worth exploring dur-
ing the May 2006 meetings, perhaps through small multi-
stakeholder partnerships – a civil society grouping, a pri-
vate sector partner and an IGO, for example, jointly explor-
ing an area of ICT policy which has real importance for the
future. As things stand, most action lines are unlikely to
meet again in formal session until May 2007. In these cir-
cumstances, it should not be difficult to determine whether
any action lines have the capacity in practice to generate
worthwhile activity. If none has generated substantive work
during the intervening year, then it is unlikely that these




Attitudes to WSIS follow-up vary considerably according
to the perceptions which actors have of WSIS as a whole.
Supporters of the summit see its follow-up process as a
potential springboard for future activity. Those who regard
WSIS as a distraction - including many in the donor com-
munity - are unprepared to commit further time and re-
sources to it. Their lack of commitment to follow-up is re-
inforced by the amorphous character and disparate organi-
sation of the action lines. From the perspective of January
2007, certainly, the follow-up process looks weak, except
where the Internet Governance Forum is concerned.
In the light of earlier chapters of this report, this is per-
haps unsurprising. WSIS did not have a major impact in
terms of new thinking on either rights or development. It
may have begun new processes on Internet governance
and infrastructure finance, but these are being pursued
elsewhere. New ICT issues are constantly emerging.  In
this context, the most important thing about WSIS is prob-
ably that it is in the past. Future action – whether by de-
veloping countries, civil society or any other actor – needs
to be forward-looking. Time will tell whether WSIS is seen
as a reference point (like the Maitland Commission), a turn-
ing point or largely an irrelevance; but whichever of these
hindsight eventually prefers, the conclusion of this report
is that it is not the best starting point for new action on
ICTs or ICD today. 
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Afghanistan 6 100 0 1 100 0 4 100 0
Albania 3 67 33 1 100 0 3 100 0
Algeria 8 100 0 3 100 0 71 86 14
Andorra 10 80 20 4 75 25 3 67 33
Angola 13 100 0 3 100 0 68 87 13
Antigua and Barbuda                  
Argentina 27 70 30 4 50 50 52 77 23
Armenia 24 88 12 5 100 0 32 81 19
Australia 14 64 36 6 67 33 16 81 19
Austria 39 62 38 12 75 25 46 74 26
Azerbaijan 36 92 8 11 100 0 64 94 6
Bahamas                  
Bahrain 6 100 0 4 100 0 15 93 7
Bangladesh 54 93 7 7 100 0 10 100 0
Barbados 10 50 50 5 60 40 5 60 40
Belarus 27 89 11 4 100 0 2 100 0
Belgium 20 65 35 6 67 33 20 95 5
Belize 3 67 33            
Benin 16 81 19 3 100 0 13 85 15
Bhutan 5 60 40       4 75 25
Bolivia 30 57 43 1 0 100 5 100 0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 90 10 2 100 0 22 82 18
Botswana 30 57 43 8 100 0 16 88 12
Brazil 47 89 11 25 92 8 37 76 24
Brunei Darussalam 14 93 7 2 50 50 6 100 0
Bulgaria 23 78 22 3 67 33 18 83 17
Burkina Faso 9 89 11 6 100 0 11 100 0
Burundi 6 83 17 4 100 0 6 100 0
Cambodia 7 100 0 4 100 0 5 100 0
Cameroon 10 100 0 11 100 0 20 90 10
Canada 95 69 31 16 69 31 61 59 41
Cape Verde 10 100 0       3 67 33
Central African Republic 2 100 0       13 92 8
Chad 5 100 0 9 100 0 11 82 18
Chile 11 82 18 5 80 20 12 75 25
China 21 62 38 7 57 43 59 75 25
ANNEX 1:
Participation in WSIS summits
Country Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit
Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem.
% %   % %   % %
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Colombia 10 40 60 1 100 0 5 60 40
Comoros 13 77 23 4 50 50 15 93 7
Congo 23 96 4 5 100 0 37 89 11
Costa Rica 7 86 14 1 0 100 3 100 0
Côte d’Ivoire 19 95 5 5 100 0 27 89 11
Croatia 20 65 35 4 25 75 28 71 29
Cuba 86 72 28 6 100 0 32 75 25
Cyprus 5 60 40       1 100 0
Czech Republic 20 85 15 6 83 17 42 69 31
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 7 100 0       3 100 0
Democratic Republic of Congo 6 83 17 9 78 22 13 85 15
Denmark 16 50 50 9 44 56 17 59 41
Djibouti 6 100 0 1 100 0 15 100 0
Dominica                  
Dominican Republic 10 40 60 5 20 80 51 55 45
Ecuador 9 67 33 7 86 14 10 70 30
Egypt 44 80 20 9 67 33 78 62 38
El Salvador 13 62 38 3 67 33 8 75 25
Equatorial Guinea 2 100 0       15 100 0
Eritrea 1 100 0 1 100 0 4 100 0
Estonia 13 85 15 4 50 50 6 83 17
Ethiopia 4 75 25 3 33 67 9 89 11
Fiji 2 50 50            
Finland 51 51 49 8 88 12 46 50 50
France 112 71 29 17 71 29 146 75 25
Gabon 67 76 24 6 100 0 29 90 10
Gambia 13 92 8 2 100 0 6 83 17
Georgia 11 91 9       4 75 25
Germany 59 71 29 12 67 33 69 64 36
Ghana 36 78 22 12 83 17 38 68 32
Greece 34 71 29 2 100 0 18 72 28
Grenada                  
Guatemala 9 67 33 5 80 20 8 88 12
Guinea 3 67 33 13 92 8 34 91 9
Guinea-Bissau                  
Guyana                  
Haiti 4 100 0 4 100 0 10 90 10
Honduras 6 50 50 3 100 0 2 50 50
Hungary 9 78 22 4 100 0 15 80 20
Iceland 16 56 44 2 50 50 9 67 33
India 16 94 6 6 100 0 63 92 8
Indonesia 31 90 10 9 89 11 34 94 6
Country Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit
Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem.
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Iran 62 95 5 10 70 30 100 94 6
Iraq 7 100 0 6 67 33 6 67 33
Ireland 60 72 28 6 83 17 18 61 39
Israel 29 66 34 5 100 0 68 72 28
Italy 47 68 32 9 100 0 146 68 32
Jamaica 7 43 57 2 0 100 8 63 37
Japan 53 79 21 8 100 0 37 84 16
Jordan 16 69 31 4 50 50 19 42 58
Kazakhstan 5 100 0       3 100 0
Kenya 35 83 17 8 89 11 44 52 48
Kiribati                  
Kuwait 16 94 6 3 100 0 44 70 30
Kyrgyzstan 26 85 15 1 100 0 1 100 0
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2 100 0       2 100 0
Latvia 18 56 44 5 60 40 18 61 39
Lebanon 14 86 14 3 100 0 63 81 19
Lesotho 19 74 26 5 40 60 19 74 26
Liberia                  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 9 89 11 8 100 0 12 92 8
Liechtenstein 4 100 0       3 67 33
Lithuania 16 69 31 6 50 50 12 75 25
Luxembourg 9 78 22 6 50 50 13 69 31
Madagascar 15 73 27       13 85 15
Malawi 6 83 27 4 100 0 9 89 11
Malaysia 125 61 39 11 73 27 38 66 44
Maldives 2 100 0 1 0 100 4 75 25
Mali 42 86 14 11 91 9 35 77 23
Malta 9 89 11 4 100 0 8 88 12
Marshall Islands             3 67 33
Mauritania 20 90 10 3 67 33 64 84 16
Mauritius 11 100 0 5 80 20 5 100 0
Mexico 20 85 15 4 100 0 15 93 7
Micronesia, (Federated States of ) 2 100 0 1 100 0 4 100 0
Monaco 7 71 29 2 100 0 3 100 0
Mongolia 11 82 18 2 100 0      
Montenegro - see Republic of Montenegro                  
Morocco 22 86 14 8 75 25 108 94 6
Mozambique 34 65 35 2 100 0 40 75 25
Myanmar 6 83 17 3 67 33 3 100 0
Namibia 10 70 30 4 50 50 12 58 42
Nauru                  
Nepal 9 100 0 3 100 0 39 82 18
Country Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit
Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem.
% %   % %   % %
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Netherlands 22 64 36 5 80 20 23 74 26
New Zealand 6 83 17 2 50 50 6 83 17
Nicaragua 17 59 41 6 83 17 8 100 0
Niger 7 86 14 2 50 50 30 77 23
Nigeria 64 81 19 6 83 17 50 82 18
Niue 2 100 0            
Norway 33 64 36 7 71 29 18 61 39
Oman 15 73 27 9 67 33 51 82 18
Pakistan 47 96 4 4 75 25 12 92 8
Palau 1 100 0            
Panama 7 57 43 1 100 0 2 100 0
Papua New Guinea 1 100 0       1 0 100
Paraguay 5 60 40 3 33 67 2 100 0
Peru 14 86 14 5 40 60 3 67 33
Philippines 16 69 31 3 67 33 10 100 0
Poland 14 86 14 7 71 29 12 75 25
Portugal 21 86 14 7 71 29 31 71 29
Qatar 21 95 5 5 60 40 69 93 7
Republic of Korea 38 84 16 9 100 0 42 88 12
Republic of Moldova 6 83 17 4 100 0 9 78 22
Republic of Montenegro                  
Republic of Serbia                  
Romania 102 78 22 12 75 25 67 64 36
Russian Federation 69 96 4 12 67 33 69 83 17
Rwanda 26 85 15 4 75 25 52 77 23
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 100 0            
Saint Lucia 1 100 0            
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines                  
Samoa 21 52 48 2 50 50 7 71 29
San Marino 1 0 100            
São Tomé and Príncipe             1 100 0
Saudi Arabia 27 100 0 10 100 0 19 100 0
Senegal 39 90 10 19 95 5 60 77 23
Serbia and Montenegro 21 67 33 9 56 44 15 67 33
Seychelles 1 100 0            
Sierra Leone 4 100 0       3 100 0
Singapore 10 70 30 4 50 50 7 71 29
Slovakia 19 79 21 10 80 20 17 88 12
Slovenia 11 73 27 4 75 25 4 100 0
Solomon Islands                  
Somalia                  
South Africa 79 67 33 16 25 75 95 74 26
Country Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit
Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem.
% %   % %   % %
117
Spain 33 61 39 7 43 57 61 59 41
Sri Lanka 11 100 0 3 67 33 3 67 33
Sudan 25 80 20 4 75 25 78 90 10
Suriname 2 100 0            
Swaziland 10 70 30       21 90 10
Sweden 36 50 50 6 67 33 42 52 48
Switzerland 49 76 24 20 75 25 52 67 33
Syrian Arab Republic 9 89 11 7 29 71 15 73 27
Tajikistan             43 100 0
Thailand 72 67 33 9 44 56 25 56 44
The FYR of Macedonia 20 80 20       6 83 17
Timor-Leste 1 100 0       2 100 0
Togo 7 100 0 1 100 0 43 98 2
Tonga 3 100 0       5 60 40
Trinidad and Tobago 6 83 17 3 100 0 5 40 60
Tunisia 29 86 14 21 100 0 54 83 17
Turkey 16 100 0 5 80 20 39 95 5
Turkmenistan                  
Tuvalu                  
Uganda 13 100 0 2 100 0 18 78 22
Ukraine 35 80 20 2 100 0 54 81 19
United Arab Emirates 14 100 0 12 92 8 31 97 3
United Kingdom 30 94 6 12 67 33 33 76 24
United Republic of Tanzania 32 84 16 6 100 0 50 78 22
United States of America 66 59 41 20 45 55 130 69 31
Uruguay 9 78 22 2 100 0 7 86 14
Uzbekistan 5 100 0 3 67 33 4 100 0
Vanuatu                  
Vatican 4 100 0 3 100 0 5 100 0
Venezuela 14 64 36 4 50 50 11 45 55
Vietnam 10 100 0 7 100 0 11 100 0
Yemen 11 100 0 4 100 0 22 95 5
Zambia 13 62 38 13 85 15 20 85 15
Zimbabwe 31 84 16 5 80 20 43 88 12
TOTAL 3676 901 4450
AVERAGE 81 19 77 23 81 19
Country Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit
Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem.
% %   % %   % %
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ANNEX 2:
Participation in the TFFM and the WGIG
TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL MECHANISMS
MEMBERSHIP LIST
Task Force Chair:
Mark Malloch Brown, UNDP Administrator (Alternate: Shoji
Nishimoto, Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau
for Development Policy)
Members
Ali Abbasov, Minister of Communication and Information
Technologies of Azerbaijan
Sérgio Amadeu da Silveira, Director-President, Instituto
Nacional de Tecnologia da Informação, (ITI), Brazil (Alter-
nate: Mauricio Augusto Coelho, Chief of Cabinet, ITI)
Owen Barder, Representative, European Union on behalf
of the Netherlands EU-Presidency
Michel Chertok, Representative, Global Knowledge Part-
nership
Jim Crowe, Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs/United Nations
and Commonwealth Division, Canada
Ahmed Darwish, Minister of State for Administrative De-
velopment, Egypt
Mamadou Diop Decroix, Minister of Communications of
Senegal (Alternate: Mr. Amadou Top, Deputy Manager, Dig-
ital Solidarity Fund)
Alar Ehandi, Chief Executive Officer, Look@World Founda-
tion, Estonia
Anriette Esterhuysen, Executive Director, Association for Pro-
gressive Communications (Alternate: Willie Currie, Commu-
nications and Information Policy Programme Manager)
Nissim Ezekiel, former Executive Director, Commission on
Private Sector and Development
Jonathan Fiske, Senior Manager, Group Public Policy,
Vodafone Group Services Ltd
Ayesha Hassan, Senior Policy Manager, International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (Alternate: Bill Stribravy,ICC
Permanent Representative c/o US Council for International
Business)
Mohsen Khalil, Director, Global Information and Commu-
nication Technologies, the World Bank (Alternate: Pierre
Guislain Manager, Policy Division (CITPO), Global Informa-
tion & Communication Technologies Department, the
World Bank Group)
Sarbuland Khan, Director, Office of ECOSOC Support and
Coordination, United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs
Ayisi Makatiani, Chairman, Gallium Venture Capital and
CEO, African Management Services Company
Zouhair Masmoudi, Director-General, Ministry of Communi-
cation Technologies and Transport (Alternate: HE Ali Hachani,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent
Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations, Tunisia)
Rajendra Pawar, CEO, NIIT, India
Gisa Fuatai Purcell, Secretary/ICT Advisor, Samoa National
ICT Committee, Ministry of Communications and Informa-
tion Technology, Samoa
Daniel Stauffacher, Representative, Switzerland, Swiss
Executive Secretariat for WSIS
Ichiro Tambo, Development Co-operation Directorate, Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)
Hamadoun Toure, Director, Telecommunication Develop-
ment Bureau, ITU (Alternate: Pape-Gorgui Toure, Chief,
Policies, Strategies, and Financing Department, ITU)
Pedro Urra González, Director, Infomed, Cuba; * unable to
participate in the TF meetings
Yoichiro Yamada, Director, Specialized Agencies Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
Mohamed Yunus, Managing Director, Grameen Bank,
Bangladesh *unable to participate in TF meetings
Observers
José Antonio Ocampo, Under-Secretary-General for Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs
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Charles Geiger, Assistant Executive Director, WSIS Secre-
tariat, WSIS
Janis Karklins, President of the WSIS Preparatory Commit-
tee for the Tunis Phase
Rik Panganiban, Communications Coordinator, Conference
of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the United Na-
tions (CONGO) (29 November TF meeting)
Pietro Sicuro, Directeur, INTIF, Gestionnaire du Fonds
francophone des inforoutes, Organisation internationale
de la Francophonie (4 October TF meeting)
WORKING GROUP ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE
MEMBERSHIP LIST
Chair
Nitin Desai, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for
the World Summit on the Information Society, Delhi/
Mumbai
Members
Abdullah Al-Darrab, Deputy Governor of Technical Affairs,
Communications and Information Technology Commission
of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh
Carlos A. Afonso, Director of Planning, Information Net-
work for the Third Sector; Member, Brazil’s Internet Steer-
ing Committee; Member, Non-Commercial Users Constitu-
ency (Rio de Janeiro) 
Peng Hwa Ang, Dean, School of Communication and Infor-
mation, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Karen Banks, Networking and Advocacy Coordinator, As-
sociation for Progressive Communications; Director,
GreenNet, London
Faryel Beji, President and CEO, Tunisian Internet Agency,
Tunis
Vittorio Bertola, Chairman, ICANN At-large Advisory Com-
mittee; President and CTO, Dynamic Fun, Turin
José Alexandre Bicalho, Member, Brazilian Internet Steer-
ing Committee; Advisor to the Board of Directors of the
National Telecommunications Agency (Brasília)
Kangsik Cheon, Chief Operating Officer, International Busi-
ness Development, Netpia, Seoul 
Trevor Clarke, Permanent Representative of Barbados to
the United Nations Office in Geneva 
Avri Doria, Research Consultant, Providence, Rhode Island
William Drake, President, Computer Professionals for So-
cial Responsibility; Senior Associate, International Centre
for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva
Raúl Echeberría, Executive Director/CEO, Latin America
and Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry, Montevideo 
Dev Erriah, Chairman, ICT Authority of Mauritius, Port Louis
Baher Esmat, Telecom Planning Manager, Ministry of Com-
munications and Information Technology of Egypt, Cairo
Mark Esseboom, Director of Strategy and International
Affairs, Directorate General for Telecom and Post, Minis-
try of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague
Juan Fernandez, Coordinator of the Commission of Elec-
tronic Commerce of Cuba, Havana
Ayesha Hassan,  Senior Policy Manager for E-Business, IT
and Telecommunications, International Chamber of Com-
merce, Paris
David Hendon, Director of Business Relations, UK Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, London
Qiheng Hu, Adviser to the Science and Technology Com-
mission of the Ministry of Information Industry of China;
Former Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences, Beijing
Willy Jensen, Director General, Norwegian Post and
Telecom Authority, Oslo
Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Professor, International Commu-
nication Policy and Regulation, University of Aarhus
Jovan Kurbalija, Director, DiploFoundation, Geneva/La
Valetta
Iosif Charles Legrand, Senior Scientist, California Institute
of Technology, Pasadena, California  
Donald MacLean, Director, MacLean Consulting, Ottawa
Allen Miller, Executive Director, World Information Tech-
nology and Services Alliance, Arlington, Virginia
Jacqueline A. Morris, Consultant, Port of Spain
Olivier Nana Nzépa, Coordinator, Africa Civil Society,
Yaoundé
Alejandro Pisanty, Director of Computing Academic Serv-
ices, Universidad Autónoma de México; Vice-Chairman
of the Board of ICANN, Mexico City
Khalilullah Qazi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Paki-
stan to the United Nations Office in Geneva
Rajashekar Ramaraj, Managing Director, Sify Limited,
Chennai (formerly Madras)
Masaaki Sakamaki, Director, Computer Communications
Division, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications,
Tokyo
Joseph Sarr, President, NTIC Commission, Dakar Regional
Council, Dakar
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Peiman Seadat, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office in Ge-
neva
Charles Sha’ban, Executive Director, Talal Abu-Ghazaleh
Intellectual Property, Amman
Lyndall Shope-Mafole, Chairperson, Presidential National
Commission on Information Society and Development of
South Africa, Pretoria
Waudo Siganga, Chairman, Computer Society of Kenya,
Nairobi 
Juan Carlos Solines Moreno, Executive Director, Gobierno
Digital, Quito
Mikhail Vladimirovich Yakushev, Director of Legal Support
Department, Ministry of Information Technology & Com-
munications, Russian Federation, Moscow 
Peter Zangl, Deputy Director-General, Information Society
and Media Directorate General, European Commission,
Brussels
Jean-Paul Zens, First Counsellor, Director of the Media and




WSIS outcome document “commitments”
Geneva Declaration of Principles
A number of articles reaffirm commitments to MDGs, Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights etc.
10.
We are fully committed to turning this digital divide into a
digital opportunity for all, particularly for those who risk
being left behind and being further marginalized.
11.
We are committed to realizing our common vision of the
Information Society for ourselves and for future
generations. … We are also committed to ensuring that
the development of ICT applications and operation of
services respects the rights of children as well as their
protection and well-being.
12.
We are committed to ensuring that the Information Soci-
ety enables women’s empowerment and their full partici-
pation on the basis on [sic] equality in all spheres of soci-
ety and in all decision-making processes.
65.
We commit ourselves to strengthening cooperation to seek
common responses to the challenges and to the imple-
mentation of the Plan of Action, which will realize the vi-
sion of an inclusive Information Society based on the Key
Principles incorporated in this Declaration.
66.
We further commit ourselves to evaluate and follow-up
progress in bridging the digital divide, taking into account
different levels of development, so as to reach internation-
ally agreed development goals, including those contained
in the Millennium Declaration, and to assess the effective-
ness of investment and international cooperation efforts
in building the Information Society.
Geneva Plan of Action
27.D2
refers to “above commitments” but preceding text con-
tains no use of the word “commit”.
Tunis Commitment
Article 7 reaffirms Geneva commitments.
Article 23 reaffirms commitment to gender equity; article
25 to inclusion of young people.
16.
We further commit ourselves to evaluate and follow up
progress in bridging the digital divide, taking into account
different levels of development, so as to reach internation-
ally agreed development goals and objectives, including
the Millennium Development Goals, and to assess the ef-
fectiveness of investment and international cooperation
efforts in building the Information Society.
24.
We will strengthen action to protect children from abuse
and defend their rights in the context of ICTs.
30.
Recognizing that disaster mitigation can significantly sup-
port efforts to bring about sustainable development and
help in poverty reduction, we reaffirm our commitment to
leveraging ICT capabilities and potential through foster-
ing and strengthening cooperation at the national, re-
gional, and international levels.
31.
We commit ourselves to work together towards the im-
plementation of the Digital Solidarity Agenda, as agreed
in paragraph 27 of the Geneva Plan of Action.
32.
We further commit ourselves to promote the inclusion of all
peoples in the Information Society through the development
and use of local and/or indigenous languages in ICTs.
Tunis Agenda
42.
We reaffirm our commitment to the freedom to seek,
receive, impart and use information, in particular, for the
creation, accumulation and dissemination of knowledge.
43.
We reiterate our commitments to the positive uses of the
Internet and other ICTs and to take appropriate actions and
preventive measures, as determined by law, against abu-
sive uses of ICTs as mentioned under the Ethical Dimen-
sions of the Information Society of the Geneva Declara-
tion of Principles and Plan of Action.
49.
We reaffirm our commitment to turning the digital divide
into digital opportunity, and we commit to ensuring har-
monious and equitable development for all. We commit
to foster and provide guidance on development areas in
the broader Internet governance arrangements, and to
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include, amongst other issues, international interconnec-
tion costs, capacity building and technology/know-how
transfer.
53.
We commit to working earnestly towards multilingualization
of the Internet, as part of a multilateral, transparent and
democratic process, involving governments and all stake-
holders, in their respective roles.
83.
Building an inclusive development-oriented Information
Society will require unremitting multistakeholder effort.
We thus commit ourselves to remain fully engaged—na-
tionally, regionally and internationally—to ensure sustain-
able implementation and follow-up of the outcomes and
commitments reached during the WSIS process and its
Geneva and Tunis phases of the Summit.
90.
We are committed to working towards achieving the in-
dicative targets, set out in the Geneva Plan of Action, that
serve as global references for improving connectivity and
universal, ubiquitous, equitable, non-discriminatory and
affordable access to, and use of, ICTs, considering differ-
ent national circumstances, to be achieved by 2015, and
to using ICTs, as a tool to achieve the internationally agreed
development goals and objectives, including the Millen-
nium Development Goals, by:
a. mainstreaming and aligning national e-strategies, across
local, national, and regional action plans, as appropriate
and in accordance with local and national development
priorities, with in-built time-bound measures.
b. developing and implementing enabling policies that
reflect national realities and that promote a support-
ive international environment, foreign direct invest-
ment as well as the mobilization of domestic resources,
in order to promote and foster entrepreneurship, par-
ticularly Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises
(SMMEs), taking into account the relevant market and
cultural contexts. These policies should be reflected
in a transparent, equitable regulatory framework to
create a competitive environment to support these
goals and strengthen economic growth.
c. building ICT capacity for all and confidence in the use
of ICTs by all - including youth, older persons, women,
indigenous peoples, people with disabilities, and re-
mote and rural communities - through the improve-
ment and delivery of relevant education and training
programmes and systems including lifelong and dis-
tance learning.
d. implementing effective training and education, par-
ticularly in ICT science and technology, that motivates
and promotes participation and active involvement of
girls and women in the decision-making process of
building the Information Society.
e. paying special attention to the formulation of univer-
sal design concepts and the use of assistive technolo-
gies that promote access for all persons, including
those with disabilities.
f. promoting public policies aimed at providing afford-
able access at all levels, including community-level,
to hardware as well as software and connectivity
through an increasingly converging technological en-
vironment, capacity building and local content.
g. improving access to the world’s health knowledge and
telemedicine services, in particular in areas such as
global cooperation in emergency response, access to
and networking among health professionals to help
improve quality of life and environmental conditions.
h. building ICT capacities to improve access and use of
postal networks and services.
i. using ICTs to improve access to agricultural knowl-
edge, combat poverty, and support production of and
access to locally relevant agriculture-related content.
j. developing and implementing e-government applica-
tions based on open standards in order to enhance
the growth and interoperability of e-government sys-
tems, at all levels, thereby furthering access to gov-
ernment information and services, and contributing to
building ICT networks and developing services that are
available anywhere and anytime, to anyone and on any
device.
k. supporting educational, scientific, and cultural insti-
tutions, including libraries, archives and museums, in
their role of developing, providing equitable, open and
affordable access to, and preserving diverse and var-
ied content, including in digital form, to support infor-
mal and formal education, research and innovation;
and in particular supporting libraries in their public-
service role of providing free and equitable access to
information and of improving ICT literacy and commu-
nity connectivity, particularly in underserved commu-
nities.
l. enhancing the capacity of communities in all regions
to develop content in local and/or indigenous lan-
guages.
m. strengthening the creation of quality e-content, on
national, regional and international levels.
n. promoting the use of traditional and new media in or-
der to foster universal access to information, culture
and knowledge for all people, especially vulnerable
populations and populations in developing countries
and using, inter alia, radio and television as educa-
tional and learning tools.
o. reaffirming the independence, pluralism and diversity
of media, and freedom of information including
through, as appropriate, the development of domestic
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legislation, we reiterate our call for the responsible use
and treatment of information by the media in accord-
ance with the highest ethical and professional stand-
ards. We reaffirm the necessity of reducing interna-
tional imbalances affecting the media, particularly as
regards infrastructure, technical resources and the de-
velopment of human skills. These reaffirmations are
made with reference to Geneva Declaration of Princi-
ples paragraphs 55 to 59.
p. strongly encouraging ICT enterprises and entrepre-
neurs to develop and use environment-friendly pro-
duction processes in order to minimize the negative
impacts of the use and manufacture of ICTs and dis-
posal of ICT waste on people and the environment. In
this context, it is important to give particular atten-
tion to the specific needs of the developing countries.
q. incorporating regulatory, self-regulatory, and other ef-
fective policies and frameworks to protect children and
young people from abuse and exploitation through ICTs
into national plans of action and e-strategies.
r. promoting the development of advanced research
networks, at national, regional and international lev-
els, in order to improve collaboration in science, tech-
nology and higher education.
s. promoting voluntary service, at the community level,
to help maximize the developmental impact of ICTs.
t. promoting the use of ICTs to enhance flexible ways of
working, including teleworking, leading to greater pro-
ductivity and job creation.
119.
We commit ourselves to review and follow up progress in
bridging the digital divide, taking into account the differ-
ent levels of development among nations, so as to achieve
the internationally agreed development goals and objec-
tives, including the Millennium Development Goals, as-
sessing the effectiveness of investment and international
cooperation efforts in building the Information Society,
identifying gaps as well as deficits in investment and de-
vising strategies to address them.
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ANNEX 4:
References
The main WSIS documents are available from the WSIS
website, which is maintained by the ITU. The overall URL
is www.itu.int/wsis. Different sections of this website pro-
vide access to:
• The four WSIS output documents
• The reports of the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms
and the Working Group on Internet Governance (on the
latter, see also www.wgig.org)
• The proceedings of the two full Summit sessions
• The proceedings of the preparatory process, including
the PrepComs and the regional preparatory meetings
• Participant lists in all summit fora
• A variety of other summit-related material.
The site also provides access to materials generated by
the follow-up processes to WSIS, including the post-WSIS
action lines. The Internet Governance Forum maintains a
site at www.intgovforum.org, while the first IGF meeting
is also recorded at www.igfgreece2006.gr.
The following list notes the URLs for a number of organi-
sations’ work on WSIS, where this has significant bearing
on the report above.
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